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Abstract
This thesis examines whether Rawls or Dworkin’s theory of justice is better
at justifying restrictions on wealth inheritance in a liberal democracy. It
sets out to argue that Dworkin’s theory is better suited to guide a liberal
democracy on justifying restrictions on wealth inheritance than Rawls’s
theory. This argument begins by proposing that the extant literature re-
flects a conflict between three intuitive judgements about what matters for
the justice of restricting wealth inheritance in a liberal democracy. As a
result the successful theory will have fewer disadvantages and more advan-
tages in its impartial justification for restricting wealth inheritance to the
liberal, opportunity and luck intuition.
This thesis examines Rawls and Dworkin’s theories because both the-
orists propose views that aim to be impartial and justifiable in a liberal
democratic society. They both aim to cater to the associated concerns of
protecting individual liberty and guaranteeing social equality. I examine
both theories on this aim in three metrics. First I consider their internal
coherency. In doing so I examine the coherency of Rawls’s principles when
they aim to treat social class and wealth inheritance differently. I then
explore the coherency of Dworkin’s prescriptions with the expectations in-
dividuals have in a liberal democracy. The second metric I consider is the
ability of either theory to cater to each of the three relevant intuitions.
This involves examining the scope of Rawls and Dworkin’s theories and
their competency in satisfying the concerns of the luck intuition. Lastly
I consider the impartiality of the theories as the third metric. As such,
I consider how well Rawls and Dworkin give equal consideration to the
associated concerns of the opportunity and luck intuition.
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Introduction
How should liberal democratic societies justify restricting wealth inher-
itance? This question is at the forefront of this thesis. It seems they
should endorse a course of action consistent with a theory of justice. I of-
fer an examination of the respective advantages and disadvantages between
John Rawls’s “Justice as Fairness” and Ronald Dworkin’s luck-egalitarian
“Equality of Resources”. I argue that Dworkin’s theory is better than
Rawls’s theory for the purpose of justifying restrictions on wealth inher-
itance in a liberal democratic society. This is because Dworkin’s theory
justifies its restriction to a broad range of associate intuitions more equally
than Rawls’s theory.
Why is wealth inheritance significant for justice?1 I submit that wealth
inheritance is of philosophical interest and needs to be evaluated from the
perspective of justice for its contribution to the extreme nature of wealth
inequality in liberal democratic societies and elsewhere.2 The extreme
1Ann Mumford (2007) suggests another alternative. She suggests a sociological
analysis that argues in favour of restricting wealth inheritance by analysing how liberal
democratic societies understand the supposed fairness of progressive taxes and helping
‘the poor’ by taxing the rich. Ezra Hasson (2013) has also explored the effect of gender
relations on the legal act of will-making and bequeathing.
2It seems that if inequality of wealth is extreme then it must necessarily be an
inequality of welfare. However, for liberal democracies particularly in the post-war
era, growing and maintaining the well-being of citizens at an acceptable level has been
accepted as a requirement for good governance. Almost all liberal democracies have
some form of social safety net, that either prevents individuals from descending to a
diminished state of well-being or ensure efficient systems are in place to help those who
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nature of wealth inequality is evidenced best in the most popular statistic
of the current zeitgeist which is the percentage share of wealth held by
those in the top one percent of wealth holders in the United States. As
of 2010, in the United States of America individuals who were in the one
percent of the population who held the most wealth, also held a little over
one third of the financial assets and made a little over one third of the
total household net worth (Keister 2014; Keister and Lee 2014). Another
statistic that adds to the importance of wealth inequality is that, as of
2013, less than one percent of the world’s adult population owned more
than forty percent of the world’s wealth (Keating et al. 2013: 22). This one
percent of the world’s adult population holds more than thirteen times the
wealth that two-thirds of the world’s adult population holds. The extreme
nature of this inequality is hard to ignore.
Recent research of various western liberal democratic economies sug-
gest that cuts in capital taxation have contributed to the rise in wealth
inequality (Alvaredo et al. 2013: 4–6, 12–14). This would indicate that
a rise in inequality in liberal democracies, and the world, is linked to the
rise in inherited wealth due to cuts in the top marginal tax rate and cuts
in capital gains taxes. Furthermore, recent analysis and comparison of
economic models of wealth inequality, both inside and outside the United
States, have indicated that wealth inheritance contributes much more to
the wealth share of the richest one percent of wealth holders than for the
poorest fifty percent of wealth holders (Cagetti and Nardi 2008; Gokhale
and Villarreal 2006).
The next question that suggests itself is why Rawls and Dworkin should
be included in this analysis of wealth inheritance at the exclusion of others?
do end up with intolerably low levels of well-being. Inequality in wealth has grown
in liberal democracies to an extent where despite serious concerns for the welfare of
citizens diminishing or being incorporated into a system of social protection, some
groups of individuals persistently possess vastly more wealth than the great majority of
individuals. It seems this requires some explanation which is independent of an analysis
of individual welfare.
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Rawls and Dworkin are included in this analysis for the simple reason that
both argue for unified theories of justice in a democratic society.3 As Rawls
and Dworkin say:
. . . justice as fairness is to provide an acceptable philosophical
and moral basis for democratic institutions. . . (Rawls 2001: 5)
What political institutions and processes should an egalitarian
community have? I assume that the community is large and
complex and so must be governed by the decisions of represen-
tative officials rather than by separate decisions, case by case,
of the whole community. (Dworkin 2000: 184)
It may seem self-evident that a society committed to equal con-
cern must be a democracy rather than, for example, a monarchy
or dictatorship or oligarchy. (Dworkin 2000: 185)
Both Rawls and Dworkin see their theories as existing within and being
justifiable to the citizens of a liberal democratic society.4 Rawls conceives
of liberal society as a mosaic of different normative judgements with dis-
agreeing intuitive convictions. Rawls (2001: 32–33) argues that if a liberal
democracy is conceived as a society of free and equal persons engaged in a
fair system of co-operation then a process of reflective equilibrium will re-
sult in an overlapping consensus on a shared justifiable political conception
of justice. Rawls expects his theory of justice to be justifiable to a broad
3Given the scope of the contemporary literature and of Rawls and Dworkin’s theory,
this thesis is focused on wealth inheritance in liberal democratic societies. This does not
mean that wealth inheritance is philosophically uninteresting in illiberal non-democratic
societies, but only that arguments to restrict wealth inheritance in those societies would
be perhaps appropriate or consistent only in those societies. Democratic institutions
organised on the general principle of individuals to be governed by free consent, requires
normative judgements and an analysis of wealth inheritance that is appropriate to a
society with such institutions.
4The same expectancy does not appear in Robert Nozick (2013) or Michael Otsuka’s
(2003) libertarianism, Amartya Sen’s (2010) equality of capability or even Gerald Co-
hen’s luck-egalitarianism (2011).
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range of disagreeing judgements about how social institutions should be
organised. Dworkin (2000: 128, 148) proposes that, if a liberal democratic
society accepts the “abstract egalitarian principle” and the “principle of
abstraction”, then it also accepts equality as a political ideal. This means
that the society accepts that governments should show equal concern to
all individuals, and that individuals should be free to act as they wish con-
strained only by the need for society to show equal concern for the life and
property of all individuals. However, Dworkin’s principles are not absolute
principles for political action. Rather they are background principles that
Dworkin believes most, if not all, liberal democracies would accept after
reasoned reflection. Dworkin (2000: 154–155) argues that his background
principles entail a theory of justice that is broadly justifiable to a range of
disagreeing convictions on how a society should be organised.
But given the limitations of space I will not argue the merits or deficien-
cies of any particular theory of democracy. I will not endorse either Rawls’s
conception of a “property-owning” democracy, or Dworkin’s “dependent”
conception of democracy (Rawls 2001: 135; Dworkin 2000: 203–204). I
will however make an assumption about the democracy that frames this
debate which both Rawls and Dworkin have in common.5 This is that a
democracy to some extent requires a decision making procedure that is
acceptable to all, which is impartial to the intuitive normative judgements
that individuals hold. This means that the comparative analysis of this
thesis will be framed within a democratic society that requires restrictions
on wealth inheritance to be equally justifiable to a range of disagreeing
intuitions about the justice of restricting wealth inheritance.6
5This assumption is an implicit endorsement of “democratic pluralism”. By this I
mean the type of reasonable disagreement that Joshua Cohen (2003: 18) refers to as
“reasonable pluralism” or what Thomas Christiano (2003: 42–44) refers to by his view
of “Equal Consideration of Interests” or even what David Estlund (2003: 71) refers to
as “conscientious disagreement” in a liberal democracy.
6Matthew Clayton (2012: 104–105) follows a similar interpretation and compares
Rawls and Dworkin’s theories as examples of anti-perfectionist liberal-egalitarians.
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But, what are these disagreeing intuitions? Specifically, what are the
relevant intuitions for justifying restrictions on wealth inheritance? I sub-
mit there are three relevant intuitions: the liberal, opportunity and luck
intuition. In the following section I clarify these intuitions by showing
how they are reflected in the contemporary discussion on the justice of
restricting wealth inheritance.
1 A Brief Taxonomy
As I mentioned above, this thesis will be a comparative analysis of how well
Rawls and Dworkin justify restricting wealth inheritance to three relevant
disagreeing intuitions in a liberal democracy. These intuitions, although
not exhaustive provide a useful starting point to analyse how wealth in-
heritance should be approached in a democracy. In this section I clarify
these intuitions by classifying theorists in the contemporary debate about
wealth inheritance into theorists who seek to either satisfy the liberal, op-
portunity or luck intuition.7 Each intuition draws on a set of concepts and
pre-theoretic normative judgements about what matters for the justice of
inheriting wealth and any restriction of it in a liberal democratic society.
While similar to the project I propose in this thesis, Clayton’s comparison does not
draw out the normative intuitions that must be satisfied and attempt an analysis of
whether Rawls or Dworkin’s theories is better at justifying restrictions on wealth.
7Two intuitions that are not included in the taxonomy are the welfare and efficiency
intuitions. The welfare intuition is a commitment to a set of pre-theoretic concepts
and judgements that emphasise the political significance of individual or social well-
being of inheritors and bequeathers. The efficiency intuition is more a justificatory
condition that is used by some theorist to justify their normative judgements about the
legitimacy of inheritance taxation in itself or at certain rates. The efficiency intuition
is a pre-theoretic judgement that all that what is intuitively significant for restricting
wealth inheritance is the efficiency of the restrictions to achieving a given end. Very
few theorists, at least in the contemporary literature, are committed solely to one of
these two intuitions. These intuitions are either commitments that help to justify a
judgement or form a complimentary commitment to the opportunity intuition.
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The liberal intuition expresses the intuitive judgement that the liberty and
freedom of bequeathers and inheritors is what matters most when deter-
mining how it is, or can be, just to restrict wealth inheritance. This intu-
ition is a pre-theoretic judgement about whether the restrictions on wealth
inheritance maintain the freedom of individuals to accumulate and dispose
wealth. The opportunity intuition expresses the intuitive judgement that
a measure to restrict wealth is consistent with justice if the opportunities
for bequeathers and inheritors to accumulate and dispose wealth are equal.
This is a pre-theoretic judgement about whether individuals with the same
formal freedoms have an equal chance to exercise their formal freedoms.
The luck intuition expresses the judgement that choice as opposed to luck
should determine how wealth is distributed regardless of whether it is in-
herited or bequeathed. The luck intuition considers wealth inheritance to
be a matter of luck, for which individuals should not be held responsible
whether they inherit wealth or not. The following taxonomy will show how
these intuitions are reflected in some of the leading theorists in the con-
temporary literature surrounding the justice of permitting or restricting
wealth inheritance.
The Liberal Intuition
Gordon Tullock (1971) is perhaps the earliest contemporary theorist who
argues that we should reject confiscatory inheritance taxes, which pro-
gressively transfers a piece of private property into state ownership. By
“confiscatory” taxes, I refer to steep progressive inheritance taxation that
rises steeply based on either the age or size of the property being inher-
ited. Tullock’s perspective can be understood as two arguments about
inheritance taxation.
Tullock first argues that a society with a laissez-faire economy with no
government policy of income redistribution, is much better at achieving our
egalitarian aims if it permits wealth inheritance than if it does not. Tullock
(1971: 472) argues that a society that permits wealth inheritance allows
11
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for capital accumulation that may benefit both the government and the
inheritors. Tullock believes that imposing steep progressive inheritance
taxes would in effect raise no revenue at all because individuals would
spend their wealth before their death. According to Tullock these taxes
would also fail to transmit any wealth on to inheritors that truly require
some advantage from their ancestors in order to remain competitive in a
laissez-faire economy (Tullock 1971: 471).8
Tullock’s second argument is that inheritance taxes are preferable if
they are set at the most efficient level to raise the most revenue but also
encourage individuals to produce and accumulate wealth (Tullock 1971:
472). In this regard Tullock is more in favour, not of a steep progressive
inheritance tax, but of either a flat or very gradually progressive income
tax. These taxes according to Tullock would both raise revenue for the
purpose of redistribution but also allow individuals to accumulate wealth so
as not to burden the state in old age and allow some freedom for individuals
to better the condition of their descendants.
Tullock’s arguments emphasise the intuitive importance of individuals
having the freedom to accumulate and pass on wealth to future genera-
tions. Tullock’s perspective is grounded in a conception of society that
creates efficient ways for individuals to help themselves and help their de-
scendants. The primary concern of Tullock’s arguments is the protection
of a bequeather’s liberty to dispose their property.
Like Tullock, Edward McCaffery (1994) argues against inheritance tax-
ation. But unlike Tullock he argues not only that it is an inefficient in-
strument of government but that it is illegitimate in a liberal democracy.
8Tullock (1971: 472–473) concedes that if a society truly wishes to express its egal-
itarian values in public policy, then even in a society with a laissez-faire economy an
income tax system would be a more efficient economic instrument to raise revenue than
a tax on wealth. Tullock argues this is more effective, if the reason to impose a con-
fiscatory inheritance tax is to empower the individual who inherits nothing. This sort
of taxation would not disincentivise individuals to save and yet would allow a constant
stock of private property to be redistributed if necessary.
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To this end, McCaffery argues in favour of a consumption tax.9 McCaf-
fery argues against inheritance taxation on two grounds. Firstly he argues
that inheritance taxation at least in the more moderate non-confiscatory
way that it is adopted is not “furthering liberal values and principles”
(McCaffery 1994: 286).10 McCaffery argues that this is because inheri-
tance taxation incentivises bequeathing private property before death and
conspicuous consumption. Both acts increase inequality of opportunity
because a large part of the inheritance tax can be avoided if individuals
gift private property well before their death yet control the property un-
til their death. Conspicuous consumption on the other hand can directly
increase the inequality of opportunity in the market if wealthy individuals
spend their wealth before death such that “It can drive up the costs of
basic sustenance” (1994: 291). It is the distortion of the marketplace by
conspicuous consumption without saving that can actually lead to less op-
portunities for the less wealthy to compete. Much like Tullock’s argument,
McCaffery’s argument against inheritance taxation is dependent on a con-
ception of what is intuitively significant in a liberal democracy. McCaffery
is concerned that an inheritance tax conflicts with the intuitive preference
that individuals in liberal democracies have for a free undistorted market-
place where individuals can have the same freedom to accumulate and save
as any other individual.11
9McCaffery’s argument mirrors the current status of inheritance taxes world wide,
where most OECD and developing nations have either abolished inheritance taxes, or
instituted very minimal estate taxes (Rij and Helmer 2013). The taxing of income
rather than wealth has become the preferred instrument of liberal egalitarian societies
to redistribute resources.
10Although it is not entirely clear what McCaffery means by “liberal values” he
appears to refer to the fundamental commitment of liberal societies to the freedom of
individuals to use themselves and their property as they desire.
11Barry Bracewell-Milnes (1997) is another theorist who joins McCaffery by argu-
ing for the political legitimacy of wealth inheritance as a social practice because of
its efficiency in distributing wealth. Bracewell-Milnes argues that inheritance taxa-
tion is costly because it diminishes the incentive for individuals to save and hence
13
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Pace Tullock and McCaffery, Daniel Halliday (2012) defends the legit-
imacy of inheritance taxation as an economic measure to restrict property
bequests. Halliday argues that whilst inheritance taxation has become
increasingly unpopular in liberal democracies, it is a legitimate economic
instrument to reduce inequality, of opportunity, resources and for the dis-
persal of wealth concentration. This is because bequests have a lower op-
portunity cost than property that has already been inherited. Halliday’s
argument rests on the intuitive normative judgement that any restriction
on this liberty over their private property is only preferable if it does not
lessen the range of opportunities open to an individual in their lifetime.
Halliday (2012: 630) argues that:
When we note that a bequeather and a gift-giver are both sub-
jectively determining the value of transferring their property
over the alternatives, we risk overlooking the way in which a
bequeather will, other things being equal, have already had op-
portunity to derive utility from the property in question, when
they occupied the place of the gift-giver.
Halliday’s argument in short is that the opportunities available to a be-
queather to gift or disperse their wealth before their death are less nu-
merous and less valuable to individuals than after the bequeather’s death.
Halliday argues that this lower opportunity cost means that inheritance
grow wealth for society’s benefit. This is because wealth inheritance itself according to
Bracewell-Milnes (1997: 163–164) is a costless form of wealth creation that increases
the subjective value of a piece of property. Bracewell-Milnes believes that through the
institution of inheritance wealth can grow in subjective value since it is a form of sav-
ing that is never drawn down and which always provides a stable level of consumption
for the owner and their descendants. Bracewell-Milnes (1997: 163) argues that wealth
inheritance perfectly fulfils the general desires of ownership that savers have. Bracewell-
Milne’s judgement that wealth inheritance is preferable to any measure that restricts it
is grounded in the intuition that society should not impede the individual preference to
save and accumulate property and that governments should assist, rather than impede,
individuals to pursue this end.
14
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taxation as a wealth transfer tax is at best less coercive or at worst as
equally coercive as other forms of taxation. Pace McCaffery, Halliday ar-
gues that describing the virtue of social links is no justification for the
illegitimacy of inheritance taxation, because gifting before death allows
for far more potential social links outside one’s immediate family.
It is reasonable to conclude that Halliday, Bracewell-Milnes, McCaffery
and Tullock all engage with wealth inheritance by either defending or op-
posing the taxation of inherited or bequeathed wealth to cater to the liberal
intuition. Aside from Halliday, these theorists satisfy the liberal intuition
by justifying very little restrictions on wealth inheritance either because of
the political illegitimacy of inheritance taxation or its inefficiency.
The Opportunity Intuition
David Haslett (1986; 1997) is one contemporary theorist who argues for
the legitimacy of inheritance taxation12 and the social practice of inheri-
12Two of the earliest theorists to propose an inheritance tax were Ernest Solvay and
Eugenio Rignano at the turn of the century. For Solvay an inheritance tax was efficient
because it would replace many income taxes and it would increase the total revenue
of the state by slowly deincentivising the transfer of wealth through inheritance and
incentivising the use of wealth in the economy (Solvay 1897: 407 as cited in Erreygers
and Bartolomeo 2007: 615; Lafaye 2008: 27). Rignano (1925: 31) believed an inheri-
tance tax was a legitimate political and economic instrument after the First World War
in order “to modify the distributive system in the direction of greater justice without
causing violent and disastrous crises in production”. For Rignano (1925: 34) an inher-
itance tax that progressively rose higher every time a piece of property was inherited
was an efficient method of redistribution that did not require any radical revolution. An
inheritance tax as opposed to an income tax does not limit the incentive of individuals
to create wealth since the inheritance tax only comes into effect when an individual in-
herits rather than bequeaths. Rignano believed that the accumulation of wealth ought
to be left to the individual initiative but that the state had legitimate claim on taxing
inherited wealth. Rignano (1925: 129) believed that his more minimal programme could
be suitable for liberal democracies where the nationalisation of the means of production
was not democratically popular. Rignano believed that a more robust welfare system to
fix the inequality of resources and life prospects created by an economy advantageous
15
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tance with a strong emphasis on the political significance of increasing the
equality of opportunity and reducing concentrations of wealth.13 Haslett’s
(1986: 127; 1997: 140) argument is premised on three claims. Firstly that
in liberal democracies the well-being of each individual is dependent on
their ability to be productive in accordance with their preferences. Sec-
ondly that any inequality in the opportunity to be productive undermines
an individual’s reason to be a productive member of their society. Thirdly,
that wealth inheritance is a cause of inequality in an individual’s oppor-
tunity to be productive in the marketplace and therefore to fulfil their
preferences. Haslett concludes that some restriction must be placed on the
act of wealth inheritance. Haslett’s normative suggestion is a limit on the
right to bequest based on the age of the property being bequeathed and a
lifetime quota for individual bequests.14 Haslett’s pre-theoretic judgement
to capital owners, could be funded by an inheritance tax rather than a high income tax.
13The conceptual roots of a political restriction on the right to bequeath or inherit
is found in the work of John Stuart Mill (1864) and Francois Huet (Huet 1853; cited
in Cunliffe and Erreygers 1999; Cunliffe and Erreygers 2003; Erreygers and Bartolomeo
2007; Lafaye 2008). Both 19th century philosophers, argue for a political restriction on
the right to bequeath what one has been bequeathed. Huet and Mill both believe that
individuals should not be afforded complete liberty over a piece of private property they
have inherited. Whilst Mill (1864: 289) is more cautious in detailing how this restriction
on political rights should be enforced, Huet is clear that inherited wealth transferred
once, must be confiscated by the state to redistribute it when the inheritor dies (cited in
Erreygers and Bartolomeo 2007: 614). What is distinctive about both theorists is their
motivation for engaging with wealth inheritance. They are not motivated by a desire
for an optimal economic management of a society’s resources, but rather the desire to
resolve an inequality of opportunities in the free market by using some political measure.
Huet understands the inequality of opportunities resulting from wealth inheritance as
contrary to his belief that all individuals have a natural right to an equal share of
nature’s resources (Cunliffe and Erreygers 2003: 94–96).
14Caroline Lafaye (2008) is another theorist who proposes a restriction, in the way
that Haslett suggests to more efficiently disperse large concentrations of wealth. Lafaye’s
crucial contribution to the discussion is in recognising that the inheritance tax does
in many cases have the potential to sever social links that individuals wish to make
(Lafaye 2008: 32). Lafaye (2008: 32) contends that by enforcing a restriction on the
16
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is what grounds his insistence that a restriction on bequest, rather than
inheritance is legitimate. Haslett wants to preserve the opportunity for
individuals to accumulate wealth and the equal opportunity to do so.
Like Haslett, Lily Batchelder argues for a “comprehensive inheritance
tax”. Batchelder (2009: 2) argues that if one assumes a welfarist approach
to the role of a tax system, then that tax system ought to be concerned
with the welfare of all individuals equally. As such wealth transfer taxes
are a legitimate economic instrument to bring about an equal fulfilment of
a basic level of welfare for all individuals. Batchelder believes inheritance
taxation can be made efficient if it operates as another form of income tax
such that the receipt of inheritances should be treated as income that is
then taxed at a progressive rate like all other forms of income (Batchelder
2009: 62). In this way Batchelder distances herself from a commitment
to formal equality and is motivated by the intuitive significance of all
individuals being given an equal opportunity to shape and change their
welfare.15
right of bequest above a certain threshold, would force individuals to make social links
even within the family that are based on immaterial things such as the skill of self-
sufficiency. Lafaye’s position seems to be in reaction to the kinds of objections posed
by Janna Thompson (2001). Thompson (2001) argues that inheritance taxation is
politically legitimate only if it can ensure that the bonds between family members are
not broken. Thompson (2001: 128) argues that if individuals are unable to give gifts it
makes it impossible for families and societies to nurture a sense of shared heritage and
historical connection. Thompson does not argue against the effectiveness of inheritance
taxation or its consistency with a broad range of modern political and economic values.
Thompson (2001: 125) is concerned that steep confiscatory inheritance taxes will rob a
society of its ability to reproduce relations of justice between individuals if relations of
care between family members are effectively abolished.
15James Hines (2009: 203–204) is another theorist who largely agrees with Batchelder,
but emphasises one way in which Batchelder’s proposal may be modified. He proposes
that the tax be made efficient to increase the well-being of individuals and to break up
large concentrations of the wealth that may distort the market due to inequalities in
consumption. Hines is motivated then not just by the well-being of individuals but for
the inequality of consumption.
17
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Martin O’Neill (2007) responds to McCaffery’s general concern that in-
heritance taxation encourages individuals not to save and accumulate cap-
ital by arguing that this is an objection to the practicality of the taxation
and not its political legitimacy. O’Neill argues that inheritance taxation
can be, and is at least in the United Kingdom, applied in such a way that
it does not tax the majority of individuals but only those above a cer-
tain wealth threshold. Therefore taxation does not prevent the majority
of individuals from creating bonds between generations. O’Neill argues
that inheritance taxation is as legitimate a form of taxation as any form
of taxation because:
The money and property that we legitimately hold is in part
defined by, and results from, the operation of the whole complex
web of tax rules and regulations. (O’Neill 2007: 65)
O’Neill argues that progressive optimal taxation on wealth transfers can
both break concentrations of wealth and provide more opportunities for
those who inherit little to compete in the marketplace. O’Neill is motivated
by a strong commitment to the notion that what is of political significance
when discussing wealth inheritance is the ability of a society to redistribute
wealth so that liberal property rights are not violated and individuals still
have an equal opportunity of achieving social and economic positions.
The Luck Intuition
Anne Alstott, following her book The Stakeholder Society in 1999 with
Bruce Ackerman, argues in favour of inheritance taxation because it miti-
gates the luck of having poor ancestors. Alstott argues that individuals are
not morally responsible for the advantages or the disadvantages of wealth
inheritance because they have not chosen to inherit. Alstott argues that
equalising opportunity should be interpreted not as equalising the range of
choices that individuals might have, but as holding individuals responsible
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for the choices they do make.16 Alstott’s interpretation is clear when she
writes in 2007:
. . . the starting point for each individual is the threshold of
adulthood - the point at which she can make choices and should
be held responsible for their consequences. Childhood is taken
to be a time for nurture and education - for the development of
the capacities one needs to make choices about one’s vision of
the good - and the equality of resources ideal suggests that ev-
ery child should receive an equal investment. At adulthood, the
process of development is taken to be finished, and each indi-
vidual accedes to her equal share of material resources. (Alstott
2007: 486)
Alstott argues that if the purpose of the inheritance tax is to benefit indi-
viduals who do not inherit then it must not be seen as a tax on the virtue
of saving and capital accumulation, but rather on the concentration of
wealth (Alstott 2007: 505). Therefore a lifetime exemption on inheritance
up to a certain amount would ensure that individuals may accumulate
wealth whilst prevent large concentrations of wealth. Alstott believes an
expanded inheritance tax - or accessions tax - that raises revenue at an
economically optimal rate would work well in funding a public inheritance
fund in order to provide, those who inherit little or nothing, a form of
social inheritance. Alstott’s suggestion entails that intelligent individuals
may accumulate large concentrations of wealth and have more opportu-
nities than others. For Alstott this is permissible if those individuals are
genuinely responsible for their larger set of opportunities. This largely
conforms to Alstott and Ackerman’s recommendations in 1999. The pull
of the luck intuition is clear in Alstott’s normative claims. It is the intu-
16This intuitive emphasis on choice is the same intuition that Christopher Lake (2001:
5, 12) labels the “egalitarian intuition” when he attempts to clarify what pushes theo-
rists to make certain claims about justice that are rooted in their views about equality
and responsibility.
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itive appeal of compensating individuals for the role of luck in not allowing
individual to live the life they choose, that forces Alstott to judge in favour
of inheritance taxation.
The Results of the Taxonomy
The above taxonomy reveals the contemporary discussion as complex but
intelligible if understood through the framework of the liberal, opportu-
nity and luck intuitions. Without this framework it is not clear with whom
theorists are arguing or how they justify their arguments. The three polit-
ical intuitions used to classify the literature highlight the most significant
intuitions that motivate the conflicting normative proposals. Theorists
committed or motivated by the liberal intuition are concerned with the
effect of any restriction of wealth inheritance on an individual’s formal
freedoms. Theorists committed to the opportunity intuition seem to have
a conceptually prior concern, namely the equal chance of individuals to ex-
ercise their formal freedoms. The lone contemporary theorist committed
to the luck intuition is concerned with whether any restriction on wealth
inheritance appropriately holds individuals responsible for the opportuni-
ties they actually choose. The intuitive disagreement between these three
groups cannot be resolved by merely perfecting or repeated criticism.
I submit that these three groups of disagreeing perspectives on restrict-
ing wealth inheritance reflect the disagreeing convictions of individuals and
organisations in a democracy. Therefore a normative perspective on the
justice of restricting wealth inheritance must be justifiable to these dis-
agreeing group of intuitive convictions. To this end, a more comprehensive
inquiry is needed into what restriction of wealth is justifiable to a broad
range of disagreeing perspectives in a democracy. I submit that Rawls and
Dworkin’s theories are best suited to this inquiry, because they both ex-
pect to justify their theories of distributive justice to a range of disagreeing
perspectives in a democracy.17 The following chapter argues that the three
17Other contemporary theories of justice are not included as candidates because they
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intuitions in the taxonomy above necessarily conflict. It is this conflict I
argue that reflects the disagreements in liberal society between competing
conceptions of just restrictions on wealth inheritance.
2 Methodology
The taxonomy above shows that the three relevant intuitions to which
Rawls and Dworkin justify their restriction of wealth inheritance are re-
flected in a seemingly intractable discussion about the justice of wealth
inheritance. I believe these disagreeing intuitions encapsulate and ground
some of the conflicting normative perspectives on restricting wealth inher-
itance in liberal democracies. So far we have established the framework of
this thesis thusly: Rawls and Dworkin are selected at the exclusion of oth-
ers because they attempt to justify their theories in a liberal democracy,
which for the purposes of this thesis is a society which at the very least en-
dorses a reasonable pluralism about competing normative positions. These
positions include, again in the context of this thesis, three normative in-
tuitions on what matters for the justice of restricting wealth inheritance,
namely the liberal, opportunity and luck intuition.
But the question that now presents itself is: how will we compare the
ways Rawls and Dworkin go about justifying their restriction on wealth
inheritance to these normative intuitions? In other words, what is the
methodology of this thesis? As I alluded to earlier, I offer a comparative
analysis which I hope to conclude in favour of Dworkin’s theory. But what
do not appear to impartially cater to the liberal, opportunity and luck intuition. Robert
Nozick’s (2013) theory intends to cater only to the liberal intuition and so would be
partial to justifying only those normative judgements that liberal democracies should
leave wealth inheritance unregulated or evolve purely on the basis of individual decisions.
Gerald Cohen’s (2011) version of luck-egalitarianism intends to cater only to the luck
and opportunity intuition in such a way that is partial to the judgement that liberal
democracies should redistribute vast amounts of wealth and restrict the institution of
wealth inheritance.
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are the metrics of this analysis? I submit three metrics.
1. Internal coherency: This is defined as the internal coherency of a
theory’s theses and motivations after any modifications.
2. Justifiability to each intuition: This is defined as the attempt of a
theory of justice to answer rather than ignore the normative concerns
associated with each intuition.
3. Broad or Equal Justifiability to all three intuitions: This is defined
as the ability of a theory to give equal weight to all three intuitions.
The first metric is perhaps both the most crucial but will also be the least
likely to separate Rawls and Dworkin in the analysis. Internal coherency
will involve, judging whether Rawls and Dworkin can maintain a coher-
ent set of normative propositions and definitions about restricting wealth
inheritance. These definitions will include the concepts that Rawls and
Dworkin use to construct their principles. Internal coherency will also in-
clude, judging whether the conclusions that Rawls and Dworkin draw are
consistent with their own motivations and the motivation of proposing a
theory of justice in a democratic society. This will mean that a modi-
fication that makes a theory incoherent with respect to its principles or
its initial motivations will be ruled out as unsuccessful. While I believe
maintaining internal coherency will be crucial it will be unlikely to rule out
Rawls or Dworkin given that both theories have unified plausible aims.
The second metric is how well Rawls or Dworkin answer the three
relevant normative intuitions. This is a judgement about whether the
modifications to Rawls or Dworkin’s theories forces either theory to ignore
one of the normative intuitions. This can occur if a modification rejects
a principle that previously answered a normative concern of an intuition
or if it changes the scope of a principle to shift its focus away from one
intuition to another. In either case this will count as a significant cost to the
candidate theory. This is because the aim of this thesis is to compare how
Rawls and Dworkin justify their theories to the three normative intuitions.
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If even one of the intuitions is ignored then it shows that the candidate
theory in question has not justified its restriction of wealth inheritance to
the three relevant intuitive convictions in a democracy.
The third metric is perhaps what will clearly separate Rawls and
Dworkin’s theories in the comparative analysis. This is because the third
metric is a judgement of how well the theories justify restricting wealth
inheritance in three ways, namely how much weight they give to each of
our three relevant normative intuitions. This metric judges how well Rawls
and Dworkin can balance the normative concerns of competing intuitions
without prioritising one intuition vastly above the others. This will mean
that even if Rawls or Dworkin’s theories answered the normative concerns
of all three intuitions they could still have costs if they choose to give more
weight to one intuition more than the others. In effect, this will mean
the candidate theory is not as impartial between the personal normative
convictions of citizens as is required in a democracy.18 Deciding how well
18This method is similar to the Canberra Plan method of resolving metaphysical
disputes. It is similar because it uses intuitions as a primary tool to analyse and decide
between competing theories. Canberra Plan conceptual analysis largely consists of three
parts (Jackson 1998: 35–36; Braddon-Mitchell and Nola 2009: 5–9). First one looks to
the folk or common-sense concepts or institutions that describe certain phenomenon or
entity as real. Using these concepts we remove the theoretical or contested terms by
replacing them with bound variables. This process fixes the relationship between those
terms in our folk theory that are contested and those which are not. Then we look at our
best scientific theories for entities or phenomena that play the roles the bound variables
play in our folk theory. This last step might show that what is real is more rich and
complex than our folk theory or that our folk theory may be false. What is significant
for our purposes is that those who use the Canberra Plan methodology believe the best
way to arrive at our initial cluster of concepts is to look to our intuitions. As Jackson
(1998: 135) says:
Moreover, we must start from somewhere in current folk morality, other-
wise we start from somewhere unintuitive, and that can hardly be a good
place to start from. And we must seek a theory that stands up to critical
reflection: it can hardly be desirable to end up with a theory that fails to
stand up to critical reflection.
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Rawls or Dworkin do this will be a matter of how they can maintain an
equal focus on all three intuitions while solving any problems but not de-
parting too far from their original motivations.
3 An Overview
I now hope the core elements of this thesis are clear, namely the framework
and the methodology. I aim to suggest that Dworkin’s theory of justice
is better at justifying restricting wealth inheritance in a liberal democracy
than Rawls’s theory. I argue this on the grounds that Dworkin’s theory
is less costly in justifying restrictions on wealth inheritance equally to all
three intuitions. My approach to that conclusion will be the following way.
Chapter 1 will introduce Rawls and Dworkin’s theories of justice and
how each justifies restrictions on wealth inheritance differently. The chap-
ter will also clarify two sets of distinctions. First a clarification of the
three distinct political intuitions that must be catered for by Rawls and
Dworkin’s theories. Second, wealth inheritance itself will be analysed into
two distinct formal relations that must be given equal priority by a theory
of justice.
Chapter 2 will critically analyse Rawls’s theory with respect to three
objections. This analysis will conclude that Rawls’s original theory cannot
justify restricting wealth inheritance to the opportunity and luck intuition
coherently without modification. Firstly I will critique the consistency
My methodology differs from Canberra conceptual analysis in a number of ways. I do
not revise or discount intuitions if they depart from our empirical observations. Any
failure of Rawls and Dworkin’s theories to account for the three intuitions is a cost for
Rawls and Dworkin and not our initial intuitions. I use the intuitions as fixed entities,
which a candidate theory must satisfy by answering the normative concerns of those
individuals in a democratic society who hold the particular normative intuition. In
some sense the role of theories and intuitions is reversed in my methodology, because
the theories are tested for their impartiality towards the intuitions as opposed to testing
the intuitions themselves.
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of Rawls’s position towards the arbitrariness of social class and wealth
inheritance. An objection is then borrowed from Gerald Cohen (2008) as
to whether Rawls’s basic structure can justify the difference principle and
its scope. Finally, I will discuss Iris Marion Young’s objection that Rawls’s
basic structure of social institutions is too narrow to appropriately propose
a conception of justice in a liberal democracy.
Chapter 3 will critically analyse Dworkin’s theory with respect to three
objections. I argue in the analysis that Dworkin’s original theory can-
not coherently justify restricting wealth inheritance. Firstly, I will discuss
the Harshness Problem which argues that Dworkin’s theory is incoherent
with respect to the motivations and expectation of proportionate treat-
ment. Secondly, I will discuss the Wrong Focus Objection which argues
that Dworkin’s theory focus on the wrong subject in its pursuit to restrict
wealth inheritance by equalising resources. Thirdly I will discuss Gerald
Cohen’s (2011) challenge that Dworkin’s theory makes an incoherent dis-
tinction between preference and circumstance.
Chapter 4 will attempt to resolve the internal problems and the external
challenges posed to Rawls and Dworkin’s theories. I first offer solutions to
the Distinction Problem and then Young’s Structural Injustice Problem.
I then offer defences of Dworkin’s theory against Cohen’s theory of Equal
Access to Advantage.
Chapter 5 attempts the final step of the comparative analysis by ad-
dressing the benefits that each solution provides and the costs they inflict.
I argue that Rawls’s theory, once it adopts the solutions I offer, does not
balance the normative concerns of all three intuitions. I argue that Rawls
prioritises the luck intuition above the liberal intuition and then the op-
portunity intuition above the luck intuition. In contrast I argue Dworkin’s
theory only prioritises the opportunity and luck intuition slightly above the
liberal intuition. In sum, Dworkin’s theory is less costly because it bal-
ances the normative concerns of those who hold each of the three intuitions
better than Rawls’s theory.
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Intuitions, Relations and
Candidate Theories
In the Introduction I outlined the landscape of normative judgements, both
philosophical and broader, on wealth inheritance. The landscape is com-
plex, with deep disagreement on how and why liberal democratic societies
should restrict wealth inheritance. To understand this complex landscape,
I introduced three political intuitions to organise the contemporary litera-
ture. These intuitions offer a way to understand the intuitive judgements
that theorists are committed to and how these judgements conflict. The
intuitions are detailed further in this chapter.
However, using the political intuitions to order the literature did not
in itself reveal any plausible way to resolve the conflicting judgements in
a liberal democracy. This chapter presents two candidate theories to solve
this problem. Rawls and Dworkin’s theories attempt to prescribe broadly
justifiable principles for restricting wealth inheritance in a liberal democ-
racy. Rawls and Dworkin’s theories are selected as candidates because they
are conceptions of justice that attempt to justify normative principles to
a broad range of political intuitions in a liberal democracy. To this end,
Rawls and Dworkin’s theories must be acceptable or at least cater to the
three political intuitions that reveal the intuitive commitments of disagree-
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ing theorists in the contemporary debate about wealth inheritance. This
chapter argues that both Rawls and Dworkin’s theories of justice can be
reconstructed to achieve this end.
Before considering Rawls and Dworkin’s theories, two sets of distinc-
tions must be clarified. First the distinction between two constitutive re-
lations of wealth inheritance, and second the distinction between the three
political intuitions used to frame the debate about wealth inheritance.
Both distinctions are required to understand how Rawls and Dworkin’s
theories apply to wealth inheritance since both theories are not originally
intended solely to argue for the restriction of wealth inheritance. These
clarifications are required to understand how the reconstruction of Rawls
and Dworkin’s theories judge inheritors and bequeathers with different po-
litical intuitions about wealth inheritance and how Rawls and Dworkin’s
theories can be justified to these individuals.
In §1.1, wealth inheritance is understood as consisting of at least two
relations - the diachronic and synchronic relations. These relations are
offered as the fundamental dimensions of wealth inheritance that candidate
theories should account for. This section will also identify one desideratum
for a successful theoretical approach, namely that any successful approach
has to provide a consistent and on the balance of costs and benefits a
complete account of both the synchronic and diachronic relations.
In §1.2, I return to the three intuitions used in the introduction to
more clearly identify the normative intuitions that motivate theorists in
the contemporary debate about wealth inheritance. The section reveals
the conflicts between the three intuitive positions and how these conflicts
are reflected in the contemporary literature.
In §1.3, I survey John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin’s respective theories
of justice. While both theories are not composed to deal specifically with
wealth inheritance they are reconstructed and presented in such a way
in light of the intuitions regarding wealth inheritance. The survey also
includes an explanation of how both theories attempt to be justifiable
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to the three disagreeing political intuitions that divide the contemporary
literature.
In §1.4, I outline some of the problems that Rawls and Dworkin’s the-
ories may need to resolve. Either the arguments show that Rawls and
Dworkin’s theories are inconsistent in their attempt to justify restricting
wealth inheritance, or the arguments show that Rawls and Dworkin do not
actually appeal to all three of our political intuitions.
1.1 Two Constitutive Relations
Assessing whether Rawls’s theory or Dworkin’s theory better justifies re-
stricting wealth inheritance requires a clearer definition of wealth inheri-
tance than has been used so far. I propose that the phenomenon of wealth
inheritance is constituted by at least two fundamental relations - the syn-
chronic and diachronic relation.1 However, the present project is not a
description of the sufficient and necessary conditions for wealth inheri-
tance but rather an exploration of what liberal democracies are justified in
doing once they encounter something we consider to be wealth inheritance.
Therefore, this section clarifies the phenomenon that Rawls and Dworkin’s
theories judge should be restricted and how the phenomenon itself affects
the justifiability of their theories in a liberal democracy.
The first constitutive relation is the synchronic relation that exists be-
tween inheritors and bequeathers. The synchronic relation conceptualises
wealth inheritance as a distribution of wealth where individuals grow their
capacity to bequeath by accumulating wealth. The synchronic relation
1This terminology for the relations that constitute wealth inheritance is used by
Janna Thompson (2009b: 2) to describe Rawls’s (Rawls 1999: 251-8) conception of
the constitutive relations of intergenerational justice. Thompson’s terminology of “syn-
chronic” and ‘diachronic” is used to pick out the two different ways that just relations
may exist; first between living contemporaries and second between living contempo-
raries and future. I use these terms to pick out the relations of wealth inheritance that
are relevant to our concerns about the justice of restricting the practice.
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can be observed at different instances in a society’s history to provide a
snapshot of how wealth is distributed and what political measures caused
the distribution.2 In general terms the relation exists between agents who
can exercise the political liberties relevant to private property in the same
way. The role of a bequeather is defined as an agent who has enough prop-
erty to transfer to another agent. The role of an inheritor is defined by
the capacity to have ancestors who can bequeath or as an agent who has
already benefited by an inheritance. In the synchronic relation individuals
are economic agents that use their capital to fulfil the desires they have the
opportunity to satisfy. The range of opportunities depends on the amount
of capital they have and their ability to use it.3
The second constitutive relation of wealth inheritance is the diachronic
relation between a bequeather and an inheritor. The diachronic relation
conceptualises wealth inheritance as a transfer of wealth. This is different
from the synchronic relation where inherited wealth is static and does not
move between individuals. The most important property of the diachronic
relation is that individuals and their wealth are in a dynamic relation. The
diachronic relation is the relation of wealth inheritance where individuals
become political actors as opposed to merely property owners. This is not
2The synchronic relation appears different at different times even when it operates
between the same sets of individuals. The synchronic relation in adulthood when one is
an inheritor looks strikingly different than when an individual is in childhood and enjoys
the effects of inherited wealth. The synchronic relation also exists between bequeathers.
For example the relation between inheritors as young adults would seem unjust if some
inheritors had inherited large amounts of wealth and other inheritors inherited very
little. Contrastingly the relation would seem more just in middle age or old age if
some bequeathers have more wealth to bequeath due to the income they accumulated
through hard work. Here the synchronic relation once again seems different if relating
bequeathers in middle age as opposed to old age.
3The synchronic relation forces individuals to view their place in society as a whole
or at least as one individual amongst the set of inheritors or the set of bequeathers.
Individuals must then justify their socio-economic position and the opportunities of
that position rather than any specific political action.
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to say that being a property owner is not a political action but merely that
it is in the diachronic relation that individual freedoms are exercised and
individuals have a causal influence on the life of other individuals. The
diachronic relation is the conditional relation that decides the distributive
outcome of the synchronic relation.
In the diachronic relation individuals are political agents exercising a
particular freedom: the freedom to transfer property to one’s descendants,
or the freedom to receive property from one’s ancestors. The diachronic
relation describes two groups, each of whom views their own perspective
as simple property use. The bequeathers undertake a political action by
transferring their property, without coercion or engagement in the wider
economy, to their descendants. Importantly this relation does not involve
the satisfaction of an immanent desire, eg. nourishment, but a developed
desire that reaches its final satisfaction with the act of bequeathing wealth.
It may seem that the diachronic relation is asymmetric since inheritors
stand in relation to bequeathers not as property users but as property
accumulators. The perspective of an inheritor is that of someone who
enjoys surplus yield from an arbitrary event. For farmers this event may
be heavy rains, for a pensioner who purchases a lottery ticket it may be
an unlikely but lucky sequence of numbers, and for an inheritor it is the
arbitrary luck of having wealthy ancestors.
One criterion that emerges to decide the success of Rawls and Dworkin’s
theories, is whether both the synchronic and diachronic relations are taken
into account. Given that both theories expect to be justifiable to all,
if not most, individuals in liberal democracies, a theory of justice that
ignores either the diachronic or synchronic relation will not be justifiable
to a broad range of disagreeing judgements. For example, if a theory
were to take into account only the diachronic relation and restrict wealthy
bequeathers transferring their wealth, that theory would not be justifiable
to a group of inheritors who are disadvantaged and never have sufficient
capital to accumulate enough wealth to compete with their fellow wealthy
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inheritors.4 This theory would only account for the injustice of bequeathers
and inheritors who are diachronically related but not the injustice between
inheritors who are synchronically related. Both constitutive relations of
wealth must be taken into account to decide whether Rawls or Dworkin’s
theory is the better theory in justifying restrictions on wealth inheritance
to a range of disagreeing intuitive judgements.
1.2 Intuitions
Rawls and Dworkin propose an approach to restricting wealth inheritance
that is intended to be justifiable to a range of conflicting judgements. This
section describes in greater detail the three political intuitions outlined in
the Introduction. I argued in the Introduction that the three normative
4A theory that accounts only for the diachronic relation would be a “deflationary”
approach to restricting wealth inheritance. Robert Nozick’s (2013) Right-libertarianism
and Janna Thompson’s (2009b; 2009a) Communitarianism are two theories that allege
the diachronic diachronic has been ignored by Rawls and Dworkin and that this igno-
rance is unjustifiable to those who hold the liberal intuition. Nozick (2013: xix, 178) is
supported by Loren Lomasky (1987: 16, 54), Edward Feser (2005: 71) and Eric Mack
(Feser 2005: fn. 27) who argue for a minimal restriction of an inheritors right to inherit
so that all individuals have a chance to become bequeathers in their lives. On the other
hand Thompson argues for minimal restrictions on inherited wealth on the grounds
that restricting it in the way Rawls and Dworkin suggest ignores the intuitive impor-
tance individuals place on their intergenerational obligations and commitments. To
restrict wealth inheritance like Rawls and Dworkin is to break the relationships formed
by these obligations even when individuals in liberal democracies value them so highly.
Both theories allege that Rawls’s Dworkin’s theory do balance the normative concerns
of the liberal intuition as equally as Rawls and Dworkin hope with the associated con-
cerns of the opportunity and luck intuition. Despite this, these theories have not been
included in the comparative analysis because, as Michael Levy (1983: 545–548) and Will
Kymlicka’s (2002: 102–165) analyse of political philosophy and Michael Otsuka (2003),
Peter Vallentyne (2007) and Hillel Steiner’s (2009) expositions on “Left-libertarianism
have shown, the larger debate about how best to accommodate the concerns of liberty
and equality when restricting wealth inheritance is complex and too large for the scope
of this thesis.
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intuitions relevant for this dissertation are reflected in the contemporary
literature on the justice of restricting wealth inheritance. In this section I
go further to explain why these intuitive normative judgements conflict. I
explain the conflicts to clarify the kinds of normative concerns that Rawls
and Dworkin must answer and give equal weight to in their theories.
Our taxonomy of the contemporary literature began with the submis-
sion of an intuition that reflects the considered convictions of Tullock
(1971), McCaffery (1994), Bracewell-Milnes (1997) and Halliday (2012).
Termed the liberal intuition, it is the judgement that wealth inheritance
should be unrestricted or at least minimally restricted because the justice
of wealth inheritance depends on the preservation of the bequeather’s lib-
erty. The intuition asks us to attend to the concerns of the bequeather
as a disposer of private property. The state of affairs pertaining to wealth
inheritance is judged as just, so long as the bequeather is able to exercise
the individual freedom to dispose of their private property as they like
without violating the liberty of others. Tullock (1971: 465–466) expresses
this intuitive judgement best when he states:
. . . we permit people to leave their money to whom they wish,
not because of interest in the legatee, but because we are in-
terested in the testator. We are, in this view, compelled by the
mere logic of private property to permit a man not only to give
it away while he is alive, but also to give it away on his death.
McCaffery (1994: 296) is committed to a similar judgement when he
stresses that a tax restriction on wealth inheritance is unpopular in lib-
eral democracies because:
The estate tax is quite possibly an anti-sin, or a virtue, tax. It
is a tax on work and savings without consumption, on thrift,
on altruism.
Like Tullock, McCaffery is concerned with the way inheritance taxation im-
poses restrictions on bequeathers. This judgement is similar to Bracewell-
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Milnes’s (1997: 163) insistence that rational agents in liberal democra-
cies prefer “ownership to consumption”. Bracewell-Milnes’s judgement is
grounded in the belief that the restriction of wealth inheritance should be
aligned to how agents in liberal democracies want to behave, namely to
own wealth rather than consume it. Even though Halliday (2012: 621) ar-
gues in favour of restricting wealth inheritance, his judgement is based on
the conviction that a restriction on wealth inheritance violates the freedom
of bequeathers less than an income tax on inheritors. All four judgements
in the contemporary literature are grounded on the intuition that the jus-
tice of restricting wealth inheritance depends on how the liberty of the
bequeather over their property is restricted.
The liberal intuition, however, also entails that if the inheritor is not
violating the liberty of the bequeather to dispose of their private property,
then the inheritor is acting in a just manner. Accordingly, many contem-
porary theorists including Tullock and McCaffery judge that even a tax on
inheritors is unjust and that any taxation designed to redistribute wealth
must take the form of either an income tax, or a consumption tax.
The second intuition submitted in the taxonomy, the opportunity in-
tuition, reflected a set of political convictions that conflict with the lib-
eral intuition. The “opportunity intuition” is a helpful label for set of
convictions held by Chester (1976), Haslett (1986; 1997), Lafaye (2008),
Batchelder (2009) and O’Neill (2007). These theorists are committed to
the judgement that the equality of opportunity that bequeathers and inher-
itors have to exercise their social and economic freedoms is what decides
the justice of restricting wealth inheritance. The theorists are concerned
by a society with a market economy where agents, with similar talents and
willingness, do not have the same opportunities open to them to achieve
positions in society and the market. Haslett (1986: 128) express this best
on behalf of all the above theorists when he states:
But for people to be productive it is necessary not just that
they be motivated to be productive, but that they have the
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opportunity to be productive.
When he repudiates taxing income and not wealth, Chester (1976: 62,
100) expresses the same underlying commitment to the judgement that
the justice of any policy that restricts wealth inheritance is dependent on
the way it promotes an equality of opportunity. The focus on the distri-
bution of wealth as opposed to income reflects the theorist’s consideration
of the synchronic relations of wealth between all agents, not just as lone
individuals with relations to other individuals. This consideration reveals
that some agents have more opportunity due to differences in education,
established wealth and personal relations to people of power and influence.
Lafaye (2008: 30) expresses this clearly when she states that judging the
justice of restricting wealth inheritance:
. . . ought to refer not only to the balance between personal
and impersonal standpoints involved in these reforms, but also
to their ability to correct inequalities of opportunities due to
morally arbitrary facts.
The opportunity intuition as I understand it here is distinct from the nor-
mative intuition that all agents ought to have the same level of resources
at any given time. Rather, it is the intuition that wealth inheritance is
just, so long as agents with similar natural talents and motivations have
equal access to the possible means to live the life they desire by gaining
social positions and economic goods. The opportunity intuition conflicts
with the liberal intuition because the latter is a concern for individuals to
have the liberty to bequeath if they have enough wealth, while the for-
mer is a concern for all individuals to have an equal chance to accumulate
enough wealth to bequeath. It appears that theorists committed to the
opportunity intuition and liberal intuition hold opposing normative judge-
ments of what a liberal society should equalise or protect. The former want
to equalise the chances for individuals to bequeath while the latter want
to equalise the formal liberty of an individual to bequeath if they have a
chance to do so.
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The final political intuition, termed the luck intuition, in our taxonomy
was the intuitive judgement that the justice of restricting wealth inheri-
tance was dependent on mitigating the role of luck in determining whether
an agent can live the life they desire. Specifically it is an intuition about
the role luck plays in determining whether agents are morally responsible
for their interactions with other individuals. The luck intuition assumes
that a particular state of affairs is just or at least more just than other
states of affairs if individuals have made a genuine choice to live in that
particular state of affairs. Importantly the luck referred to by the luck
intuition is not the inherent luck of guessing the result of a coin toss or
some other event irrelevant to an individual’s prospects in life. Rather it
is the luck inherent in birth, some illnesses or the effect of fluctuations in
the global economy that diminish the role of genuine choice in people’s
lives. Wealth inheritance is judged as a lucky product of birth that does
not reflect an individual’s choices, but arbitrarily distributes resources. Al-
stott (2007: 477) is the only theorist in the contemporary literature who is
committed to this intuitive judgement of wealth inheritance. She grounds
her judgement in the notion that:
. . . outcomes ought to reflect one’s choices (or ambitions) - that
one should take responsibility (in the sense of bearing conse-
quences) for one’s choices.
If theorists are committed to the judgement that distributions of wealth
should reflect choices, then restrictions on wealth inheritance are more
likely to be just. However a commitment to the luck intuition conflicts
with both the liberal and opportunity intuitions. The luck intuition as I
understand it here, is not concerned with the restrictions of a bequeather’s
liberty over their private property, or whether inheritors and bequeathers
have the same opportunities to exercise their freedoms. Importantly, the
luck intuition differs with the opportunity intuition because the luck intu-
ition is perfectly compatible with an inequality of opportunities for indi-
viduals who do not inherit, so long as their disadvantage is the result of
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genuine choice. This means that the luck intuition is not concerned with
making the range of choices open to all individuals equal, but just that
individuals should be morally responsible for the choices that are open to
them. The luck intuition is concerned with the justice of individuals with
equal liberties, having their choices limited or curtailed by luck or uncho-
sen circumstances. This consideration is not limited to individuals who
are similarly talented or willing, but is in fact sensitive to the differences
in talent and willingness between individuals and the reasons for these dif-
ferences. Consequently, theorists who hold the luck intuition are opposed
to those theorists committed to the liberal and opportunity intuition with
respect to what states of affairs individuals are morally responsible for in
liberal societies.
The above clarification brings out the conceptual links between our
taxonomy of the contemporary literature and the conflicts between the
detailed intuitions. The clarification has revealed that theorists arguing
in the contemporary debate about what liberal societies should do about
wealth inheritance, hold disagreeing normative judgements that reflect a
conflict of political intuitions. As I proposed in the Introduction I view this
conflict as a form of reasonable democratic pluralism about what intuitively
matters to individuals who live in a democratic liberal society that proposes
restrictions on wealth inheritance. My thesis enters this framework of
reasonable pluralism and compares whether Rawls’s theory or Dworkin’s
theory is better suited to guide us through the pluralism. Both attempt to
do this by balancing and catering to the disagreeing intuitions by proposing
principles about how to organise social institutions and to redistribute
wealth.
1.3 Candidate Theories
This section explicates two candidate theories of justice that argue for a
restriction on wealth inheritance. Both theories intend to be systematic
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theories of justice that are justifiable to a range of disagreeing conceptions
of the good life for the individual and the politically right action for society.
As explained in the Introduction, Rawls’s conception of liberal society as a
system of fair co-operation between free and equal people, and Dworkin’s
conception of the abstract egalitarian principle and principle of abstraction
entail that they must be impartial to a range of disagreeing judgements
about restricting wealth inheritance. Neither theory is intended to cater
to only a narrow set of normative judgements, but a range of disagreeing
convictions about what is just in a liberal democracy. This is not to say
that Rawls and Dworkin judge wealth inheritance in the same way. On
one way to understand them, the theories prioritise the three intuitions in
different orders but attempt to cater to all three.
1.3.1 Rawls’s Justice as Fairness
One distinctive aspect of Rawls’s theory is that it does not judge the
inequality of wealth inheritance as morally distinct from the inequality in
natural endowments like intelligence or height. Rawls (1999: 245; 1971:
278) is unequivocal when he says:
The unequal inheritance of wealth is no more inherently unjust
than the unequal inheritance of intelligence.
However Rawls (1971: 277–279; 1999: 245–247; 2001: 56) qualifies this
view when he argues that the inequality of wealth inheritance is just insofar
as it benefits the “least fortunate” and is compatible with his first and
second principles of justice. For Rawls the institution of wealth inheritance
does not meet these conditions and therefore it is just to restrict it through
taxation. Rawls’s judgement requires an account of what his principles of
justice are and why a liberal democracy should accept them as justification
for restricting wealth inheritance.
Rawls’s (2001: 42) first principle is that in a just society, each individ-
ual has an indefeasible claim to equal liberties that are compatible with
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the liberties of all other individuals. These liberties are also assured so
they have equal value to all. This means that liberties for one group of
individuals cannot be curtailed for the benefit of another group, for the
efficient management of the economy or state security. One of the liberties
that Rawls believes is guaranteed by his principle is the freedom to own
private property and the freedom to use it to further our self-interest.
Although the freedom and self-determination of bequeathers and in-
heritors is important for Rawls, it is important only in the context of
facilitating ongoing mutual agreement on an arrangement of social institu-
tions. To achieve this Rawls (2001: 42) introduces his second principle of
justice, which states that social and economic inequalities are permissible
if they maintain a fair equality of opportunity and be of the “greatest ben-
efit to the least advantaged”. While Rawls does not believe that wealth
inheritance is inherently unjust, he does believe it is unjust in some circum-
stances. These include circumstances in which wealth inheritance prevents
similarly talented and motivated individuals to have equal opportunities
to attain economic goods and social positions. This is the basic conse-
quence of Rawls’s second principle of justice which is a combination of the
difference principle and the principle of fair equality of opportunity (2001:
43, 64).
The first part of Rawls’s second principle of justice is the principle of fair
equality opportunity which states that the attainment of economic goods
and social positions in a society should be equally open for competition
by all individuals (Rawls 2001: 43–44). The principle of fair equality
of opportunity does not just refer to economic and social position being
formally open to competition but that all individuals of similar talent and
motivation should have an equal chance to attain them. The difference
principle states that inequalities in the distribution of economic goods or
social positions are permissible and just if the inequalities are of some
advantage to the worst off in a society and that without these inequalities
the worst off would have even worse prospects. By “worse off” Rawls refers
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to a general description of the social and economic opportunities that an
individual is likely to have. By “opportunities” I mean the real prospects
an individual has for leading their life the way they wish in accordance with
the laws and institutional arrangements compatible with the first principle
of justice. These desires can include increasing individual welfare, the
accumulation of property or the fulfilment of some long term desire.
Rawls acknowledges three ways that his second principle of justice can
be interpreted. One way is that the difference principle along with the
first principle of justice judges a state of affairs to be just if individuals are
allowed to exercise their liberties and talents over their private property
as they see fit (1971: 72). Such a state of affairs would yield the most
efficient distribution of social positions and goods because no alteration
in the state of affairs could be made that would advantage any individual
without disadvantaging another individual. This state of affairs is what
Rawls refers to as being an efficient distribution. This interpretation of
Rawls’s principles of justice would not judge wealth inheritance or bequest
to be unjust because individuals are exercising their liberties and talent
freely where no redistribution of wealth could advantage some individuals
without disadvantaging other individuals. Therefore this interpretation of
the second principle would not judge that wealth inheritance ought to be
restricted. Rawls argues that this interpretation of his second principle is
not justifiable in a liberal democracy because it allows arbitrary aspects of
an individual’s life to radically affect their life prospects and so does not
treat all individuals as free and equal.
Rawls’s second interpretation is that the principle of fair equality of
opportunity requires that the similarly talented and skilled individuals in
a society should have the same social and economic opportunities (1971:
73–74). To this end, a society should try and mitigate the effects of the ini-
tial social class the individuals are born into by regulating the free market
system so that opportunities in education, healthcare, and cultural knowl-
edge are open to all citizens. By “social class” Rawls refers to the income
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bracket of the individual’s parents. This second interpretation would judge
wealth inheritance as just because it accepts the initial natural distribution
of property and opportunity. This second interpretation would not judge
that society ought to restrict wealth inheritance. Rawls believes that the
flaw with this interpretation is that it accepts that individuals with differ-
ences in their natural talent will have different prospects and opportunities
no matter the social or economic regulation.
Rawls rejects his first two interpretations in favour of a third. This
third interpretation is what Rawls calls “democratic equality” (1971: 75–
76) or “liberal equality” (2001: 44). In this interpretation the difference
principle would ensure that a state of affairs could have an unequal dis-
tribution of resources and starting social positions and still be just (1971:
75–80). Such a state of affairs could still be just as long as the unequal dis-
tribution was of some advantage to the worst off individuals in that society.
The distribution is unjust, if diminishing the prospects of the better off did
not make the prospects of the worst off better. Rawls does make a point
to differentiate between his liberal equality and the formal meritocracy of
the second interpretation. Liberal equality for Rawls does not accept that
equal opportunity should just apply to those with similar natural talents
and skills but to everyone in the society regardless of their natural tal-
ents and skills (2001: 43–44). To do this society must redress the initial
unequal distribution of natural talents and socio-economic positions by
compensating individuals through social initiatives and not only by state
regulation. But Rawls is quick to point out that such initial inequalities
must not be eradicated or those advantaged would be disadvantaged in
ways that violate their individual freedom (2001: 43). The liberal equality
interpretation of Rawls’s second principle allows him to judge the restric-
tion of wealth inheritance through taxation as just if the concentration of
wealth becomes too great.
Rawls argues that his two principles of justice are the most rational
way to organise social institutions in a society of fair co-operation with
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individuals who consider themselves free and equal. Therefore the citizens
of a liberal democratic society should accept his two principles of justice as
justification for restricting wealth inheritance. Rawls’s (2001: 5) first rea-
son relies on his conception of the purpose of liberal democracy as a society
of fair social co-operation. In this conception it is self-evident that a demo-
cratic society is not one where individuals are socially and economically
dominated as in feudal or slave societies. According to Rawls, this concep-
tion entails that a system of fair co-operation conceives all participating
individuals as free and equal in fulfilling their life plans and goals (Rawls
2001: 19). Rawls argues that his principles are the best way to achieve and
maintain a society of fair social co-operation with free and equal individ-
uals. The restriction of wealth inheritance is justified, in cases where not
imposing restrictions would undermine the best way to achieve a society
of free and equal persons engaging in fair social co-operation.
Rawls’s theory of justice, despite its use of normative principles, is
a theory of procedural justice. The principles of justice are intended as
normative constraints on the basic structure of society, which for Rawls is
the cooperative interaction of political and social institutions (Rawls 2001:
10). The pure procedural justice of Rawls’s theory hinges on the way
his principles are applied to society. They are not applied as normative
principles on every individual transaction between individuals. Rather
they are to apply as the rules according to which a society’s institutions
must be organised. Rawls (2001: 54) expresses his notion of procedural
justice when he states:
. . . when everyone follows the publicly recognized rules of co-
operation, the particular distribution that results is acceptable
as just whatever that distribution turns out to be.
Rawls’s contention is that if a society’s social and political institutions are
organised and continually modified to conform to his principles of justice
then a form of background state of justice is achieved (Rawls 2001: 52–54).
Individuals may be then left to live and interact within the institutional
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arrangements of their society. The normative principles need not inter-
vene at every transaction an individual undertakes or every contract an
individual enters. Pure procedural justice is achieved when the social and
political institutions are regulated continually according to the two prin-
ciples of justice making any subsequent complex array of free interactions
just.
Rawls’s theory clearly attempts to cater to all three of the intuitions
sketched earlier. The theory satisfies the intuitive concern for a be-
queather’s liberty to dispose of their property through the first principle.
Restrictions on wealth inheritance cannot curtail the bequeather’s freedom
to posses and transfer wealth in order to advantage those that either pos-
sess little wealth or have no interest in transferring it. In addition, the
second principle satisfies the intuitive normative judgements of the oppor-
tunity and luck intuition. The purpose of the second principle is to ensure
inheritors and bequeathers that are similarly talented and willing have an
equal chance to achieve the same social and economic positions regard-
less of arbitrary social contingencies like social class. Both the difference
principle and principle of fair equality of opportunity attempt to ensure
that the long term prospects of inheritors are, as far as possible, a prod-
uct of individual choices rather than the luck of birth. Rawls’s argument
for the restriction of wealth inheritance is intended to be justifiable to all
the citizens of a liberal democratic society including the theorists in the
contemporary literature mentioned earlier. This is argued on the grounds
that his principles of justice are the best way to organise a society of fair
social co-operation with free and equal individuals.
Nevertheless, Rawls’s theory prioritises the opportunity intuition.
Rawls (2001: 149) makes clear that the “. . . requirement of the fair value
of the political liberties, as well as the use of primary goods, is part of the
meaning of the two principles of justice”. This means that Rawls’s theory
prioritises the opportunity intuition not at the expense of the liberal in-
tuition, but to ensure all individuals enjoy an equal value of the political
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liberties. Rawls justifies this order of prioritisation by appealing to the
observation that without an intuitive concern for citizens to have equal
opportunities to exercise their liberties, liberal societies would regress into
a system of natural liberty where contingent facts about a citizen’s class
and natural talent would determine their prospects in life. This observa-
tion highlights how Rawls can judge wealth inheritance to be unjust only
in certain circumstances. For Rawls one circumstance is when inheritance
helps to concentrate wealth and power such that the equal opportunity
of all individuals to gain any social or economic position is threatened
(1971: 277; 2001: 51). In these cases wealth inheritance is unjust but
not inherently unjust such that it should be abolished as an illiberal and
unfair institution. Wealth inheritance under Rawls’s approach is justified
as a social institution in a property owning democracy satisfying the first
principle of justice (1971: 54; 2001: 114). Wealth inheritance would be un-
just only if the distribution of resources and social and economic positions
was inconsistent with the difference principle, fair equality of opportunity
principle and the first principle of justice.
1.3.2 Dworkin’s Equality
Dworkin’s theory is a version of luck-egalitarianism that understands jus-
tice as an equality of resources. The theory uses a distinction between
different types of luck to argue for a restriction on wealth inheritance.
Dworkin’s argument for the restriction of wealth inheritance is grounded
in what he sees as a fundamental principle of justice, namely the abstract
egalitarian principle which states that:
. . . government must act to make the lives of those it governs
better lives, and it must show equal concern for the life of each.
(2000: 128)
Dworkin takes this as a politically and culturally accepted principle in
most liberal democratic societies and that insofar as we accept it we are
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committed to equality of some kind as a political and distributive ideal.
Dworkin’s theory of justice is a theory that interprets the most coherent
conception of this abstract principle to be the “equality of resources”. An
equality of “resources” as opposed to Rawls’s “opportunities”, is what
Dworkin believes allows all individuals in a liberal democracy to choose
their own ends. It is the ability of the state to promote or maintain the
ability of all individuals to choose their own ends that shows an equal
concern for all individuals.
Similar to Rawls’s theory, Dworkin’s theory places great importance on
the view that individuals have personal freedom and individual liberties
that should be protected. But crucially Dworkin judges that differences in
the opportunity of individuals to choose how to live their lives should not
be an arbitrary fact about the world. Rather all individuals insofar as they
are treated with equal concern must have the same opportunities to pursue
their own ends. Dworkin’s method for creating a distribution of resources
that allows all individuals to choose how to live their lives, as opposed to
being determined by unchosen facts, is by using three theoretical devices.
The first is the envy test which determines whether an equal distribution
of resources has been achieved. The envy test requires a second device,
the auction, so that individuals may choose the resources they wish to use
to purse their ends. In order to redress any inequalities resulting from
lucky events, like wealth inheritance, that may interfere with the auction,
Dworkin uses a third device, insurance schemes. These schemes allow
people to insure themselves against unlucky consequences, like inheriting
very little property.
Dworkin’s central motivation for understanding the equality of re-
sources as the best interpretation of the abstract egalitarian principle is
that the distribution of resources in a just society cannot be caused by an
arbitrary fact about the individuals in that society or the world in which
that society exists (2000: 65). An equal distribution of resources must be
chosen by the agents of that society and not entailed by unchosen facts.
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Dworkin’s initial method of determining an equal distribution of resources
is the device of the auction (see below). Dworkin’s auction is a way to
avoid a simplistic numerically equal distribution of resources. A simple
numerically equal distribution would not take into account the inherent
variations in resources in nature and the preferences of each individual for
each resource. Individuals would quickly become envious and prefer the
resources of other individuals. To resolve this Dworkin proposes the envy
test.
The envy test is the criteria by which an equal distribution of resources
is actually deemed to be equal by all the individuals in society (2000:
66–67). The test states that in a society with limited resources and with
limited means to use them, as long as no individual prefers the resources of
another individual after the distribution takes place then an equal distri-
bution of resources has been achieved. The test applies only to the initial
distribution of resources, so that the initial distribution reflects what in-
dividuals mutually accept given their own preferences and life plans. The
test is an end state test that certifies a distribution as equal so long as in-
dividuals have chosen to fulfil some preferences and not others. Thus, the
distribution of resources is sensitive to the preferences that each individual
wishes to fulfil given a limited set of resources available for distribution.
Dworkin proposes an auction as a way for a distribution of resources to
pass the envy test. First, tokens of value such as clamshells, as he uses in his
example, are allocated to each individual (2000: 67–69). These tokens are
allocated equally and are used as a way for individuals to bid for a certain
fixed metric of resources. A mutually agreed upon auctioneer then adjusts
the starting price up or down depending on the initial lowest bid. Then the
auction is left to run its course so that eventually only one individual or set
of individuals own the resources without any other individual wanting that
resource at that price. By “price” Dworkin means the number of tokens of
value distributed earlier. The auction ensures that no individual desires a
resource for the price that the individual who won the auction paid. This
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means that individuals who lose an auction on a given set of resources have
greater bidding power on subsequent auctions, in contrast to the individual
who won, who has lost this bidding power and has less opportunity to
win the subsequent auctions. In short, the opportunity cost of using the
tokens in an auction is the diminished bidding power in all the subsequent
auctions. Dworkin believes this type of auction achieves quite neatly and
through a market mechanism an envy free state of affairs. Since according
to Dworkin the criteria for an actual equal distribution is the envy test,
the state of affairs resulting from the auction is an equality of resources.
This is despite the fact that some individuals will have numerically fewer
resources than other individuals.
The immediate problem Dworkin anticipates is that the auction does
not account for the extra resources or handicaps that individuals may have
before or after entering into the auction. The pertinent example of this
for our purposes is wealth inheritance. Dworkin (2000: 77) believes these
unchosen facts are important because they will affect whether there is an
actual equal distribution of resources after the auction. To solve this prob-
lem, Dworkin (2000: 73–74) distinguishes between two types of luck. First
there is option luck which is a state of affairs that is a consequence of
a deliberate choice that has inherent risk. Such luck is luck that indi-
viduals should have anticipated when making their decisions. The other
type of luck is brute luck, that is a consequence of truly unforeseeable and
unpredictable events that an individual has no choice in inflicting upon
themselves. Dworkin points out this distinction is not one of an essential
difference but one of degree.
Brute luck poses a problem for the auction model of equal distribution if
it causes individuals to bid in the initial auction with more tokens of value
than other individuals. An inheritor who benefits from wealthy ancestors
is an example of how brute luck can disrupt the auction. Individuals
who come to the auction with more tokens of value because they were
lucky to inherit them from their ancestors or were born in an area with a
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resource surplus, would have the opportunity to take risks with potentially
higher pay-offs and be able to accrue more resources to their desires than
individuals with fewer tokens of value (2000: 67–69). Dworkin attempts
to neutralise the effects of brute luck by proposing that every individual
have the equal opportunity to take out insurance against certain brute luck
events. This insurance would obviously vary in value and premium based
on the chances that each individual actually has of suffering the brute luck
event that they were insuring against.
The example of brute luck for our purposes is when individuals have
very little or no chance of inheriting wealth because of their poor ances-
tors. Individuals would have the option of taking out insurance against
not receiving any inheritance or very little and would be compensated in
the event that this occurs. This does not mean that insurance for these
individuals is a futile effort to equalise inheritance levels among wealthy
and poor bequeathers. Rather the insurance would compensate inheritors
for the unchosen advantage of having poor ancestors. Dworkin also sug-
gests that if individuals come to the auction already affected by brute luck
then they are entitled to be compensated in the form of greater purchas-
ing power in the auction. This means that some individuals who suffered
brute luck before they came to the auction are entitled a greater number
of clamshells in order to balance their disadvantages against individuals
who have not suffered brute luck.
The insurance device transforms the lack of an option that individuals
face in the possibility of brute luck into the very real option of being insured
against the costs the brute luck event would impose on them if it were to
occur. Nevertheless, Dworkin believes that in this type of insurance market
individuals pre-disposed to inheriting very little property would be charged
higher premiums. Dworkin (2000: 77–78) acknowledges that while this is
a problem it is not a knock down objection. Dworkin argues that dispo-
sitions that lead to higher premiums cannot rationally be admitted when
conducting the auction because such dispositions themselves are forms of
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brute luck. For the insurance scheme to discriminate against individuals
with unchosen dispositions would undermine Dworkin’s abstract egalitar-
ian principle. One example is if an individual is charged higher premiums
to insure against developing cancer because they are medically disposed to
have a higher chance of developing cancer. This individual has not chosen
to suffer the brute luck of having a higher disposition for developing can-
cer, therefore the individual should be charged the same premium as any
other individual. Dworkin concedes that in reality the insurance scheme
for wealth inheritance would be taken out by everyone in a hypothetical
insurance market which would then model a progressive taxation system
on inherited wealth. Apart from this, the hypothetical insurance works
the same way as an actual insurance market, with the exception that it
is made efficient by reducing it to a taxation system that taxes inheritors
progressively higher amounts as the size of the inherited wealth grows.
What has been described so far is a luck-egalitarian account of a just
distribution of resources. However Dworkin does advance an account of in-
dividual freedom and property rights through commitment to what he calls
the “principle of abstraction”. The principle of abstraction is a minimalist
liberal principle that states:
. . . an ideal distribution is possible only when people are legally
free to act as they wish except so far as constraints on their free-
dom are necessary to protect security of person and property,
or to correct certain imperfections in markets. (2000: 147–148)
The principle of abstraction secures the freedom of choice and the right of
all individuals to prefer any life they choose within the bounds of ensuring
the physical and mental security of others as well as the fair running of the
auction. Dworkin unlike Rawls does not give a lexical ordering to either the
principle of abstraction or abstract egalitarian principle. He firmly believes
there is no conflict between equality and liberty as is sometimes made out.
By giving individuals more discriminating choices in the auction, Dworkin
believes that his conception of a just distribution of resources is impartial
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and justifiable to every individual’s particular plans and preferences for
their life (2000: 147–148). A distribution of resources is equal if it passes
the envy test. A distribution can pass the envy test, if individuals are
afforded the liberty of choosing their own lives through the auction. Indi-
vidual freedom and self-determination then is assured in the establishment
of the auction as a background constraint on what kind of auction takes
place. An auction must allow all individuals the most fine grained choices
so that every individual would have the resources that reflect the most fine
grained costs of not having any other individual’s resources.
For our purposes we may understand Dworkin’s luck-egalitarianism
as attempting to cater to all three of our political intuitions. The in-
tuitive concern for the individual liberty of the bequeather is satisfied by
Dworkin’s principle of abstraction, that ensures that the auction must al-
low for the maximum possible set of choices to accumulate and protect
their private property. Dworkin’s conception of “equality of resources”
satisfies both the opportunity and luck intuition. The intuitive concern
for individuals with similar talents and willingness to have the same op-
portunities in society and the market is achieved by Dworkin’s method of
redressing brute luck like social class and wealth inheritance through insur-
ance schemes. The flexibility of this method also allows it to ensure that
individuals are able to choose and be morally responsible for their own
lives. Therefore the intuitive judgement that wealth inheritance ought
to be restricted for its role in determining the lives of individuals is also
satisfied.
Nevertheless, Dworkin’s theory prioritises the luck intuition in a way
that attempts to placate the liberal and opportunity intuitions. Dworkin’s
prioritisation is justified by his understanding of the abstract egalitarian
principle and principle of abstraction. If a state must show equal concern
for all citizens, then it must establish a regime that is equally sensitive to
the desires of each individual and the ways they choose to satisfy them.
Individuals have no reason to take part in such a regime if some individ-
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uals are held responsible for their lives and others are not. According to
Dworkin’s theory if poor inheritors are not held responsible for their dis-
advantage for being born to poor ancestors, then wealthy inheritors are
also not responsible for the wealth they inherited. Therefore, Dworkin is
compelled to treat wealth inheritance as a form of brute luck that would
be unjustly imposed on individuals without compensation.
1.4 Some Problems on the Horizon
Taking stock for a moment, I have presented two theories as different
ways to justify restricting wealth inheritance in a liberal democracy. Both
theories attempt to argue for a restriction of wealth inheritance that is
justifiable to three intuitively conflicting perspectives on the restriction of
wealth inheritance. Rawls’s theory considers the maintenance or creation
of equal opportunity as the highest priority when restricting wealth inher-
itance. Dworkin’s theory considers mitigating the role of luck in people’s
lives as the highest priority when restricting wealth inheritance.
In this section I flag some of the problems that I will be discussing in
Chapters 2, 3 and 4. I flag these problems to outline the way the candidate
theories I have detailed in this Chapter will be analysed and criticised.
The problems question the coherency of Rawls and Dworkin’s theories to
answer and balance the normative concerns of the liberal, opportunity
and luck intuition. The analysis will involve testing how well Rawls and
Dworkin’s theories can actually justify restricting wealth inheritance to all
three normative intuitions. If it seems the problems are genuinely troubling
I suggest some modifications to Rawls and Dworkin’s theories to resolve
the problems.
One immediate internal problem seems to be that Rawls’s theory does
not treat wealth inheritance the same way as social class. By this I mean
that Rawls does not recognise wealth inheritance as being arbitrary in
the same way as an individual’s social class of origin. Another problem
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originally raised by Gerald Cohen (2008; 2011) is that Rawls’s principle of
fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle are motivationally
incoherent. This is troubling for our purposes because both these principles
are the primary normative tools that Rawls uses to answer the normative
concerns of the opportunity and luck intuition. Another problem that I
will discuss further in Chapter 2 is Iris Marion Young’s (2011) argument
that Rawls’s theory defines the basic structure of society too narrowly.
This argument entails that despite the perfect application of the Rawls’s
principles of justice, social behaviours can reflect social values that limit
the choices open to certain individuals. In effect this problem questions
the extent to which Rawls’s theory can answer the normative concerns of
those who hold the luck intuition.
Turning now to Dworkin’s theory, one immediate problem that suggests
itself is that his theory is intuitively too harsh on individuals because
it allows individuals to suffer greatly from their own choices.5 Another
problem is that in trying to answer the normative concerns of the luck
intuition Dworkin’s theory focuses on equalising the wrong thing, namely
resources instead of social relations. Both problems question the coherency
of the way Dworkin’s theory answers the normative concerns of the luck
intuition with the democratic expectation for proportionate treatment and
the normative ideal of equality. Both problems are originally raised by
Marc Fleurbaey (1995), Jonathan Wolff (1998), Elizabeth Anderson (1999)
and Samuel Scheﬄer (2003).
The final problem I discuss for Dworkin’s theory is Gerald Cohen’s
(2011) argument that Dworkin’s theory makes an inconsistent distinction
between unchosen preferences and unchosen circumstances. This is trou-
bling for Dworkin because Cohen argues that in order for Dworkin to re-
solve this inconsistency he should modify his theory to equalise all forms of
5The earliest responses to Rawls and Dworkin’s theories emerged after the first
publications of Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971) and Dworkin’s four-part essay “What
is Equality?” (1981a; 1981b; 1987a; 1987b).
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advantage. Cohen argues that a better way for Dworkin to answer the nor-
mative concerns of the luck intuition is to equalise “access to advantage”
and not just resources like inherited wealth.
1.5 Conclusion
I would like to conclude this chapter hopeful that Rawls and Dworkin’s ap-
proaches to justifying restrictions on wealth inheritance in a liberal democ-
racy are clear. Rawls and Dworkin’s theories both argue for restrictions
on wealth inheritance they expect will be justifiable to the three groups
of intuitive judgements on the restriction of wealth inheritance. To make
this clear, I clarified wealth inheritance into two relations - the synchronic
and diachronic relation. This was to to show that a successful theory must
account for the relation between bequeathers and inheritors and the rela-
tion between inheritors. I then clarified how the three normative intuitions
conflicted and how this conflict is reflected in the contemporary debate.
The following three chapters will offer a thorough explanation and anal-
ysis of the problems outlined in the previous section. Chapters 2 and 3
will question the coherency of Rawls and Dworkin’s theories in trying to
justify restrictions on wealth inheritance. These chapters will also ques-
tion how Rawls and Dworkin balance the normative concerns of the liberal,
opportunity and luck intuition.
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Chapter 2
Rawls’s Justice as Fairness
This chapter attempts a critical analysis of how Rawls’s theory of justice
justifies the restriction of wealth inheritance to the opportunity and luck in-
tuition. By focusing on three particular problems I argue that Rawls’s the-
ory cannot coherently justify restricting wealth inheritance without some
modification. The first two problems criticise how Rawls’s theory analy-
ses wealth inheritance as an arbitrary distribution of resources. The third
problem criticises the scope of Rawls’s theory and its definition of the basic
structure of a liberal society.
First I will argue that Rawls’s distinction between the arbitrary dis-
tributions of resources caused by wealth inheritance on the one hand and
social class on the other is questionable. This problem suggests that for
Rawls’s theory, the arbitrary distribution of resources due to birth matter
less in equalising the life-prospects of individuals than their social class of
origin. Rawls’s different treatment of wealth inheritance and social class is
unjustifiable to the opportunity and luck intuition. One response to this
argument may be that wealth inheritance is a necessary inequality. I then
take up the argument used by Gerald Cohen to show that Rawls’s use
of the difference principle to justify necessary inequalities undermines the
motivations for the principle of fair equality of opportunity.
The third problem I take up is one first formulated by Iris Marion
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Young. Young argues that Rawls’s definition of the basic structure as the
subject of justice is too narrow and cannot account for the way individual
actions like bequeathing and inheriting contribute to social behaviours
that limit the set of choices open to individuals. This problem suggests
that Rawls cannot justify the restriction of wealth inheritance to the luck
intuition if it applies only to his original conception of the basic structure.
2.1 Arbitrariness and Rawls
In this section I present two arguments that challenge the way Rawls’s the-
ory justifies the restriction of wealth inheritance. These arguments suggest
that Rawls’s theory may not be coherent in its attempt to justify the re-
striction of wealth inheritance to the opportunity and luck intuition. The
consequence of this is that Rawls’s theory requires some modification or
must be offered some way of responding to the criticism. The first argu-
ment questions the extent to which Rawls’s theory is actually committed
to satisfying the opportunity and luck intuitions. This argument centres
on why Rawls chooses to focus on social class as the primary source of
inequalities rather than inequalities like natural talent and wealth inher-
itance. One response to this argument is that wealth inheritance is a
necessary inequality that cannot and should not be restricted. The second
argument questions this response. I question whether some inequalities of
opportunity, such as wealth inheritance can really be justified as necessary
by Rawls’s theory. Specifically this argument is a three step argument that
questions how Rawls’s theory can justify judging some inequalities such as
wealth inheritance as necessary in the background of the principle of fair
equality of opportunity and the difference principle.
2.1.1 Wealth Inheritance and its Arbitrariness
In this section I deal with the equalisandum claims of Rawls’s theory.
These claims are what Rawls’s theory judges should be equal, namely
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the equal chance to achieve social and economic positions. I advance the
argument that Rawls’s original theory evaluates the domain of morally ar-
bitrary resource distributions in a way that is not justifiable to the luck
intuition. I argue that Rawls’s theory unjustifiably distinguishes the ar-
bitrariness of wealth inheritance and natural talent from the arbitrariness
of social class. The consequence of these arguments is that Rawls’s theory
requires either some response that deflects the seriousness of these argu-
ments or modifies Rawls’s theory to more coherently justify restricting
wealth inheritance in a liberal democracy.
Rawls (1999: 245–247; 1971: 277–278) accepts that the distribution of
wealth inheritance is arbitrary, but not any more unjust than other talents
or natural endowments. It appears that Rawls (2001: 124) believes both
are necessary inequalities used by a just society for the benefit of all its
citizens. However there is one relevant way in which natural talents and
endowments are different from wealth inheritance. It seems that natural
talents and endowments are not entirely under the control or determination
of their possessor. An individual with above average intelligence cannot
truly choose to double the power of their talent or transfer it to a descen-
dent. In the case of wealth inheritance it appears the life-prospects of the
inheritor is entirely dependent on the choice of the bequeather. Although
the inheritor is free to choose how they use their good fortune, their good
fortune was the product of social contingency, namely a social practice that
values wealth accumulation for the good of future generations. Further,
the inheritance of vast wealth is an inherent advantage to accumulating
more wealth. The capacity to control and shape one’s future and the fu-
ture of one’s descendants is a crucial difference between wealth inheritance
and natural talent.
Despite wealth inheritance being a social contingency, Rawls is not
eager to declare it unjust. This contrasts with the way Rawls (2001: 55)
judges that unequal opportunities caused by the “social class of origin”
should be equalised. According to Rawls’s (2001: 44) principle of fair
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equality of opportunity, social class is an arbitrary distributor of resources
that should not cause an inequality in life-prospects for individuals who
are similarly talented and motivated. As Rawls (2001: 46) says:
The fair value of the political liberties ensures that citizens
similarly gifted and motivated have roughly an equal chance of
influencing the government’s policy and of attaining positions
of authority irrespective of their economic and social class.
Rawls is however less clear on why the social contingency of inheriting
wealth should be treated differently. Rawls’s conception of social class
is not the same as the luck of inheriting wealth. Social class as Rawls
conceives it refers merely to the groups of individuals in a society who
have differing opportunities and life-prospects. A family’s wealth, cultural
status, or income causes these differences in opportunities. Rawls’s prin-
ciple of fair equality of opportunity forbids differences in life prospects if
individuals are similarly talented and motivated. But it does not forbid dif-
ferences in life-prospects between individuals who are differently talented
or differently affected by the luck of birth. Rawls distinguishes the arbi-
trary distributions of resources caused by social class from the distribution
caused by lucky individuals. I contend that Rawls cannot justify this dis-
tinction when justifying the restriction of wealth inheritance to those who
prioritise the luck intuition in their normative judgements.
Let us consider an example that illustrates my contention. Consider a
Honey Farmer who lives in a liberal society that resembles Rawls’s concep-
tion of a property-owning democracy. The Honey Farmer’s first problem
is that her start-up costs involve a piece of land, a shed and other bottling
facilities. Although she has a natural talent for business unlike her fellow
discoverers, she is not part of the wealthy upper class. Therefore she does
does not have the means to buy this equipment and at her current occu-
pation it would take too long to amass the necessary capital to farm the
productive but lethal bees. Our Honey Farmer then asks her near dying
parents for a portion of their savings in order to start her honey making
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business. They freely bequeath a portion to her immediately which she
then invests in her business. Our Honey Farmer is able to have a consid-
erable advantage over her competitors and establish her business. Many
years pass as she sells honey, grows her business, hires new people and
makes greater profits. However one day one of the lethal bees escapes,
stings and kills another individual. Our Honey Farmer is brought into a
court battle over her negligence for not keeping her bees safely away from
other individuals. She once again finds that she is short of money to fight
her court case. Fortunately for her, her parents die and their remaining
estate is inherited by our Honey Farmer. With this new inheritance our
Honey Farmer is able to hire expensive lawyers that argue within the laws
of the state that our Honey Farmer is not responsible for the individual’s
death. Our Honey Farmer then goes on to sell honey and lead the life she
always wanted.
The somewhat long winded example is meant to highlight the familiar
role of wealth inheritance in creating an inequality of opportunity in soci-
ety and the way this inequality is judged to be just under the difference
principle. In a very direct sense, our Honey Farmer’s business could not
have employed other individuals with less valued talent and endowments
if she had not been bequeathed wealth to start her business. In an indi-
rect sense wealth inheritance helps to maintain the survival of the business
with respect to the court case and so saves the jobs of many employees
simultaneously. In both instances, according to Rawls’s theory, the in-
equalities in wealth between our Honey Farmer and any other individual
is just because the inequalities are advantageous to the worst off. This
is because if the inequalities did not exist at all then the Honey Workers
would be unemployed. Unemployment would make the workers, who are
worse of compared to our Honey Farmer, even more worse off. Just as
the Honey Farmer has a natural talent for managing a business she also
has the advantage of inherited wealth. Both, according to the difference
principle, are necessary inequalities that make the worst off in society bet-
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ter off compared to a state of affairs where these inequalities did not exist.
Therefore any restriction of wealth inheritance must not tax or redistribute
the Honey Farmer’s wealth so that it disadvantages the least advantaged.
An important assumption in this is that one cannot simply remove or
redistribute natural talent unlike money or land. Similarly, under a com-
mitment to the first principle of justice, liberty over one’s private property
would mean that the state could not simply remove or redistribute the
right or freedom of an individual to bequeath property.
The Distinction Problem
I contend that the problem for Rawls is that although he can justify the
inequality of opportunities between the Honey Farmer and the plaintiff in
her court case, he cannot justify the initial inequality between our Honey
Farmer and the other individuals who discovered the lethal bees. In the
latter context Rawls treats wealth inheritance as an inequality just like nat-
ural talents. Wealth inheritance is an inevitable feature of family relations
that allow individuals to exploit their natural talents. Restricting individ-
uals from using their natural talents would be beneficial to no one. Rawls
justifies this judgement by appeal to the difference principle. But Rawls’s
theory is clear that the Honey Farmer’s social class should not allow her
more opportunities than similarly talented and motivated individuals, to
compete for social and economic positions. However, the problem is that
Rawls does not justify why he distinguishes equalising the arbitrariness of
social class, from the arbitrariness of natural talent or wealth inheritance.
In the example, our Honey Farmer is only one individual among others
who discovers the potentially lethal bees. The only thing that distinguishes
her from the other discoverers is her ability to exploit her natural talent by
using her inherited wealth. Her social class does not enable her to establish
her business any more easily than her competitors. In fact she pays taxes
at her pre-farming job just as anyone else to fund the education of children
from lower social classes. Nonetheless, the Honey Farmer’s luck to have
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wealthy parents who are able to bequeath capital allows her to use her
business talent to gain an advantage over others.
Although Rawls’s theory advocates the restriction of wealth inheritance
so that our Honey Farmer would have to pay some amount of tax on her
inheritance, it does not permit taxing our Honey Farmer so she has the
same opportunity as the other individuals who discovered the bees. How
does Rawls justify this constraint on restricting wealth inheritance? In
short why does the arbitrary distribution of resources due to birth matter
less in equalising the life-prospects of individuals than their social class
of origin? After all, limiting the influence of social class is the primary
motivation for Rawls (2001: 46–48) to move away from pure meritocratic
distributions of resources or “careers open to talents”. But Rawls is not
clear on why less talented individuals with less wealthy parents should
have less opportunity to start businesses or use the legal system than our
Honey Farmer.
Rawls’s treatment of wealth inheritance is put into sharp contrast when
what Rawls’s theory prescribes for when the Honey Farmer discovers the
bees is compared to the Honey Farmer’s good fortune in finding the money
to pay skilled lawyers. In the second instance the plaintiff, whether a
relative of the deceased or the state, is similarly talented to the Honey
Farmer in legal practice. Both sides must pay for the help of others. In
this case there should not be any inequality in opportunities for the Honey
Farmer and the plaintiff to fight their cases. An equality of opportunity to
fight the court case is required for the procedural justice of the court, but
also for the justice of having opportunities to keep the business running. It
appears that Rawls’s theory would advocate a redistribution of resources
to allow the plaintiff and our Honey Farmer the same opportunities to
fight their cases. It would seem that Rawls’s theory treats the court battle
differently to the initial luck the Honey Farmer enjoys. Why should the less
talented businessperson who discovers the bees at the same time have less
opportunities as our Honey Farmer to establish a business? This question
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is pertinent because it expresses the central worry of the luck intuition.
Why is the Honey Farmer responsible for her initial advantageous business
opportunity, whilst not responsible for the self-evident advantage she has
in fighting the court battle.
I contend that Rawls’s inability to answer this worry means he can-
not coherently justify restricting wealth inheritance to the luck intuition.
This inability means that Rawls’s theory requires some modification either
by reinterpreting a principle or by additional theoretical commitments.
Rawls’s restriction of wealth inheritance only when it causes inequalities
of opportunities between similarly talented and motivated individuals is
only weakly justifiable to the luck intuition. This is because he ignores the
associate concerns of the those who hold the luck intuition for the way the
Honey’s Farmer’s initial wealth inheritance is as much a lucky event as her
family’s social class.
Rawls’s theory appears to recognise wealth inheritance as an unjust dis-
tributor of resources insofar as it stops an individual from a different social
class but of similar talent and motivation from competing with our Honey
Farmer. However, Rawls’s theory does not recognise the arbitrariness of
wealth inheritance in the Honey Farmer’s initial inheriting of wealth as an
impermissible inequality of opportunity. In the Honey Farmer’s case, her
life-prospects are determined by her initial advantage over others, yet she
is not in any way morally responsible for this advantage.
One response to this contention is that wealth inheritance, like social
class and natural talent, is a necessary inequality. An inequality that is
necessary for individuals to use the superior natural talents for the bene-
fit of the least well off in society. This response seems powerful because
it includes social class, natural talent and wealth inheritance in the same
category. According to the difference principle, differences in social class
might be necessary in preventing the least well off having fewer opportuni-
ties than they already do. The argument links diminishing opportunities
to the restriction of wealth inheritance, the advantages of natural talents
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and social class. If all are necessary to some extent then treating wealth
inheritance the same as natural talents is justifiable. I leave this argument
here as a catalyst to what I argue in §2.1.2, namely that considering wealth
inheritance, social class and natural talent as all necessary inequalities to
some extent undermines the principle of fair equality of opportunity. I
suggest that a possible response to this is for Rawls to adopt a modified
difference principle that includes natural talent as the only necessary in-
equality. If this is the case then the Distinction Problem remains open
and shows that Rawls’s restriction of wealth inheritance is only weakly
justifiably to the luck intuition.
2.1.2 The Distilled Argument: Equality of Opportu-
nity to the Difference Principle
In §2.1.1 I presented the Distinction Problem. I argued that Rawls’s theory
unjustifiably distinguishes the arbitrariness of wealth inheritance and nat-
ural talent from the arbitrariness of social class. I argued that this made
Rawls’s theory only weakly justifiable to the luck intuition. I suggested
one response for Rawls could be to consider wealth inheritance, social class
and natural talent as necessary inequalities. In doing so it was justified
that wealth inheritance was treated similar to natural talent and social
class. In this section I argue against the motivational coherency of the
principle of fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle when
attempting to justify the restriction of wealth inheritance. I argue that if
wealth inheritance is considered as a necessary inequality then the differ-
ence principle undermines the motivations for the principle of fair equality
of opportunity. This once again means that some further modification is
required for Rawls’s original theory to be justifiable to the opportunity
and luck intuition.
I wish to borrow a three step argument from Gerald Cohen (2008; 2011)
that reconstructs and distils an argument from Cohen’s many arguments
against Rawls’s difference principle. I wish to distil from these wide ranging
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and at times confusing exchange of arguments a straight forward argument
against Rawls’s theory. This argument centres on how the second principle
of justice justifies the restriction of wealth inheritance to those individuals
who hold the opportunity intuition. The distilled argument is composed of
three steps. Firstly, Cohen establishes what justifies the difference princi-
ple given that it is lexically subordinate to the principle of fair equality of
opportunity. The second step establishes how the difference principle jus-
tifies inequalities of opportunities. It is argued that Rawls’s theory treats
inequalities of opportunities caused by wealth inheritance and other social
contingencies as inevitable inequalities for a just distribution of resources.
Cohen then argues that the incentive based system of production is Rawls’s
justification for considering wealth inheritance as a necessary inequality of
opportunities. Cohen argues that this justification at worst undermines the
principle of fair equality of opportunity, and at the very best, undermines
the commitment of a society to a structure of just institutions justifiable
to everyone.
Cohen opens his argument by asking how a society can justify the
difference principle whilst also justifying the principle of fair equality of
opportunity. Specifically this question asks how Rawls’s theory can justify
to all individuals in the original position behind the veil of ignorance that
they should endorse two things. First that they should accept a principle
that guarantees the equal opportunity to attain social and economic po-
sitions and secondly accept the principle that some unequal distributions
of opportunities resulting from social contingencies like wealth inheritance
are permitted. Rawls’s answer to this opening question is that his theory
of justice is about analysing why some individuals have lower life-prospects
than others and whether this is justified. As Rawls (2001: 55) says:
Justice as fairness focuses on inequalities in citizens’ life-
prospects. . . as these prospects are affected by three kinds of
contingencies:
(a) their social class of origin: the class into which they are
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born and develop before the age of reason;
(b) their native endowments (as opposed to their realized en-
dowments); and their opportunities to develop these en-
dowments as affected by their social class of origin;
(c) their good or ill fortune, or good or bad luck, over the
course of life (how they are affected by illness and accident;
and, say, by periods of involuntary unemployment and
regional economic decline).
The above contingencies are causes of inequalities that cannot easily be
resolved or made illegal by a well-ordered society that conceives of itself
as a system of fair cooperation between free and equal people. A society
would violate the equality of basic liberties if it outlawed individuals of
certain income from having children or attempted to actively disadvantage
some individuals because of their inherited wealth. In fact Rawls believes
that for society to satisfy the equal value of basic liberties for all its citizens
the society must produce goods and services for which difference in talent,
good and ill fortune are required. However, Rawls also judges the above
social contingencies as unjust determiners of an individual’s life-prospects.
Rawls argues that the difference principle balances these two concerns.
Rawls (2001: 64) argues that the type of inequality judged as just by
the difference principle is an unequal distribution of resources and oppor-
tunities that are of benefit to the worst off individual. This is because
those with lower prospects are able to benefit from the productive power
of those with higher prospects. As Rawls (2001: 64) states:
. . . the difference principle requires that however great the in-
equalities in wealth and income may be, and however willing
people are to work to earn their greater shares of output, ex-
isting inequalities must contribute effectively to the benefit of
the least advantaged.
The answer to Cohen’s opening question is that the difference principle
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is justified by its egalitarian purpose. The principle is intended to jus-
tify some inequalities of opportunities so that individuals with lower life-
prospects may compete for their own benefit with individuals with higher
life-prospects, without violating any basic liberties.
The second step of Cohen’s argument is a critique of how the difference
principle is applied to benefit the worst off. Why would a liberal society
accept a principle that judges as just, distributions of resources where,
despite their efforts, some individuals will have lower prospects and some
will have higher prospects? Rawls’s answer to this question is the incen-
tive based system of resource distribution. Specifically Rawls (2001: 64)
believes that the difference principle must be understood as a “principle
of reciprocity”. This means that the difference principle impels a society
to redistribute resources so that:
. . . the better endowed (who have a more fortunate place in
the distribution of native endowments they do not morally de-
serve) are encouraged to acquire still further benefits - they are
already benefited by their fortunate place in that distribution -
on condition that they train their native endowments and use
them in ways that contribute to the good of the less endowed
(whose less fortunate place in the distribution they also do not
morally deserve). (Rawls 2001: 76–77)
Rawls believes that differences in talent and natural endowment mean that
some will by the luck of birth have more ability to offer services or goods
that are more valuable to all. These individuals are those with higher
life-prospects than those with talents and endowment that are not valued
by most individuals.1 Rawls believes that those with higher prospects will
by market forces need an incentive to be productive at the level needed
for those with worse prospects to benefit. Incentives in this context would
mean higher pay or the opportunity to bequeath their wealth. Clearly these
1By “value” here I mean nothing more than the value placed on goods and services
by individuals in the market.
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“incentives” are inequalities of resources and opportunities, but justified
under the difference principle. However, these “incentives” are precisely
the sorts of things that lead to differences in social class and inherited
wealth. Rawls (1971: 78; 2001: 77) argues that if the worst off can be
advantaged in some way then inequalities of social class and wealth inher-
itance can be permitted and even maximised. The reasonable conclusion
to this argument is that any restriction of wealth inheritance can only be
justified insofar as it is to the benefit of the worst off even if it does not
satisfy the opportunity or luck intuition.
To highlight the importance of this critique to the justification of re-
stricting wealth inheritance, let us use a modified version of Cohen’s (2008:
70–73) example of a Doctor. The resource distribution where a Doctor
earns consistently and significantly more than a Hospital Cleaner is judged
to be just under the difference principle. It is just, because it is reason-
able to expect the Doctor will demand higher pay as incentive to work
as a Doctor for the benefit of the Hospital Cleaner. Without the higher
pay, the Doctor would not have any impetus to be productive enough so
that her services are affordable enough for the Hospital Cleaner. The most
important aspect of this example is that the Doctor will also have more op-
portunities to accumulate and bequeath wealth. This allows the Doctor’s
descendants to enjoy a greater array of opportunities than the descendants
of the Hospital Cleaner. However, according to the difference principle, the
Doctor’s incentive is just even if it produces further social contingencies.
It appears that restrictions on wealth inheritance are justified only to the
extent that those with more valued natural talents have the incentive to
be productive. Any restrictions that would create an equality of opportu-
nities for both the eventual Hospital Cleaner and the eventual Doctor to
earn the same income would be unjustified. This is clearly contrary to the
opportunity intuition.
Rawls responds by comparing the Hospital Cleaner’s state of affairs
when the Doctor has no incentive to be productive and when she does. In
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both cases the Hospital Cleaner is the worst off. She has a reduced capacity
to accumulate and bequeath wealth and fewer opportunities to compete in
the labour market. The Hospital Cleaner is the worst off whether the Doc-
tor has enough incentive to be productive to benefit the Hospital Cleaner
or not. However in the cases where the Doctor has the incentive to be
productive the Hospital Cleaner is advantaged by having access to the
Doctor’s services. Rawls goes on to argue that the principle of fair equal-
ity of opportunity and the difference principle only permit the Hospital
Cleaner to have fewer opportunities than the Doctor if she is less naturally
talented and motivated. As Rawls (2001: 44) says most succinctly:
. . . those who have the same level of talent and ability and
the same willingness to use these gifts should have the same
prospects of success regardless of their social class of origin. . .
According to Rawls, the difference principle is to every individual’s
advantage and it justifies unequal distributions of resources and opportu-
nities. In the case of wealth inheritance, Rawls’s rebuttal to Cohen is that
any restriction on wealth inheritance should not disincentivise the Doctor
from being productive, even if it would create unequal opportunities in
the future. The difference principle judges that some arrangement of so-
cial institutions where individuals with the lowest prospects are benefited
in some way is more just than some other arrangement where the worst
off are not benefited in any way. Rawls’s restriction of wealth inheritance
is justifiable to the opportunity intuition only on the condition that an
equality of opportunity incentivises the naturally talented and motivated
to be productive enough to benefit the worst off.
Cohen responds that if the difference principle is understood in the way
Rawls argues, the difference principle actually undermines the motivation
for the principle of fair equality of opportunity. Cohen argues that Rawls is
committed to equalising opportunities while also committed to maintaining
or maximising inevitable inequalities of opportunities that are necessary
for the advantage of the worst off. Cohen believes that these commitments
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are entailed by the incentive based justification for the difference principle.
Individuals with high prospects only have high prospects because they
need the incentive to be productive enough to benefit those with lower
prospects. However Cohen (2011: 246) argues that:
. . . if the inequality is indeed necessary, then it’s necessary be-
cause and only because productive people would be unwilling
to be as productive as they are if they did not prosper better
than others do.
Cohen believes that to permit incentive seeking like the Doctor in the
above example, means that individuals are not really committed to the
principle of fair equality of opportunity. They are actually committed to
the exploitation of one’s natural talents and endowments to the greatest
extent whilst still benefiting others in some way. For Cohen the individ-
uals who need incentives to benefit those with lower prospects are not
really interested in having an arrangement of social institutions justifiable
or agreeable to everybody (MacKay 2013: 522). Rather individuals are
interested in an arrangement where those with higher prospects can im-
pose unnecessary burdens on the arrangement in terms of higher pays or
higher social status. These burdens are unnecessary precisely because they
are used simply to incentivise those with more valued talents and natural
endowments to share some of their production with those who have less
valued talents and endowments.
This criticism is particularly important for our purposes since one pri-
mary determiner of whether someone inherits or bequeaths wealth is their
opportunities to accumulate wealth. Those born into wealthy families are
more likely to inherit wealth that confers more opportunities to accumu-
late and bequeath more wealth. It appears that if the difference principle
justifies unequal distributions of resources and opportunities by appealing
to the incentives for talented individuals to produce, then Rawls’s theory
does not satisfy the opportunity intuition and luck intuition in the way
he hopes. This is because the opportunity intuition is the intuitive judge-
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ment that what matters for the justice of restricting wealth inheritance
is whether bequeathers and inheritors have equal opportunity to exercise
their social and economic freedoms. If Rawls judges unequal opportunities
as just then the restrictions on wealth inheritance entailed by this judge-
ment will not promote an equality of opportunities for bequeathers and
inheritors. Rawls’s theory would not answer the normative concerns of
the opportunity intuition. Similarly, Rawls’s theory would not answer the
normative concerns of the luck intuition. This is because the luck intuition
expresses the intuitive judgement that the justice of restricting wealth in-
heritance depends on mitigating the role that luck plays in determining
whether agents are morally responsible for their interactions with other
individuals. If Rawls’s theory uses the difference principle to justify un-
equal opportunities then restrictions on wealth inheritance will either be
impermissible or too weak to mitigate the role of luck in determining peo-
ple’s lives. Cohen (2011: 246) concludes that Rawls’s theory incorrectly
argues that inequalities of opportunities are necessary to make the worst
off benefit even if they are still the worst off:
. . . inequality isn’t really or strictly necessary to make the worst
off better off: it is not necessary independently of human will
- it is necessary only because and insofar as the productive are
unwilling to act otherwise: it is their choices that make the
inequality necessary.
It should be noted that Cohen does not argue that inequalities of opportu-
nities are unnecessary in a society of fair social cooperation. He also does
not argue that there are no normative principles that can justify unequal
distributions of resources and opportunities. Cohen’s argument is only that
Rawls’s second principle of justice contains two constituent principles, of
which the lexically subordinate principle undermines the motivation for
the lexically prior principle. This is because the difference principle treats
inequalities resulting from wealth inheritance as a necessary condition for
making the worst off benefit in some way. In short Cohen’s argument shows
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that Rawls’s theory is incoherent in responding to the Distinction Problem
by treating wealth inheritance as a necessary inequality. The Distinction
Problem was problematic because it shows that Rawls’s theory could only
weakly justify restricting wealth inheritance since it did not answer the nor-
mative concerns of the luck intuition. If the Distinction Problem stands
then Rawls require another solution to the Distinction Problem or against
the distilled argument I have presented in this section. The next section
explores the latter option.
Rawls’s Possible Response
One possible response to Cohen’s argument is that Rawls’s theory over-
states the case when it argues that inequalities of opportunities are nec-
essary for the benefit of the worst off. Importantly this would mean that
wealth inheritance might not be a necessary inequality. This response be-
gins with a new perspective on Rawls’s difference principle, namely the
perspective of an individual who is the worst off in a society and attempt-
ing to reach a state of reflective equilibrium with her fellow citizens. This
individual may compare her preference for a difference principle that de-
fines necessary inequalities more broadly than a difference principle that
defines necessary inequalities more narrowly. In particular, the individual
would compare the consequences for her under a difference principle that
defines only natural talent as a necessary inequality to Rawls’s original dif-
ference principle that defines social class, good fortune and natural talent
as necessary inequalities. The first definition is clearly more narrow than
the second.
The broad definition of the difference principle is familiar because it is
the definition that Rawls endorses. The narrow definition prescribes that
wealth inheritance and social class are contingently permissible inequali-
ties. They are contingent on whether permitting them would actually be
to the benefit of the worst off. The benefit in such a case would be that
the worst off were helped to compete with equal opportunities with the
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better off.
Let us return to an earlier example to illustrate my contention. Our
Honey Farmer along with other individuals finds potentially lethal bees
and hatches a plan to farm them and sell bottled honey at a profit. Our
Honey Farmer let us assume was born into the lower class of her soci-
ety. This is because compared to other individuals her life prospects at
the time of birth were limited by the economic and social opportunities
that individuals of her class usually enjoyed. Neither of her parents could
afford to start a similar business because neither had the time, talent or
capital. Our Honey Farmer finds that despite her motivation and talent
she has no initial capital to start a business. This is contrasted with other
individuals who received inheritances from their ancestors and were easily
able to start their businesses whilst also having the natural talent to start
and run a business. Due to tax subsidised education our Honey Farmer
eventually finds employment in one of the Honey Farms set up by the other
discoverers.
The Honey Farmer may wonder at this point what her life would have
been if her social class had played no role in determining the distribution
of resources. She may say that her limited opportunities in life at birth
was an arbitrary limitation of her resources and that such a system was
not necessary for those in the lower class to benefit in some way. Those in
the lower class would obviously have been better off if what determined the
distribution of resources was talent and natural endowments of intelligence
or strength of will. Rawls may argue that this is a case where the worst
off in society would be made better off if the difference principle permitted
inequalities only on the basis that they are contingent. What are the
contingencies in the above case? Two contingencies stand out, firstly the
contingency of the Honey Farmer being born into a social class that does
not value her entrepreneurial motivation, and secondly her luck at being
born to parents with little wealth to bequeath.
It appears that the Honey Farmer would obviously prefer to live in a
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society ordered by a difference principle that only justifies natural talent
and endowment as necessary inequalities. However, Rawls’s theory does
not argue for an equality of outcomes. To this end inequality resulting
from an open and fair competitive marketplace is just as long as it is
made compatible with Rawls’s two principles of justice. An inequality of
talents in a fair system of cooperation would be permitted and necessary
for society to produce enough goods to satisfy the varying needs and desires
of its citizens. It should be noted that Rawls’s conception of individuals as
free and equal means that the mutually compatible interests of all citizens
have equal value. This means that some inequality is inevitable given the
limited resources available to society.
I believe the Honey Farmer would prefer the narrow definition of the
difference principle. Under this principle the distribution of resources and
opportunities according to social class would be permissible if unequal
social classes were entrenched social structures arranged so that individuals
of any class had equal opportunity to move between social classes. Social
class in this case would not be an inequality necessary for a productive
society, but rather a contingent one. Nevertheless a contingent permissible
inequality so long as the arrangement is beneficial to everyone such that all
individuals have the opportunity to move from one social class to another.
If the Honey Farmer’s society adopted the narrowly defined difference
principle then I believe the following would be the case. The Honey Farmer
would discover that it is reasonably possible for her to earn enough if she
is motivated enough to start her own Honey Farm in due time. For the
society to be just, our Honey Farmer would receive much more support
than mere subsidised education. This could include, perhaps subsidised or
interest free loans, business classes, or progressive tax breaks to allow our
Honey Farmer to eventually move into a higher social class and actually
establish a Farm of her own.
The problem for Rawls seems solved. Social class and wealth inher-
itance are contingently permissible and not necessary. Nevertheless I do
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not believe this solves the Distinction Problem. The narrow definition of
the difference principle permits unequal social classes, but it does not per-
mit taxing the Honey Farmer’s competitors so that they have the same
opportunities to establish their business as our Honey Farmer. Under the
narrowly defined difference principle unequal resource distributions due to
wealth inheritance are permissible so long as they help individuals move
into higher social classes. But this also permits the Honey Farmer’s com-
petitors to inherit their parent’s wealth as well. Even a progressive tax
on inherited wealth would still permit the Honey Farmer’s competitors to
inherit their wealth and establish their business. This is because a confis-
cation of inheritances would not fund the required programs to help our
Honey Farmer move into a higher social class.
Where does this leave Rawls’s theory? Well, the narrow definition of
the difference principle would treat wealth inheritance and natural talent
differently. Unfortunately this does not solve the Distinction Problem.
This is because Rawls still treats social class and wealth inheritance dif-
ferently. Both are social contingencies but the first is a stratification of
society from the least advantaged group to the most advantaged group,
while the second is treated as a means to benefit the least advantaged
group. To that end, Rawls’s theory still permits wealth inheritance, as a
means for individuals to gain the same opportunities as similarly talented
and motivated individuals from higher social classes.
In effect, wealth inheritance is still permitted to create unequal op-
portunities so long as it helps individuals move into higher social classes.
This seems unjustifiable to the luck intuition. This is because under the
narrow difference principle any restriction of wealth inheritance would be
weak enough to advantage the worst off providing them the opportunities
to become better off. Those who hold the luck intuition in a liberal democ-
racy would find restricting wealth inheritance to this extent only weakly
justifiable since individuals are still held responsible for events they did
not choose. Our Honey Farmer must still suffer having fewer opportuni-
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ties than her fellow bee discoverers so that she can then be compensated
to have an equal opportunity to move into a higher social class. Her in-
herited wealth is not treated the same way her social class is despite both
being brute luck events. I suggest a more comprehensive solution to the
Distinction Problem in Chapter 4.
2.2 The Basic Structure and Individual Re-
sponsibility
So far I have focused on the coherency of Rawls’s principles of justice. But
now I move to the individuals that affirm the principles and the social
institutions they apply to. In this section I explicate Iris Marion Young’s
(2001; 2011) critique that Rawls’s concept of the basic structure is too
narrow and that this narrowness is caused by his implausible focus on
the basic structure as the only domain to which his principles of justice
apply. The conclusion I draw from Young’s critique is that Rawls’s theory
might not be as sensitive to the normative concerns of the luck intuition
as his principles of justice indicate. I believe Young’s critique shows that
a society operating according to Rawls’s principle may still create forms
of structural injustice that limit the set of choices open to individuals,
without their choice. I believe the consequence of this critique is that
Rawls’s theory needs to be modified in some way to account for the ways
wealth inheritance can contribute to structural injustice.
Young agrees with many of Rawls’s motivations. She does not believe
distributive justice can be captured simply by the acceptance of natu-
ral rights and moral side constraints on individual interactions in society.
Young even accepts Rawls’s conclusion that what is just or unjust in lib-
eral society is not individual interactions but the basic structure of liberal
society, namely its social institutions. Despite this, Young departs from
Rawls’s view of justice when she considers the kind of society that is left
when the society adheres to all of Rawls’s procedures and principles. Young
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argues that Rawls’s basic structure of social institutions is too narrow to
account for the effect of social behaviours on the lives of individuals. One
of the social behaviours we are interested in is wealth inheritance. Young’s
argument suggests that Rawls’s restriction of wealth inheritance, even after
accepting his principles, may be too weak to justify to the luck intuition.
This is because wealth inheritance is one type of social behaviour that
limits the set of choices open to individuals who do not inherit or inherit
very little. Let us remember that the luck intuition is the conviction that
certain individuals have that what matters for the justice of restricting
wealth inheritance is how well it mitigates the role of luck in people’s lives.
This conviction is the intuitive judgement that a just society should hold
individuals responsible for their choices and not for how luck has affected
their lives.
I will use two contrasting cases to make Young’s argument clear. First
there is Young’s (2011: xiii, 43) example of Sandy who is forced into
homelessness by a combination of causes. Second there is Sandra, who
is like Sandy in every way except she lives comfortably. Young uses her
example of Sandy to separate two ways that social injustice occurs, namely
singular actions of one individual violating the rights of another and the
injustice of unfair or discriminatory social behaviours. In Young’s example,
Sandy finds herself unable to find housing because, her current flat is being
converted, she finds other rental properties unaffordable, and the affordable
properties inaccessible to transportation and other amenities important to
her children. Young proposes that as a single mother Sandy is faced with a
labour market that forces her to work the same hours as her male colleagues
for less pay or in a female dominated field with lower average wages. This
results in Sandy being constrained to only a small sector of the housing
market.
In contrast to this, Sandra lives comfortably due to her inheritance.
Sandra is unemployed, has the same natural talents and developed skills
as Sandy and would be in the same socio-economic position as Sandy if
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it were not for her inherited wealth. Sandra’s inheritance is restricted
through progressive taxation according to Rawls’s principles but is able to
access high return capital investments that enable her to live a comfortable
but not lavish lifestyle. Sandra’s inheritance helps many of the worst off
in her society like Sandy through various forms of wealth redistribution.
Nevertheless, Sandra’s set of choices are wider than Sandy’s.
Young argues that Sandy does not suffer any singular immoral action
that leads her to homelessness. No one individual robs her of all her pos-
sessions and makes her unable to pay for any kind of shelter. There is
perhaps one way that Sandy has been morally wronged, namely that she
is paid unequally for equal work. However even this is contestable if there
is a background assumption about the fairness of competitive labour mar-
kets or that despite Sandy’s equal pay she would still be homeless because
of the meagre pay increase. Young’s argument is that what we intuitively
identify as wrong about Sandy’s case is not a moral wrong but structural
injustice. Sandy’s choices are limited because of brute luck events. These
events are outside her control. She is, in colloquial language, a victim of
circumstance. But importantly she is not victimised by a criminal or some
lone institutional interaction. It seems entirely reasonable to question why
wealth inheritance should not be restricted to increase Sandy’s opportu-
nities and decrease Sandra’s? Although Sandra’s inheritance is restricted,
why should it not be restricted so that the choices open to Sandy are
affected by the choices Sandy makes.
If Sandy and Sandra’s cases are analysed from the perspective of
Rawls’s theory of justice there does not appear to be any clear signs of
injustice. After all, the social institutions that Sandy interacts with are
assumed to not violate any of her basic liberal rights or her opportunity to
achieve social and economic positions. Rawls (2001: 65–66) even entertains
objections to his theory that appeal to the way existing race and gender
discrimination can mean individuals do not have equal opportunities to
access the public goods of their society. He concludes that while unequal
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access to the basic liberties could have been argued as to the advantage
of women and racial minorities, we certainly do not conclude this in the
present day. To this extent Sandy’s case should not be seen as a form gen-
der discrimination, but as a circumstance of cultural character or social
value. Societies are different and value different ends; Sandy finds herself
in a society that values male breadwinners and capital accumulation. This
does not mean it is illegal for Sandy to be a breadwinner or for her not to
care about accumulating capital, her choices to do so are merely limited.
Nevertheless, let us suppose that through the difference principle the
inequality of opportunity in Sandy’s society is of some benefit to Sandy.
Perhaps the economic growth for the rich allows the government to collect
taxes and provide assistance to Sandy for her food and educational needs.
Young (2011: 70) argues that:
Depending on the issue, the structural processes that tend to
produce injustice for many people do not necessarily refer to
a small set of institutions, and they do not exclude everyday
habits and chosen actions.
Young appears to argue that injustice in a liberal society can be produced
by parts of society outside the social institutions Rawls’s theory is con-
cerned with. This raises the incredulous question: what parts of society is
Young referring to when she says that the injustice of Sandy’s situation is
not solvable by reforming the social institutions that Rawls’s theory focuses
on? Young seems to be looking for an injustice that does not exist. Young
argues that Rawls focuses too narrowly on the basic legal and economic
frameworks that regulate individual interactions in the economy and with
respect to the law. Young (2011: 70) suggests that:
Social structures are not a part of the society; instead they
involve, or become visible in, a certain way of looking at the
whole society, one that sees patterns in relations among people
and the positions they occupy relative to one another.
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Although Young (2011: 52–59) laments that structural injustice is hard to
define, it appears that her explanation of social structures does reveal the
general area she is worried about. She is concerned with what individuals
value, and how these values are reflected in social behaviours that endorse
certain types of behaviours over others.
If we understand social structures this way, I believe we can better un-
derstand why Sandy’s example is a case of structural injustice. Sandy’s
situation is caused by a social behaviour within the basic structure that
values men as breadwinners with a nuclear family. Sandy’s situation can
also be analysed through the way her society does not value assisting indi-
viduals who are disadvantaged by circumstances outside their control such
as labour and property market fluctuations that may result in more wealth
for some but homelessness for others. Sandy’s set of choices are limited by
what her society values, namely the kind of life that Sandra values: capital
accumulation and capital investment.
Young argues that the way individuals interact and contribute to
broader social behaviours makes them responsible for stopping the kind
of injustice that Sandy faces. When comparing Sandy and Sandra, one
of these broader social behaviours is clearly the effect of wealth inheri-
tance in reinforcing the social value of capital accumulation resulting in
the marginalisation of certain individuals. If individuals contribute to so-
cial practices that reinforce the valuing of one type of family above all
others or one group of wealth holders above others then they are responsi-
ble for reforming or constructing new social institutions that remedy this
injustice.
Young’s criticism is particularly important for our purposes because it
appears to show that Rawls’s theory might not be able to rule out the
structural injustice of wealth inheritance enough. Why? Because the do-
main to which his principles apply does not include the values reflected in
social behaviours. Rawls’s theory might not be sensitive to the injustice
that occurs outside the social institutions that Rawls is concerned with,
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namely the injustice of individuals being unable to effectively take respon-
sibility for their lives. Rawls does not offer any means for a just society
to reform its institutions so that wealth inheritance does not limit the
set of choices open to individuals. Wealth inheritance in Sandy’s case re-
flects her society’s valuing of capital accumulation and investment in such
a way that she cannot be reasonably expected to take responsibility for
the choices open to her. She did not choose to limit her choices to either
inadequate housing or homelessness. It seems if Rawls’s theory does not
provide some way for Sandy’s society to redress Sandy’s situation any re-
striction of wealth inheritance will only be weakly justifiable to the luck
intuition. This is because the luck intuition is precisely the judgement that
the justice of restricting wealth inheritance depends on making individuals
responsible for the choices open to them.
Young’s criticism shows that Rawls’s theory may not be able to justify
restricting wealth inheritance if it does not broaden the basic structure of
society. Specifically broadening it to include social behaviours that reflect
individual values about the desirable gender of the breadwinner and the
desirable type of economic interaction. Wealth inheritance is one social
behaviour that reflects these social values. This is the essential norma-
tive intuition captured by the luck intuition; that the justice of restricting
wealth inheritance depends on the mitigation of luck in determining peo-
ples lives. Sandy’s life is affected, from her perspective, from the luck of
being born into a society that values male breadwinners and capital ac-
cumulation. There appears no reason why Sandy is responsible for her
homelessness when she has no control to affect or predict the rental prop-
erty market, or the opportunity to earn as much as a man for equal work.
Contrastingly Sandra’s life is determined by the luck of wealth inheritance
and the way her society does not value the restriction of wealth inheri-
tance. Sandy and Sandra’s cases are contrary to the normative concerns
of the luck intuition. I offer a solution to the Structural Injustice Problem
in Chapter 4.
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2.3 The Road Ahead for Rawls
Where does all this leave Rawls’s theory? It seems that Rawls’s original
theory cannot coherently justify restricting wealth inheritance to the luck
and opportunity intuitions. To establish this three problems were intro-
duced. First, the Distinction Problem, that Rawls’s theory unjustifiably
treats wealth inheritance as similar to natural talent and different to social
class. This problem reveals that Rawls’s restriction of wealth inheritance
may be too weak and unjustifiable to the opportunity and luck intuition.
One response to this problem was considered, namely that wealth inher-
itance and social class might be necessary inequalities. At that point a
second problem suggested that treating wealth inheritance as a necessary
inequality shows that the difference principle undermines the principle of
fair equality of opportunity. In short, when justifying the restriction of
wealth inheritance, Rawls’s second principle of justice might not be co-
herent. I argued that one possible solution to this was that social class
and wealth inheritance were contingently permissible and not necessary
inequalities like natural talent. To this I responded that this solution only
partially solves the Distinction Problem. This is because wealth inheri-
tance would still not be restricted even if it helped benefit the worst off
in such way to eliminate social class from determining a person’s oppor-
tunities. The third problem was the Structural Injustice Problem. This
questioned whether Rawls’s theory may be too limited in its scope. The
problem appears to show that Rawls’s restriction of wealth inheritance is
not justifiable to the luck intuition if it does not include social behaviours
as part of the basic structure of society. I argued that this was important
because wealth inheritance was a social behaviour that reflected the social
values of society which then limited the choices open to certain individu-
als. Solutions to the Distinction Problem and Structural Injustice Problem
will be offered in Chapter 4 as the penultimate part of the comparative
analysis between Rawls and Dworkin’s theories.
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Chapter 3
Dworkin’s Resource
Luck-Egalitarianism
This chapter critically evaluates whether Dworkin’s theory coherently jus-
tifies the restriction of wealth inheritance to individuals who hold the luck
intuition.1 I conclude that Dworkin cannot do this without modifying
1One criticism that is not included in this chapter but features quite largely in the
extant literature is Susan Hurley’s (2001: 57–61) argument’s against the coherency of
Dworkin’s theory. Hurley first questions whether the aim to neutralise the effects of luck
can settle what luck-egalitarianism should redistribute. Hurley then questions whether
neutralising the effects of luck can provide a justification for how to redistribute so that
an equal distribution is achieved. I believe both arguments can be easily dismissed as
attacking a strawman version of Dworkin’s theory. Another criticism not included in
this chapter is what I term Saul Smilansky (1997; 2003) and Samuel Scheﬄer’s (2003;
2005) Free Will Objection to Dworkin’s theory. The objection is that Dworkin’s theory
appears to assume a libertarian conception of free will that is at best controversial and
at worst implausible. Smilansky and Scheﬄer argue that Dworkin’s theory is committed
to a conception of “genuine choice” that conflicts with a more scientifically supported
deterministic conception of free will where an individual’s action is determined by earlier
physical facts. Although this objection is discussed widely in the extant literate it is
not included in this thesis because it does not separate Rawls and Dworkin’s theory
in relation to either wealth inheritance or the three relevant intuitions. Smilansky and
Scheﬄer arguments appear to be equally dangerous for Rawls and theory as it is for
Dworkin’s theory.
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or reinterpreting his theory. The first criticism I discuss in this chap-
ter questions the motivational coherency of Dworkin’s theory. The second
questions the coherency of the subject of Dworkin’s theory and the norma-
tive ideal of equality. The third questions the coherency of the distinction
between luck and choice that Dworkin’s uses to justify restricting wealth
inheritance.2 The success of these criticisms would mean that Dworkin’s
theory is incoherent in the way it attempts to justify restricting wealth
inheritance to the luck intuition. This would be a significant comparative
cost for Dworkin’s theory, because this thesis is focused on comparing how
well Rawls and Dworkin’s theories justify restricting wealth inheritance to
a broad range of intuitions in a liberal democracy. I offer some responses
and possible modifications to all three problems which will be assessed for
their costs and benefits in Chapter 5.
The first criticism I discuss is the Harshness Problem. The Harshness
Problem is that in trying to justify Dworkin’s theory to the luck intuition,
the theory entails the unintuitive harsh stigmatisation of the unlucky or
the unintuitive harsh violation of personal dignity. I contend that the
Harshness Problem attempts to show Dworkin’s justification for restricting
wealth inheritance as a form of brute luck is incoherent with the liberal
democratic motivation to treat citizens proportionately to their injustices.
After considering the extant literature surrounding the Harshness Problem
I suggest a provisional solution. This solution proposes we understand
Dworkin’s theory as applying only to social institutions.
The second criticism I discuss is the Wrong Focus Objection. The
Wrong Focus Objection is essentially the objection that insofar as
Dworkin’s theory justifies restrictions on inherited wealth to make a state
of affairs distributively just, Dworkin’s theory focuses on the wrong thing.
The objection contends that Dworkin uses the normative ideal of equality
2All the criticisms in this chapter are presented not in the specific exchanges that
have taken place between philosophers but as distilled arguments that reflect the debate
surrounding certain objections and problems. This avoids unnecessary repetition and
treats Dworkin’s theory and the critiques of it in a charitable but critical light.
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to satisfy the luck intuition in the wrong way, namely by trying to equalise
resources and not, as he should, social relations. To this I suggest a pro-
visional solution that Dworkin’s theory should be understood as holding
individuals and social institutions reciprocally responsible. Further I sug-
gest and that such a relation should exist between individuals when they
are politically connected through social institutions.
The third and final criticism I discuss is Gerald Cohen’s use of his theory
of Equal Access to Advantage to challenge the way Dworkin distinguishes
between choice and luck. This challenge argues that Dworkin justified
the restriction of wealth inheritance to those who hold the luck intuition
using an incoherent distinction. This is because it does not treat the
effect of wealth inheritance on an individual’s opportunities to fulfil their
desires the same way as its effect on an individual’s opportunity for welfare.
This differential treatment of the effect of wealth inheritance shows that
Dworkin’s theory might be comparatively costly to Rawls’s theory because
it uses an incoherent distinction to satisfy those who hold the luck intuition.
Cohen’s response is to suggest that Dworkin’s theory should accept at least
parts of his theory to maintain a consistent restriction of wealth inheritance
that accounts for unchosen preferences and circumstances.
One point to note is that the criticisms in this chapter are originally
presented in the literature as arguments against luck-egalitarianism as a
general normative theory of justice.3 But a successful criticism of the gen-
eral theory will also be a problem for Dworkin’s theory of “equality of
resources”. This is because justifying restrictions on wealth inheritance
3One obstacle to analysing how these arguments apply to Dworkin’s theory is that
there seems no unified conception for how all individuals should be equal that all luck-
egalitarians agree on. It seems some, like Dworkin, are concerned with equalising re-
sources for each individual whilst others are concerned with equalising the welfare gained
by the resources. Even amongst these theories the status of responsibility also seems
vastly different. Responsibility can be seen as either strictly including individual prefer-
ences and tastes or a more restricted set of just everyday choices. This is why I propose
the two general normative theses.
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involves equalising resources, like inherited wealth, because they are inher-
ently forms of brute luck. Nevertheless, for scholastic clarity, I will outline
some general normative theses for Dworkin’s theory.
I propose two primary theses and one secondary thesis as the funda-
mental normative principles of Dworkin’s theory. The theses express in
clear terms the subject and mechanism of Dworkin’s theory.
GT1: All individuals should be rendered equal in resources.
GT2: Only the effects of brute luck, not option luck, on an individual’s
social and economic state of affairs should be minimised as much as
possible.
GT2.1 All citizens should have the mutually compatible individual
liberty to act as they wish and the opportunity to participate
in the processes of their society that implement GT2.
It should be noted that the first thesis is specific to Dworkin’s interpreta-
tion of luck-egalitarianism. Many of the problems discussed in this chapter
are equally problematic to other interpretations. It is possible, to consider
another more general egalitarian thesis:
Proto-GT1: Individuals should be rendered equal in something.
Proto-GT1 is the general normative thesis shared by any theory that at-
tempts to justify an equal distribution of anything. This thesis is so general
that it can even include, as Sen (2010: 291) notes, non-distributive jus-
tice theories like Nozick’s libertarianism where individuals are only to be
rendered equal in liberties, freedoms or natural rights. However for the
purposes of examining the problems for how Dworkin’s theory justifies re-
stricting wealth inheritance, Proto-GT1 will be set aside in favour of GT1.
GT1 alone, however, is also too general and fails to specify when and
how individuals should be rendered equal. GT2 is what differentiates luck-
egalitarianism from all other egalitarian theories. It specifics when and how
to distribute resources in accordance with GT1. Importantly GT2 refers
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to “brute luck” as differentiated from “option luck”. Brute luck is the luck
enjoyed or suffered by individuals from events they did not choose. In short
it is the competitive advantage or disadvantage that individuals bear for
which they are not responsible because they did not choose to have such
advantages or disadvantages (Dworkin 2000: 73–74). Brute luck is different
to option luck because option luck is the luck that individuals choose to
endure by either insuring against competitive disadvantage or by accepting
the potential risk to enjoy the possible advantage (Dworkin 2000: 73–
74). GT2 captures the notion that rendering individuals equal in resources
means making them equally responsible for their choices. Dworkin (2000:
122) describes his attitude to GT1 when he says it is:
. . . a process of coordinated decisions in which people who take
responsibility for their own ambitions and projects, and who
accept, as part of that responsibility, that they belong to a
community of equal concern, are able to identify the true costs
of their own plans to other people, and so design and redesign
these plans so as to use only their fair share of resources in
principle available to all.
Transforming brute luck events into option luck events by individuals
choosing to insure themselves against possible disadvantage allows for a
distribution of resources based on individual choice with justified inequali-
ties. Individuals are held responsible for the outcomes of option luck events
even if they mean individuals end up having unequal resources.
GT2, is the specific normative mechanism in Dworkin’s theory that sat-
isfies the luck intuition. This is because, wealth inheritance is an archetypal
example of a brute luck event that must be transformed into option luck.
A state usually redistributes resources by transforming as many brute luck
events into option luck events through insurance schemes or tax systems.
A liberal democracy enables individuals to insure themselves through a
scheme that pools premiums and pays out when the events individuals
have insured against occur. GT1 and GT2.1 are the normative mecha-
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nisms that attempt to satisfy those who hold the opportunity and liberal
intuition. This is because both theses prescribe that all individuals are
to be given equal concern and that all should have equal opportunities
to participate in the processes that transform brute luck into option luck.
The fundamental nature of these “opportunities” is prescribed by GT2.1
as “individual liberty” because individuals must be free and under no co-
ercion to exercise their choices when transforming their brute luck into
option luck. To that end, GT2.1 is the normative mechanism of Dworkin’s
theory that attempts to satisfy those who hold the liberal intuition.
GT1 and GT2 provide a clear target to which the criticisms in this
chapter can be levelled. These criticisms will show that without certain
modifications Dworkin’s theory is motivationally incoherent when trying to
justify restrictions on wealth inheritance in a liberal democracy. This is be-
cause Dworkin’s theory applies GT2 in a way that violates the democratic
expectation of proportionate treatment and is an incoherent realisation of
the normative ideal of equality. This examination will proceed by engag-
ing in the three distinct criticisms outlined previously. The first criticism,
which has far reaching consequences for Dworkin’s theory, is the Harshness
Problem. Following this I will deal with a criticism that has been termed
the Wrong Focus Objection that questions whether Dworkin’s theory is a
coherent realisation of the normative ideal of equality. The third and final
criticism will analyse Cohen’s challenge that his theory is better at justi-
fying restricting wealth inheritance to the luck intuition because it uses a
coherent distinction between chosen states of affairs and unchosen ones.
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3.1 The Harshness Problem
Theorists that pose the Harshness Problem4 contend that Dworkin’s aim of
rendering all individuals equal in resources, comes at a great cost, namely
the harsh and intuitively unjust treatment of certain individuals. This
“intuitively unjust” treatment is the disproportionately harsh treatment
of different circumstances. And so the main contention of the Harshness
Problem is that Dworkin’s theory prescribes principles that are incoherent
with the motivations for a theory of justice in a liberal democracy. This is
relevant for our purposes because the Harshness Problem arguably raises
doubts about the coherence of Dworkin’s motivations and principles to re-
strict wealth inheritance in a society that expects individuals to be treated
proportionate to their circumstances. The Harshness Problem pulls at the
intuition that any plausible theory of distributive justice must not treat
certain individuals disproportionate to their circumstances, as a matter of
principle. Disproportionately harsh treatment if necessary for justice must
be independently justifiable. I argue in this section that Dworkin’s theory
cannot give any such independent justification and that some modification
to the original theory is needed.
The Harshness Problem is unfortunately dealt with in a confused way
in the literature. The first step in clarifying the problem is to identify the
nature of the problem. There are, I take it, generally two ways that schol-
ars present the Harshness problem. One way is the Stigmatisation of the
Unlucky. The other way is the Violation of Personal Dignity. What both
variations of the Harshness Problem have in common is that both consider
the treatment of individuals that suffer option and brute luck as dispro-
portionate to their circumstances and actions. The problem argues that
Dworkin’s method for implementing GT1 and GT2 is incoherent with the
motivations for a theory of justice in a democratic society. This is a prob-
4The problem, was first raised by Marc Fleurbaey (1995), Jonathan Wolff (1998) and
Elizabeth Anderson (1999), and then affirmed by Samuel Scheﬄer (2003) and Richard
Arneson (2004).
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lem for Dworkin’s theory because it intends to justify restricting wealth
inheritance to the luck intuition by compensating individuals who inherit
little if they have chosen to buy insurance and not compensate them if they
have not bought insurance. In this section I shall address both variations
of the Harshness Problem in turn, and conclude that the existing responses
are inadequate. As a solution I will offer some provisional modifications to
Dworkin’s theory.
3.1.1 Stigmatisation of the Unlucky
Stigmatisation of the Unlucky is the way in which a luck-egalitarian society
treats individuals harshly by openly condemning an individual to suffer the
consequences of bad option luck. Those that do not act but can, justify
their inaction, according to Dworkin’s theory, by appealing to the victim’s
option luck. This inaction is argued as treating the victim disproportionate
to the kind of option luck they suffer. This disproportionate treatment is
incoherent with the motivations for justifying restrictions on wealth inher-
itance within a liberal democracy. Yet the disproportionate treatment is
how Dworkin’s theory answers the normative concerns of the luck intuition.
The two archetypal examples of this stigmatising is the condemnation of
negligent victims and the discrimination amongst the disabled.
The condemnation of negligent victims essentially involves the refusal
to reallocate resources to help negligent victims. These victims are found
to have suffered bad option luck because they choose to undertake risky
acts whilst knowing them to be risky. Anderson (1999: 288, 296–298)
presents the case of the negligent driver as one example. I will use a
similar example which highlights the role of wealth inheritance. Let us
propose that α and β are drivers. Both make a mistake - an illegal turn
- and seriously injure a pedestrian, whilst also injuring themselves. α and
β do not face identical situations. α has a high paying job and is wealthy
enough to take out a loan to pay for her ambulance and medical care
and so is easily able to avoid the otherwise severe consequences of her
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mistake. β on the other hand does not have a high paying job but lives
off her inheritance. According to Dworkin’s theory a just society has no
obligation to either driver, but has an obligation to restrict the effect of β’s
inheritance on her life. β must be made responsible for her choice to drive
and not for her luck in having wealthy ancestors. It would appears that
Dworkin’s theory advocates restricting β’s ability to use her inheritance
to pay for her medical costs, even if it meant she would die. Unlike the
pedestrians who could not have foreseen the actions of the drivers, the
drivers are responsible for the mistake they made and it is not just for
society to bear the burden of their medical treatment.
The example is simplistic but suffices to encapsulate the thrust of An-
derson and Marc Fleurbaey’s objection. It appears that Dworkin’s theory
cannot be taken seriously as a coherent theory because of the dispropor-
tionately harsh way it treats the negligent drivers and the pedestrian. It
appears Dworkin’s theory advocates letting β face financial ruin and a life
of misery for making one mistake. This seems incoherent with the liberal
democratic motivation to treat individuals proportionate to their actions.
Fleurbaey (1995: 41–43) concludes that luck-egalitarian theories of justice
are too harsh on individuals who take risks which are a necessary part of
everyday life. Anderson believes that the force of the objection derives
solely from the intuitive pull of helping anyone in need regardless of their
responsibility in causing certain states of affairs. The example seems to
show that in its pursuit to render individuals equal, Dworkin’s theory con-
demns individuals in need of help to suffer in a disproportionately harsh
way for the kind of risky choices they make.
Anderson’s (1999: 296) second example has less tragic consequences,
but with the same intuitive pull. Again I will modify the example slightly
from Anderson’s original to highlight the role of wealth inheritance. This
example assumes that even if some sort of obligation towards a minimal
standard of welfare can be justified by Dworkin’s theory, the treatment of
individuals still seems intuitively too harsh. In the second example α, β
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and the pedestrians are treated to some minimum standard of well-being,
yet they still suffer irreversible blindness.
In this example, it appears Dworkin’s theory compels a just society
to harshly discriminate between similarly disabled individuals. α and β
once again cannot be given any assistance precisely because the source of
their disability are their choices. Whereas the state assists the pedestrian
like any other congenitally blind individual because their disability comes
from a form of brute luck. However Dworkin’s theory prescribes that β
should cope with her blindness without the potential help of her inherited
wealth. It appears that Dworkin harshly discriminates between α and β’s
disabilities. This example highlights the harshness of luck-egalitarianism
even in cases where the options are not life or death. Condemning and,
by consequence stigmatising individuals into a life of unassisted disability
purely because of one mistake they made seems intuitively disproportion-
ate. This seems incompatible with the motivations for justifying a theory
of justice in a liberal democracy. Citizens expect different unjust actions
to be treated proportionately. Anderson (1999: 308) and Fleurbaey (1995:
41) conclude that GT2 must be modified such that the neutralising of luck
is not the sole object of egalitarian distributive justice.
3.1.2 Violation of Dignity
The Violation of Personal Dignity is the objection that Dworkin’s theory
treats individuals who suffer from option luck and brute luck in a dispro-
portionately invasive way in trying to justify restricting wealth inheritance
to those who hold the luck intuition. In short the objection attempts to
show that the means to implement GT2 with respect to wealth inheritance
are incoherent with the initial motivations of proposing principles of justice
in a liberal democracy. Citizens expect some degree of privacy or at least
proportionate treatment for their mistakes. But Dworkin’s theory seems
to entail that no matter the circumstance of people’s lives, the state must
invasively examine and judge every choice that an individual has made.
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Wolff (1998: 113–118; 2010: 343–346) and Scheﬄer (2003: 21) illustrate
the objection through the example of an individual who has suffered some
form of disability, but I will once again use a slightly modified example to
foreground the consequences for wealth inheritance.
Let us take the case of α and β again after their respective car accidents.
However this time our focus is on how a just society implements GT2,
particularly how α and β are held responsible for their choices. Wolff and
Scheﬄer argue that to plausibly implement GT2 a society that adopts
Dworkin’s theory must be constantly vigilant about whether individuals
are disadvantaged by their own choices or by brute luck. This vigilance
requires the continuous examination of any brute luck event, like inheriting
wealth, and its relation to their disability to ensure that the demands
of luck-egalitarian justice are met. Wolff and Scheﬄer contend that this
constant examination is a violation of an individual’s attempt to gather
some personal dignity to cope with their brute or option luck. β gains the
ability to cope with irreversible blindness from her inherited wealth and
yet, to plausibly implement GT2, a society must uncover what advantages
β gains from her inherited wealth and whether this is justifiable given
her earlier choices. Even if α and β suffered the consequences of a brute
luck event they would be compensated, but at the cost of having their
disability distressingly examined for its causal influence and its effects. It
appears that in the case of brute and option luck, individuals are required
to shamefully reveal their mistakes and shortcomings in order for social
justice to be achieved. Wolff and Scheﬄer contend that such revelation
is an obstacle for individuals forming a sense of personal dignity, self-
determination and worth in society.
Another example put forward by Wolff (1998: 113–114), attempts to
show the same violating of personal dignity, but without appeal to any
disabilities or potentially fatal risks. Let us suppose that α and β are
not negligent drivers and do not fortunately suffer from any congenital
disabilities or disadvantages. However, just like before α is employed and
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finds her skills valued widely in her society. On the other hand β, although
supported by inherited wealth is unemployed, not because she chooses to
be, but because the economic conditions of the market and her society
mean that her skills are not valued highly enough.
Wolff contends that Dworkin’s theory requires β to be scrutinised and
reveal whether her choices have caused her skills not to be valued by the
economy. If an individual knowingly develops skills that they know are not
valued then society is obligated to compensate the individual less resources.
In this case, in order to restrict β’s inherited wealth β would need to
suffer a shameful revelation of how her inherited wealth has contributed to
the choices she made. This is a revelation of whether she is unemployed
because of or despite her inheritance. β would suffer the scrutiny into her
personal life and the revelation of all the mistakes that could possibly have
caused their unemployment. Wolff believes that it is a severe violation
of one’s personal dignity to condemn a person to unemployment without
assistance because the skills they have chosen to develop and nurture are
no longer valued by anyone in the marketplace. Wolff contends that the
entire implementation of GT2 is humiliating and shows no respect towards
an individual’s dignity. As Wolff puts it:
But think how it must feel - how demeaning it must be - to
have to admit to oneself and then convince others that one has
not been able to secure a job, despite one’s best efforts, at a
time when others appear to obtain employment with ease. This
removes any last shred of dignity from those already in a very
unfortunate position. (1998: 114)
One immediate objection that might be levelled at Wolff and Scheﬄer’s
objections, is that they are objecting to a possible contingent consequence
of Dworkin’s theory. It would seem that any violation of dignity is an
irrational fear of what a society may think of one’s life choices. After
all no theory of distributive justice can necessarily prevent undesirable
contingent consequences like individual irrationality. Wolff explains that
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even if the violation of personal dignity is a contingent consequence of
Dworkin’s theory, the important point is that implementing GT2 has the
potential to cause great shame for many individuals in a systematic way.
As Wolff concludes:
. . . even if a source of shame is contingent and even irrational
it can still be experienced as a source of shame. (1998: 115)
Wolff argues it is intuitively immoral or unjust for a theory of distribu-
tive justice to demand individuals be humiliated. For β in both examples
above, the revelation that inherited wealth has influenced her life would be
a humiliating exercise. It seems plausible to conclude that no individual
would reasonably accept Dworkin’s principles of justice.
3.1.3 Solutions in the Literature
Responses to the Harshness Problem have largely followed two paths:
1. Add another thesis that regulates, minimises or modifies the scope
of GT2.
2. Bite the bullet and reject outright the likelihood of the cases pre-
sented, and insist on the depth and flexibility of GT2.
This section will attempt to detail the way each option is a solution to the
relevant objections in the literature and then argue that both options have
significant theoretical costs.
Problems for Option 1
Alexander Kaufman, Alexander Brown and Nicholas Barry all accept, one
way or another, that the Harshness Problem is a serious problem and that
GT2 must be regulated by another normative thesis that emphasises a
political or moral value. They suggest that an additional thesis should
emphasise inter-societal respect or a minimum welfare threshold that each
92
DWORKIN’S RESOURCE LUCK-EGALITARIANISM
individual must be kept above. One theoretical benefit of such an approach
to solving the Harshness Problem is that the problem is easily solved by
merely accepting Dworkin’s theory in the context of other moral or po-
litical commitments. Narrowing the scope of Dworkin’s theory does not
require any more necessary commitments to specific luck-egalitarian the-
ses. Rather the approach accepts that there exists a contingent pluralism
about a society’s other political and moral commitments that would tem-
per and regulate the scope of Dworkin’s theory.
Kaufman (2004: 833–834) suggests an additional principle that uncon-
ditionally guarantees a minimum level of welfare will ensure that the scope
of the second thesis will always be very narrow and not treat individuals
too harshly. Contrastingly Brown and Barry concede that GT1 and GT2
need not be the only theses to include in a theory of distributive justice.
Barry (2008: 144–148) suggests there may be other normative theses that
demand we apply GT2 only to genuinely chosen outcomes rather than risks.
Brown (2005: 298–311) suggests additional theses that demand treating
individuals according to a different egalitarian metric such as the freedom
from social oppression.
There is no reason to think any of these strategies will be successful.
Kaufman, Brown and Barry believe that adding an extra principle that
ensures a minimum standard of welfare, or that limits what cases of op-
tion luck individuals can be held responsible for will solve the Harshness
Problem. Firstly such a principle would be very hard to formulate with-
out its own exceptions, namely cases where it appears harsh to condemn
an individual to a certain welfare standard from one unfortunate option
luck event. The example used earlier appears to show that individuals are
treated harshly since they are restricted from using their inherited wealth
to improve their circumstances after only one negligent mistake. It still
appears that Dworkin’s theory is compelled to discriminate between sim-
ilarly disabled individuals and restrict the ability of inherited wealth to
play a role in sustaining β’s life above a minimum standard of welfare.
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Another reason why Option 1 is an inadequate response is that it does
not solve the Harshness Problem completely. If a principle that demands
certain minimum welfare standards is introduced then it appears we can
reconstruct cases where personal dignity is still violated or where society is
required to discriminate between the disabled. This is because limiting the
scope or circumstance when individuals ought to be rendered equal does
not change the way Dworkin’s theory prescribes individual responsibility
to be scrutinised. If a principle is introduced that would solve the Stigma-
tisation of the Unlucky, it cannot avoid the Violation of Personal Dignity.
Since the very essence of Dworkin’s theory is that a judgement should be
made about whether individuals are responsible for their situation due to
option luck or brute luck.
Problems for Option 2
Dworkin and Knight both reject the genuine force of the Harshness Prob-
lem, by rejecting the likelihood of cases where individuals are stigmatised
or have their dignity violated. A theoretical advantage of such a response
is that it does not drastically modify Dworkin’s theory, but only offers a
correct interpretation of it. Dworkin (2003: 191–192; 2002: 115, 117–118)
insists that his model of insurance schemes as a way of protecting against
brute luck is flexible enough to account for the cases Anderson, Wolff,
Fleurbaey and Scheﬄer present. Dworkin insists that α and β should
have the choice to buy insurance before driving so as to protect them-
selves against the option luck of hitting a pedestrian. He believes that
the opponents of his theory, incorrectly interpret luck-egalitarianism when
describing counter examples. This is because those treated harshly should
have the same opportunity as any other individuals to buy insurance for
their potentially risky activities and hence transform their brute luck into
option luck.
Knight (2005: 64) on the other hand insists that even if individuals
were treated as harshly and unacceptably as presented then the benefits
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of holding individuals responsible for their choices far outweighs the costs
of the harsh treatment. This is because he believes that the benefits of
compensation for suffering genuine brute luck are conflated with the social
pity for certain individuals. Knight believes that conflating the disadvan-
tage of brute luck and social pity is a misreading of luck-egalitarianism.
Inequality in resources or opportunity to welfare should be corrected be-
cause the inequality is only ever just if those who suffer the inequality have
chosen it. This has nothing to do with whether those with more resources
feel pity for those with less.
Arguably however, Dworkin and Knight both underestimate the force
of the Harshness Problem. They are both unconvinced that the Harshness
Problem is an unjustifiable cost for Dworkin’s theory. Both believe that
any worries can be solved by understanding Dworkin’s original theory in
the right way. This is because Dworkin and Knight insist on the flexibility
of GT1 and GT2. They both insist that in the cases of Stigmatisation,
individuals simply do not have equal opportunity to purchase insurance.
I believe this insistence on the flexibility of the insurance scheme misses
the point of their detractors. It is precisely the failure of GT1 and GT2 to
be flexible in certain cases that Anderson, Wolff, Scheﬄer and Fleurbaey
object to. They object that Dworkin’s theory treats individuals dispropor-
tionate to their circumstances when it denies assistance on principle when
an individual suffers bad option luck. Those who pose the Harshness Prob-
lem ask why individuals would agree to principles that have the potential
to treat individuals contrary to the motivations for creating a just liberal
democracy? Individuals do not expect to be left to die or in complete
poverty by a negligent mistake. Furthermore both Dworkin and Knight do
not engage in any substantial way with the violation of personal dignity.
Both just flatly assert that such cases are unlikely and that individuals
would not feel their dignity being violated if they are justly compensated.
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3.1.4 A Provisional Solution
I now want to suggest a provisional third way to analyse the Harshness
Problem. My solution follows Kok-Chor Tan (2008: 675–683) in that it
involves a more institutional reading of GT1 and GT2 that decreases the
frequency when society compensates for brute luck or enforces insurance
schemes. This is done by making GT1 and GT2 apply only to society’s
institutions rather than individuals. This solution involves an institution-
ally maximised reading of Dworkin’s theory. The solution is “institution-
ally maximising” because it invokes applying Dworkin’s theory to all of
society’s institutions instead of all its individual citizens. This means that
unlike Kaufman, Brown and Barry, we need not jump straight to weakening
Dworkin’s theory and unlike Dworkin, and Knight we can accommodate
and take seriously the concerns raised by Fleurbaey, Wolff, Scheﬄer and
Anderson. However Tan considers this approach for a limited purpose
because he does not use it as a response to the Harshness Problem itself.
Despite Tan’s application of an institutional reading of luck-egalitarianism,
I believe Dworkin ought to accept the following set of proposals:
1. Individuals making mistakes sometimes is a form of brute luck, be-
cause human beings are not perfectly rational or aware of their de-
cision making process.
2. Individuals are only responsible for a particular state of affairs, if all
the relevant social institutions have done well to educate and prevent
individuals from making negligent mistakes.
3. Some level of mandatory insurance may be permissible in rare cases
to ensure that human beings are insured against brute luck.
All three of these proposals, unlike the solutions mentioned so far, try to
solve both the Stigmatisation of the Unlucky and the Violation of Personal
Dignity. Moreover the proposals acknowledge the Harshness Problem as a
problem that convincingly questions whether individuals could reasonably
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accept luck-egalitarian principles. In the second proposal, “all the relevant
social institutions” refers to a complete set of institutions interconnected
by their counterfactual influence on how state of affairs could have turned
out. The second proposal does not intend to impose GT1 and GT2 on
all of society’s institutions, but only complete sets of institutions that can
make a difference to people’s lives. As such only sets of institutions that
can make a concrete difference to an individual’s life by preventing brute
luck events or insuring the individual against such brute luck events are
compelled to adopt GT1 and GT2.
Stigmatisation of the Unlucky
Let me now address the stigmatisation examples in light of the provisional
solution above. I believe Dworkin should adopt the first proposal as an
answer to the cases where individuals are stigmatised for their bad option
luck. This is because all the cases presented thus far show individuals mak-
ing mistakes that anyone could plausibly make without explicitly desiring
to make them. The examples raise the intuition that Dworkin’s theory
treats individuals too harshly for mistakes that anyone of us could make
even though we wish never to make them. As such if insurance schemes
consider human mistakes as forms of brute luck then individuals can ac-
tually buy insurance for any mistake they themselves might make in the
future. This for the sole reason that humans are not machines and will
make mistakes they do not wish to make.
The second proposal ensures that a society’s institutions bear the re-
sponsibility for the possible consequences of individual choices and not
just the individuals themselves. This would mean that the relevant insti-
tutions involved in selling and registering a vehicle in the negligent driver
case would be required to educate an individual about the possible option
luck they might face. Education would not ensure that drivers take out
insurance for themselves but that they were informed of the potential risks
as well as their society could reasonably manage. This proposal targets
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the institutions concerned with individuals using public areas like roads
and the inherent risks involved in such use. These two proposals I believe
are sufficient to answer the majority of cases where the Harshness Problem
surfaces. This is because the intuitive pull of the problem diminishes as
soon as we accept that all individuals, whether negligent or not, would
have been presented by the choice to take up insurance. Crucially this
choice involves having the assistance of the relevant social institutions to
inform citizens in a systematic way.
Nevertheless the first two proposals might not appease Dworkin’s de-
tractors entirely. It can be argued that it is still possible for GT1 and GT2
to treat individuals harshly. This is because no matter how informed an
individual is or how systematically they are faced with insurance options
to neutralise the effect of bad option luck, the individual may still choose
not to buy insurance. Consequently, the individual would again be treated
harshly in cases where they suffer bad option luck. In these limited set of
cases individuals, despite being well informed about their own potential
mistakes, insist on not buying insurance and consequently suffer bad op-
tion luck. At this impasse, the third proposal may help Dworkin’s theory.
Dworkin may argue that a society might find it more efficient to make a
certain level of insurance mandatory for risky activity rather than try to
educate every individual as much as possible. We should note that edu-
cating individuals would still involve treating individuals harshly in rare
cases if they choose not to insure. A minimum level of mandatory insur-
ance would ensure that in some rare cases where individuals refuse to be
rationally prudent, society need not treat individuals harshly. A minimum
level of insurance need not be mandatory for all possible cases of risky
activity. It can be mandatory only for those activities where there is a
high frequency of individuals suffering bad option luck and a high number
of individuals refuse to insure themselves.
Kristin Voigt (2007: 405–406) has dismissed this imposition of manda-
tory insurance schemes as undermining the fundamental luck-egalitarian
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motivation to give individuals the choice to lead the lives they wish without
suffering the effects of brute luck. A fundamental commitment to individ-
ual choice conflicts with the coercion of an individual to buy a minimum
level of insurance. Voigt contends that the basic normative mechanism of
GT1 and GT2 is to give individuals the choice to transform brute luck into
option luck. Not, as my solution proposes, to coerce individuals to protect
themselves from the effects of brute luck. I believe Voigt misunderstands
the purpose of mandatory insurance schemes. The mandatory insurance
schemes only operate to protect individuals in very rare cases. Specifically
in cases where the frequency of bad option luck is high and the consequence
of bad luck are very damaging not just for the individual undertaking the
activity but also for any bystanders. Not all risky activities would require
mandatory insurance, but only those activities with the long lasting con-
sequences of highly frequent bad option luck. In such cases individuals can
be coerced to buy insurance perhaps at a subsidised cost.
Consequently, the case of potentially denying α and β emergency hos-
pital care is mistaken. α and β would in fact be made to insure against
such an emergency because of the potentially damaging consequences not
only for the driver but for any other individuals. This does not mean that
the individual responsible would be eligible for compensation for the rest
of their lives. Perhaps merely that they would have to insure themselves
against at least acute emergency services, and perhaps not against vehicle
damage, or long term disabilities resulting from their mistake. For certain
activities such as driving on public roads, it appears a more efficient use of
available resources is to impose a mandatory insurance scheme as opposed
to educating and attempting to convince ultimately unwilling individuals
to buy insurance.
The Violation of Personal Dignity
Let us now turn to how the provisional solution engages the cases of violat-
ing personal dignity. I believe Dworkin can appeal to the first and second
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proposal in cases where implementing GT2 violates the personal dignity
of individuals. The first and second proposals clarify the aim of Dworkin’s
theory. The cases presented by Scheﬄer and Wolff should be understood
not as cases of revealing all aspects of an individual’s life, but only aspects
which can genuinely be considered a cause for that individual’s state of
affairs.
It is impossible for individuals to both know all the required facts about
the market and also compute them to make prudent choices. To compen-
sate for brute luck should be seen as a responsibility absolving act. To be
compensated for one’s bad brute luck is not to pity or reveal every possi-
ble mistake, but to absolve them of moral responsibility for their state of
affairs. In accordance with the second and third proposals a just society
should arrange all the relevant social institutions in such a way to offer in-
tensive education or a minimum level of mandatory insurance against the
possible fluctuations of the market. Another way in which the provisional
solution solves the violation of personal dignity is if social institutions con-
sider the investigation of an individual’s mistakes itself as a form of brute
luck event that the individuals cannot control. If GT1 and GT2 are ap-
plied in this way then individuals might be entitled to redress if the actions
of social institutions are so invasive that they cause individual long-term
disadvantages for accumulating, bequeathing and inheriting resources.
With respect to Scheﬄer and Wolff’s counterexamples, I would contend
that it is impossible for an average worker to be attuned to every movement
in the market. From the perspective of the worker large volatile changes
in the market that result in unemployment should be treat as a form of
brute luck. This would be the case even though market changes might be
caused by choices made by CEOs or consumers. What is more, other social
institutions such as educational centres should assist in the mitigation of
brute luck by helping to retrain individuals for new skills. With respect to
the cases of shameful revelation, the first and second proposals insist that
GT1 and GT2 should be applied to a set of connected social institutions.
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So that any cases of shameful revelation can be prevented and individuals
can still be absolved of any responsibility for unchosen states of affairs. An
institutional reading places the responsibility of applying GT1 and GT2
on powerful social institutions that limit the cases of shameful revelation,
since having one’s past mistakes revealed can also be a form of brute luck.
Therefore social institutions must apply GT1 and GT2 in ways that do
not violate GT1 and GT2. Taxing or confiscating inherited wealth would
be unjust if doing so was so invasive that itself was a form of brute luck
event that the individuals could not control.
3.1.5 Conclusion
I have offered three proposals that may solve the Harshness Problem so
Dworkin’s theory can coherently justify restricting wealth inheritance to
the luck intuition. The three modifications attempt to minimise the the-
oretical costs of modifying GT1 and GT2 to an arbitrary set of cases or
in shifting too far from the initial motivations of proposing principles of
justice in a liberal democracy. The three proposals attempt to decrease
the frequency when GT1 and GT2 are enforced by limiting the scope of
the theses to complete sets of social institutions that are interconnected.
This may avoid the problems faced when Dworkin’s theory appears im-
plausibly harsh when applied to particular circumstances. However, the
cost of adopting my three modifications might be that Dworkin’s theory
appears to weaken its definition of moral responsibility too much. If indi-
vidual mistakes are classified as brute luck events then it appears there is
almost nothing individuals can be held responsible for. This would appear
to be a significant cost to a theory of justice that attempts to balance the
demands of holding individuals responsible and yet equalising resources in
a just way. These costs will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
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3.2 Wrong Focus Objection
Another problem posed against Dworkin’s theory is that it is a theory of
egalitarian justice that intends to equalise the wrong thing. I argue the
objection shows that the way Dworkin’s original theory uses the norma-
tive ideal of equality to satisfy the normative concerns of the luck intuition
is incoherent with the subject of Dworkin’s theory. The objection entails
that Dworkin’s theory should not restrict wealth inheritance as a resource,
but rather that the theory should focus on equalising social relations. This
is directly contrary to GT1 and the aims of Dworkin’s theory. In response
I suggest some modifications that resolve the objection and hence allow
Dworkin to justify restricting wealth inheritance without any incoheren-
cies.
Wolff (1998; 2010), Anderson (1999) and Scheﬄer (2003; 2005) pose
the Wrong Focus Objection in two ways. Sometimes they argue that the
aims of Dworkin’s theory are better achieved by equalising something other
than resources. On the other hand sometimes they argue that Dworkin’s
version of luck-egalitarianism should not be considered as an “egalitarian”
theory of justice because it focuses on equalising the wrong thing. This
thesis deals with the latter version of the Wrong Focus Objection.
The way the Wrong Focus Objection is problematic for Dworkin’s re-
striction of wealth inheritance is best illustrated by an example. Let us
take α and β once again. They are individuals who are similarly talented
and have the same relevant skills that would help in their chosen lives.
However this time let us propose that α is poorer in her material resources
than β. α is not destitute but relative to β she has considerably less wealth
and has considerably fewer opportunities and choices on how to lead her
life. This inequality is due to β’s luck of being born into a wealthy ex-
tended family who allow her access to a large trust fund which she is able
to invest and live comfortably. In such a case Dworkin’s theory attempts
to justify the restriction of β’s ability to inherit her abundance of mate-
rial resources for the purpose of redistribution. This redistribution is to
102
DWORKIN’S RESOURCE LUCK-EGALITARIANISM
allow α to have the opportunity to acquire the same range of choices in
her life as β. If the Wrong Focus Objection is successful, it would entail
that Dworkin’s theory should equalise resources by restricting α’s ability
to inherit only if it ensures that α and β treat each other as individuals
of equal social standing. This means that if the only way that β treats
α as a social equal is if β is allowed to inherit vast amounts of wealth,
then Dworkin’s theory would not be justified in restricting wealth inher-
itance. Rather society should adopt an egalitarian theory of justice that
equalises α and β’s relationship in the relevant way, but not with regards
to resources like inherited wealth.
Wolff is perhaps one of the most equivocal proponents of the Wrong Fo-
cus Objection. Wolff argues that to understand a general idea like equality
is to develop an egalitarian ethos. Wolff defines an egalitarian ethos as a
set of political values related to equality. Wolff (2010: 342) describes these
values when he says:
. . . egalitarianism starts from a collection of values, not prin-
ciples, and, as I suggested in my earlier papers, those values
include fairness and respect.
These values are intended to be social values that groups of individuals
use to regulate their behaviour and to form social behaviours. It seems
Wolff rejects a methodology that starts from normative principles. Never-
theless Wolff is concerned specifically with the second social value. While
he acknowledges the contribution of Dworkin to the understanding and
formulation of normative principles around the value of fairness, he never-
theless believes:
. . . that there is more to a society of equals than a just scheme
of distribution of material goods. There may also be goods that
depend on the attitude people have toward each other. (Wolff
1998: 104)
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Wolff understands egalitarianism as the normative idea of promoting re-
spectful social relations and attitudes. On the other hand an egalitarian
theory like the one proposed by Dworkin is concerned with the distribu-
tion of resources and the opportunities these resources provide. The con-
sequence of Wolff’s argument is that the distributional theory proposed by
Dworkin is incoherent with the normative ideal of equality. Such a theory
does not give an account of how to equalise social standing and respect-
ful relations between individuals. Such a theory would also not justify
restricting wealth inheritance in the way that Dworkin’s theory intends.
Unlike Wolff, Anderson and Scheﬄer are more direct in their criticism.
Both start from a conception of what makes a theory egalitarian and what
real world injustices egalitarians should care about. As Anderson (1999:
308) explains:
Egalitarianism ought to reflect a generous, humane, cosmopoli-
tan vision of a society that recognizes individuals as equals in
all their diversity. It should promote institutional arrangements
that enable the diversity of people’s talents, aspirations, roles,
and cultures to benefit everyone and to be recognized as mu-
tually beneficial.
The “institutional arrangements” that Anderson believes an egalitarian
theory of justice should promote amounts to an arrangement that recog-
nises individuals as diverse and different as possible but with equal social
standing. For Anderson these institutional arrangements are the essence
of what an egalitarian theory should be, even though these arrangements
may have implications for distributive justice. But, in Anderson’s view
Dworkin’s theory is divorced from what egalitarian theories should be
focused. Anderson (1999: 311) describes Dworkin’s luck-egalitarianism,
under the term “equality of fortune”, as a theory that:
. . . assumes atomistic egoism and self-sufficiency as the norm for
human beings. It promises equality only to those who tend only
to their own self-interest, who avoid entering into relationships.
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We can see that Anderson objects to the inability of Dworkin’s theory to
value the equality of human relationships as opposed to the equality of
resources. On this basis Dworkin’s theory is not the egalitarian theory it
aims to be because it focuses on equalising the wrong thing in society in
the pursuit of restricting wealth inheritance.
Scheﬄer (2003: 23) takes up Anderson’s attack when he describes the
focus of GT1 and GT2:
. . . unless distributive egalitarianism is anchored in some ver-
sion of that ideal, or in some other comparably general under-
standing of equality as a moral value or normative ideal, it will
be arbitrary, pointless, fetishistic: no more compelling than a
preference for any other distributive pattern.
The “general understanding” that Scheﬄer refers to is a conception of
egalitarianism grounded in a social or political ideal that accepts the in-
herent value of human relationships. This understanding of egalitarianism
is clearly contrary to GT2. As Scheﬄer (2003: 23) says:
. . . many people accept what I have called the social and politi-
cal ideal of equality. That ideal does not support the ambition
of purging the influence of brute luck from human relations. . .
Scheﬄer (2005: 19) argues that the basic notion of any egalitarian theory
is that “to live in society as an equal among equals is a good thing in
its own right,” and therefore an egalitarian theory must provide principles
that show how individuals can live and create institutions in a society
of equals. To this end Scheﬄer (2003: 34) argues that Dworkin’s theory
is too administrative and does not express “a normative ideal of human
relations”.
Scheﬄer (2005: 7) argues that Dworkin’s theory is proposed as an
egalitarian theory of justice grounded in a “principle of responsibility”.5
5Scheﬄer (2005: 7) borrows this term from Brian Barry.
105
DWORKIN’S RESOURCE LUCK-EGALITARIANISM
This principle, according to Scheﬄer, judges inequalities as just if they arise
from causes that individuals can be held responsible for. This principle is
different to GT2 since GT2 is about what society should do to mitigate
social and economic inequalities rather than conditionally describing when
states of affairs are just. However the principle of responsibility can be
understood as a justification for GT2 since the reason to minimise the
effects of brute luck is to absolve individuals of responsibility in some cases
and hold them responsible in others. Scheﬄer (2005: 24) concludes that
neither GT1 or GT2 conceives of egalitarian distributive justice completely
when he says:
The basic point is this. A conception of distributive justice,
whether egalitarian or non-egalitarian, cannot be just a self-
standing distributive formula. It must be part of a larger nor-
mative vision of society.
In summary, the Wrong Focus Objection argues that Dworkin’s theory
should not be considered as an egalitarian theory of justice. The primary
reason given for this is that egalitarianism and the normative ideal of
equality is about social relations in a society of equals and not solely about
a just system of distribution. This is particularly troubling for our purposes
because Dworkin justifies the restriction of wealth inheritance to those
who hold the luck intuition by arguing that his theory is the best way
of realising the normative ideal that a society should show equal concern
for all its citizens. This is incoherent with realising the normative ideal
of equality by equalising social relations instead of resources like inherited
wealth. It would seem that a restriction of wealth inheritance would have
to be analysed against the normative ideal that social relations should be
equal.
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3.2.1 Responses in the Literature
Defenders of Dworkin’s theory and luck-egalitarianism respond to the
Wrong Focus Objection in at least two ways. Either they dismiss the
concerns of their objectors or attempt constructive engagement to modify
Dworkin’s theory accordingly. Dworkin himself attempts the former whilst
Richard Arneson and Kok-Chor Tan attempt the latter. Dworkin (2003:
195) is explicitly dismissive when he responds to Scheﬄer’s argument that
Dworkin’s theory is focused on the administration of distributive equality
as opposed to the “traditional heart of egalitarian theory”. Dworkin (2003:
195) describes Scheﬄer’s argument as literary criticism:
. . . calling attention to an author’s images and examples and
arguing that these betray a hidden agenda. . .
I believe Dworkin’s argument is unjustified. While Scheﬄer and Anderson
make use of appeals to intuitions to stress the inability of GT1 and GT2
to account for social relations, they do clearly outline what they believe
egalitarian theories should focus on. It appears Dworkin does not critically
engage with this proposal at all to justify why his theory argues for a system
of just distribution and not for a system that equalises social relations.
Dworkin (2003: 198) attempts to justify the focus of his theory by
referring to the intuitive injustice of some individuals having extra oppor-
tunities to “make their lives much more exciting, productive, varied or
interesting than others could”. Dworkin seems to misunderstand the force
of the Wrong Focus Objection. The objection does not question the con-
sistency or intuitive appeal of minimising the effects of brute luck so that
individuals can be held responsible for states of affairs they have actually
chosen. The objection focuses on whether the focus of his theory ade-
quately captures the normatively significant ideas of egalitarianism and
theories about constructing a society of equals. On this front Dworkin
does not seem to adequately defend why his theory should focus on the
distribution of resources like inherited wealth.
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Arneson approaches the Wrong Focus Objection with a more concilia-
tory proposal. Arneson accepts that GT1 and GT2 with its focus on luck
and individual responsibility may not be capturing the entire gamut of
normative concerns about equality. Arneson proposes that GT1 and GT2
be modified to focus on the equality of well-being. Arneson’s proposal is
to modify GT1 so that society focuses on equalising individual well-being
such that individuals are as responsible as possible for improvements and
decreases in their well-being. Arneson (2000: 342) argues that under his
proposal human relationships would be the focus while still justifying some
unequal distributions:
If we were to institute relationships of perfect equality accord-
ing to some measure of relational equality, but people ended up
living avoidably miserable and blighted lives, then we should
institute some inequality in relationships, in order to improve
the quality of people’s lives and the fair distribution of this
aggregate well-being.
Arneson’s response to the Wrong Focus Objection is to modify GT1 and
GT2 so that they capture Wolff, Anderson and Scheﬄer’s notions about
what an egalitarian theory should be. To this end, Arneson’s proposal
narrows the focus of GT1 and GT2 in order for Dworkin’s theory to qualify
as an egalitarian theory that coherently interprets the normative ideal of
equality. Arneson’s proposal would likely entail that Dworkin would need
to justify restricting wealth inheritance by analysing wealth inheritance as
a contributor to an inequality in welfare.
In contrast to Arneson, Tan argues to limit the scope of GT1 and GT2,
rather than to modify its focus. Tan argues that Dworkin’s theory must
be understood as an egalitarian theory about society’s institutions. Tan
(2008: 686) argues that:
. . . luck egalitarianism is not blind to the inherently social and
relational quality of equality. On the contrary, it recognizes
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that the motivation of distributive justice is to secure the re-
lationship among persons that best reflects their equal status
vis-a-vis each other.
Tan believes Dworkin’s motivation for theorising a system of just distri-
bution is recognised when we consider his institutional reading of luck-
egalitarianism. Before I explain Tan’s proposal it is important to note
that Tan believes Dworkin’s theory must be understood as a theory of dis-
tributive justice. This means it should focus on the distribution of goods,
services, and opportunities to accumulate and dispose goods and services.
Tan (2008: 669–670) makes it clear that the theory is not a theory of polit-
ical justice, or justice in the maintenance of law and order when he states
that the purpose of luck-egalitarianism:
. . . is to explain and justify why distributive equality with re-
spect to economic goods and burdens, over and above those
that persons need for basic subsistence, is required as a matter
of justice.
Now that the type of justice Tan accepts as luck-egalitarian is clear,
we can begin to understand his proposed solution to the Wrong Focus
Objection. Tan’s (2008: 671) proposal is that Dworkin should modify the
scope of his concern to focus on the way a society’s institutions deal with
the effects of brute luck. Tan argues that modifying the scope in this way
enables luck-egalitarians like Dworkin to order a system of just distribution
with a particular focus on how the system creates equal social relations.
Tan’s (2008: 686) response to the Wrong Focus Objection is that:
. . . if luck egalitarianism takes the institutional form I am rec-
ommending, and its task is acknowledged to be that of regu-
lating the background social conditions of ownership, it cannot
but have a social dimension.
Tan’s proposal to resolve the Wrong Focus Objection is to maintain the
focus of GT1 and GT2 on distributive justice but limit its scope only
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to include the way institutions redress or exacerbate the effects of brute
luck. This solution would follow the solution Tan offers for the Harshness
Problem so that Dworkin’s restriction of wealth inheritance is justified in
an institutional context. This would mean that inherited wealth would
be restricted not on a case by case basis but only when individuals are
engaged in socially connected activities.
3.2.2 Troubles for Arneson and Tan
While Dworkin’s solution was shown to be unjustifiably dismissive of the
Wrong Focus Objection, Arneson and Tan’s solutions seem more plausible.
If successful it appears Dworkin can justify restricting wealth inheritance
by either appealing to its ability to have implications for social relations
when individuals have equal opportunities for welfare or equal treatment
by social institutions. Nevertheless, I believe Arneson and Tan’s proposed
solutions invite their own objections. In this section I argue that both
plausible solutions do not actually solve the problem posed by the Wrong
Focus Objection. Both solutions do not respond to the essential complaint
that as a supposedly egalitarian theory, Dworkin’s theory focuses on the
effect of brute luck in apportioning moral responsibility rather than the
social relations between individuals.
Arneson’s solution narrows the focus of GT1 to equalising opportuni-
ties for welfare. This proposal would depart significantly from Dworkin’s
theory and would in many ways be contrary to almost all of Dworkin’s ar-
guments against equalising welfare (Dworkin 2000: 21–42, 48–62). Even if
these concerns were put aside I believe that by limiting the equalisandum,
Arneson misunderstands the Wrong Focus Objection. The objection does
not question whether an egalitarian theory focused on social relations will
have consequences for individual welfare. Rather the objection questions
how Dworkin’s can be considered an egalitarian theory when it has no
concern for the way social relations may be unequal.
For example, in a society with a welfare system that attempts to miti-
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gate the effects of brute luck by establishing a social safety net and a fair
market of goods and service, it appears individuals do have equal opportu-
nity for welfare. Yet, Wolff, Anderson and Scheﬄer would still argue that
such a society, if it is supposedly organised under luck-egalitarian princi-
ples, would not ensure that individuals stand as social equals. They would
argue that the Wrong Focus Objection would still hold, because the luck-
egalitarian principles would ensure only that individuals were held morally
responsible for their choices not that individuals treated each other with
equal respect and moral worth.
Arneson’s solution would also mean that Dworkin’s theory would have
to analyse wealth inheritance with respect to its role in giving individuals
the opportunity to change their well-being. This would fundamentally shift
the focus of Dworkin’s theory from resources to welfare. Such a departure
would invariably mean that Dworkin’s theory could not justify restricting
wealth inheritance in the way he hopes. In fact Gerald Cohen’s version
of luck-egalitarianism would be more suited. However as I flagged in the
Introduction I will not be evaluating how Rawls and Dworkin’s theories
justify their normative position to an intuition about the consequences of
restricting wealth inheritance for welfare.
On the other hand, Tan’s solution seems more promising. Tan’s focus
on social institutions attempts to target GT1 and GT2 on the parts of
society where individuals interact and are affected by the actions of other
individuals. These “parts” are social institutions like the voting system,
the hierarchy of government bodies, the press, the social welfare system,
and perhaps most importantly the market. Tan’s solution appears to mod-
ify the scope of GT1 and GT2 to deal with the effects of brute luck when
individuals interact with the institutional structure of society.
However, the problem for Tan’s solution is evident in his own argument.
Tan insists that Dworkin’s theory should be understood as a theory about
the distributive justice of social institutions that might have consequences
for the social relations between individuals. Wolff, Anderson and Scheﬄer
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object to this marginalisation of social relations in favour of distributive
justice. This is because egalitarianism for Wolff, Anderson and Scheﬄer
must provide some account of how the social relations between individuals
are made equal. If social relations are not the primary focus then according
to Dworkin’s theory a conflict between creating distributive justice and
equal social relations will have to be resolved by promoting distributive
justice at the expense of equal social relations.
3.2.3 A Provisional Solution
I suggest a provisional solution to the Wrong Focus Objection that deals
with social relations as opposed to individual well-being or social institu-
tions alone. The responsibility based solution I suggest uses Tan’s pro-
posal about the scope of Dworkin’s theory, but expands on how GT1 and
GT2 should apply to society’s institutions.6 In effect the solution tries
to internalise the concern for making social relations equal into Dworkin’s
conception of egalitarian distributive justice.
I propose that luck-egalitarianism should be understood not just as a
theory about distributive justice but also as a theory about political equal-
ity. To this end I believe Dworkin should accept the following proposals:
1. Individuals are only responsible for a particular state of affairs, if all
the relevant social institutions have done well to educate and prevent
individuals from making negligent mistakes. (Proposed in response
to the Harshness Problem)
2. Responsibility is a reciprocal relation between individuals and social
institutions.
6Daniel Markovits (2008) proposes a solution similar to this without the use of social
institutions. Given that paper is outside the scope of this thesis I will not discuss the
merits of Markovits’s solution here, other than to say that I do not believe it modifies
Dworkin’s theory enough to solve the Wrong Focus Objection.
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(a) Social institutions hold individuals responsible for their choices
through the analysis of brute and option luck, and insurance
schemes.
(b) Individuals hold social institutions responsible for the way they
treat other individuals.
Firstly Dworkin’s theory should accept Tan’s proposal to apply GT1
and GT2, not to every interaction between individuals, but only those
that affect individuals when they interact with social institutions. Conse-
quently, GT1 and GT2 would also apply to the behaviour of social insti-
tutions and the way they affect the lives of individuals. This would mean
that Dworkin’s theory would apply to the social structures of a liberal
society where individuals were connected in political and economic rela-
tionships. This would mean that restricting wealth inheritance would be
the responsibility of institutions like the tax system, the welfare system,
the public health system and the insurance markets.
Secondly, and more important for resolving the Wrong Focus Objec-
tion, Dworkin’s theory should be concerned with whether the actions of
society’s institutions reflect the choices that individuals make as opposed
to arbitrary facts about them. This means that social institutions not
only hold individuals responsible for their own choices, but also for the ac-
tions of the institutions themselves. Understood this way luck-egalitarian
principles disseminate responsibility throughout a liberal democratic so-
ciety. This means that responsibility is conceived as a reciprocal relation
between individuals and society’s institutions. By focusing on social insti-
tutions Dworkin’s theory can have the social dimension that its objectors
argue it requires and it can still be a theory about holding individuals
responsible for their individual choices.
For example, the way the tax system is used to restrict wealth inheri-
tance is the responsibility not just of those few individuals who work for it,
but all the individuals who pay taxes or received benefits from tax receipts.
Understood this way individuals are responsible for reforming a tax system
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that restricts wealth inheritance inefficiently or unjustly. Similarly the vot-
ing system should also operate in a way that holds individuals responsible
for genuine choices and not choices affected by inherited wealth or other
forms of brute luck. However voters, should also be held responsible for
both the outcome and the way the voting system behaves. In both our ex-
amples responsibility for the outcome and operation of social institutions
does not reside with only one individual, but it is disseminated between
every individual that participates in the given institution. Understood this
way social institutions are the subject of GT1 and GT2 and the structures
that hold individuals responsible.
If we understand luck-egalitarianism in the way I suggest, then the im-
plications for social relations are more central to Dworkin’s theory than
in Dworkin’s original account. GT1 and GT2 are intended to outline the
principles for distributive justice. The Wrong Focus Objection questioned
whether this was really an egalitarian theory since it did not provide an
account of how social relations were to be equalised. However if the in-
dividuals who interact, manipulate and manage social institutions are re-
sponsible for the way those institutions behave, then GT1 and GT2 apply
to the way individuals treat each other through social institutions.
For example, a system of social hierarchy that codifies relations of con-
tempt for those who do not inherit wealth and respect for those who do
is not the responsibility only of those individuals who show contempt and
respect. It is also the responsibility of every individual who cooperates
within that system. This does not mean that individuals should not treat
individuals with contempt or respect under any circumstance. Clearly
there are acceptable conditions for these kinds of relations. My solution
only proposes that social relations cannot be unequal because of brute luck
events such as the luck of being born to wealthy parents. To live in a so-
ciety of equals, as interpreted by Dworkin’s theory, is for all the citizens
of a society to be reciprocally responsible for the actions of, and to reform
the institutions they partake in according to GT1 and GT2. Equal social
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relations are then created by a reciprocal responsibility for our democratic
choices both in actions of direct influence and actions of indirect influence
on other individuals.
3.2.4 Conclusion
Taking stock for a moment, the purpose of this section was to evaluate
the Wrong Focus Objection and its impact on Dworkin’s theory. To this
end I considered three responses and argued that they were inadequate.
Dworkin’s response was implausible because of its dismissal of the serious-
ness of the objection. Arneson’s response was judged as departing too far
from Dworkin’s theory and by doing so misunderstanding the Wrong Focus
Objection. Tan’s response was also judged to misunderstand the force of
the Wrong Focus Objection, because the objection is not that Dworkin’s
theory has no consequences for equalising social relations. But that the
normative ideal of equality is incoherent if it is not primarily fulfilled by
equalising social relations. Because of the way the Wrong Focus Objec-
tion showed an incoherency in the way Dworkin justifies restricting wealth
inheritance and the inadequacy of the existing response, I suggested an al-
ternative solution. I suggest a modification to expand Tan’s institutional
understanding of luck-egalitarianism to incorporate the reciprocal respon-
sibility of individuals for the actions of social institutions. I suggested that
this reciprocal responsibility means that responsibility for the operation of
social institutions is disseminated throughout society. Consequently, inso-
far as individuals participate in a system of politically related institutions,
then all the individuals in that system would be equally responsible for
the way all individuals treat each other. In this way Dworkin’s theory
can claim that social relations and resources like inherited wealth are the
subject of GT1 and GT2.
115
DWORKIN’S RESOURCE LUCK-EGALITARIANISM
3.3 Equal Access to Advantage
In this section I outline Gerald Cohen’s argument that his theory of “Equal
Access to Advantage” is better than Dworkin’s theory at justifying restric-
tions on wealth inheritance because he uses a coherent distinction to decide
when inherited wealth should be restricted and when it should not. Co-
hen argues that unless some modification is made to Dworkin’s theory,
Dworkin should adopt, parts of his theory to resolve the incoherent dis-
tinctions. This is important for our purposes because adopting parts of
Cohen’s theory would give Dworkin’s theory a comparative cost for depart-
ing significantly from Dworkin’s original principles. Cohen’s (2008; 2011:
14)7 first argument is that Dworkin’s theory does not coherently satisfy
the opportunity and luck intuition, because it makes an unjustified dis-
tinction between preferences and circumstances.8 Cohen then argues that
his theory of Equal Access to Advantage is a better alternative because
it treats preferences, opportunities and resources consistently and there-
fore answers the normative concerns of the opportunity and luck intuition
without making an incoherent distinction.9
7All references to pages 3–43 from Cohen (2011) are from Cohen (1989)
8What about the liberal intuition you may ask? Well, although Cohen’s theory
treats all other concerns such as equal opportunity or equal resources as antecedent to
a concern for welfare, it is concerned to some degree with individual freedom. Cohen
does not argue for a principle like Rawls’s first principle of justice but rather as a
universal value that any form of egalitarianism must “make peace with”(2008: 214).
Cohen argues that the personal freedom to bequeath private property as one desires
should be unrestricted. Nevertheless, Cohen does believe that egalitarian principles
should restrict the personal freedom to inherit private property.
9This does not mean that Cohen’s theory should be a genuine candidate for our
purposes, because it does not attempt to justify its normative prescription to all three
relevant intuitions. Cohen’s theory at best attempts to justify restricting wealth inher-
itance to those who hold the opportunity intuition and luck intuition. Cohen’s theory
gives no account of how the restriction of the right to dispose private property can be
justified to bequeathers and inheritors. However Cohen’s theory does attempt to satisfy
the opportunity and luck intuitions by restricting wealth inheritance by equalising any
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I will discuss Cohen’s challenge in §3.3.1 and §3.3.2. §3.3.1 explains
what Cohen finds so troubling about Dworkin’s theory and the applica-
tion of GT1 and GT2. Cohen presents three examples to highlight how
Dworkin’s theory does not actually make the distinction between luck and
choice, but between preference and circumstance. Cohen’s argument is
that Dworkin’s theory is unable, as a matter of principle, to account for
unchosen preferences. §3.3.2 explains Cohen’s solution for Dworkin’s the-
ory in light of the three examples he presents. Cohen’s solution will be
that we should adopt his theory of Equal Access to Advantage because it
treats all forms of unchosen states of affairs consistently, whether they are
preferences, opportunities or resources.
3.3.1 Distinguishing Preferences and Circumstances
Cohen borrows his first example from Dworkin to establish a contrast class
of cases where Dworkin’s theory appears to work well. Cohen cites the case
of Louis who deliberately chooses to cultivate an expensive preference for
plover eggs (Dworkin 2000: 49–51). Cohen argues that a just society is
not obligated to compensate Louis if he cannot fulfil his expensive tastes.
Louis is held responsible for the choices he makes, and for the disadvantage
in resources or well-being that he has because he cannot afford plover
eggs. Dworkin and Cohen agree that a just society should not redistribute
wealth to allow Louis to buy plover eggs. This case is easily imaginable in
different ways and will service as an example that contrasts against Cohen’s
next example. Cohen’s next example shows how Dworkin’s theory makes
an unjustified distinction between unchosen circumstances and unchosen
preferences, and not as Dworkin claims between choice and luck.
Cohen’s (2011: 20) second example involves two individuals, Paul who
loves photography, and Fred who loves fishing. Cohen further supposes
that Paul’s passion is expensive and difficult to pursue, whereas Fred’s
passion is cheaper. Cohen then supposes that circumstances in society are
access to advantage that individuals have that does not result from their choice.
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such that Paul can no longer pursue his passion and as result his life is
comparatively worse off to Fred’s. Cohen (2011: 20) states his approach
to this problem clearly:
I think the egalitarian thing to do is to subsidize Paul’s pho-
tography. But Dworkin cannot think that.
Cohen even supposes that Paul and Fred’s case passes the envy test with
both Paul and Fred having the same opportunity to pursue their passions.
Both individuals have also chosen without coercion to pursue their own
ends. Although the costs to pursue photography and fishing are different,
the costs are consistent for both Paul and Fred; the market does not dis-
criminate based on who chooses to pursue either passion. It appears all
the criteria for an equal distribution in society are met.
Nevertheless, Cohen argues there is a problem. Paul suffers from a
disadvantage he has not chosen, namely the preference or “passion” for
photography. Cohen argues that since Paul has not chosen to acquire
his preference for photography, he is not responsible for his diminished
well-being. Paul suffers from the brute luck of being born with an ex-
pensive preference. It appears that Dworkin’s theory is inconsistent in its
treatment of Paul’s unchosen expensive preference and Fred’s unchosen
inexpensive preference.
How are these contrasting cases relevant to the project of this thesis?
Because we can easily imagine how wealth inheritance can be used to help
Louis cultivate expensive tastes and for Paul to pursue photography. In the
first example Dworkin and Cohen would agree that a just society cannot
justify restricting wealth inheritance no matter how disadvantaged Louis
is from cultivating expensive tastes. This is because Louis is responsible
for his choice to cultivate a taste for plover eggs, but his ability to inherit
is not a choice but a form of brute luck that must be transformed into
option luck. Both Dworkin and Cohen would agree that a just society
can justify progressive inheritance taxes on Louis to fund an insurance
scheme for those who do not inherit. In the second example Dworkin
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would again advocate restricting wealth inheritance even if it means Paul
cannot pursue photography. But Cohen would prescribe fewer restrictions
on wealth inheritance for Paul because it is not his choice to have expensive
preferences.
Another way to understand the implications of Cohen’s argument is
to modify his example of Paul and Fred. For example, Fred receives an
inheritance that allows him to pursue his passions without much difficulty.
However Paul is unable to pursue any of his preferences because they are
unaffordable. Although Dworkin would endorse restricting Fred’s wealth
inheritance he would not endorse compensating Paul. Cohen argues that
this would be inconsistent, because Dworkin’s theory treats Paul’s uncho-
sen preferences differently from Fred’s unchosen circumstance of inheriting
wealth. Furthermore, Cohen argues that Paul’s inability to pursue his
expensive preferences diminishes his well-being. Although Fred’s wealth
inheritance is restricted he has a greater opportunity to increase his well-
being by fulfilling his inexpensive preferences. Cohen argues that this
inequality of opportunity for welfare is what should concern Dworkin’s
theory when restricting wealth inheritance.
What accounts for Cohen and Dworkin’s similar normative judgements
in the first example but different judgements in the second? Cohen con-
cludes that Dworkin’s theory implicitly makes the wrong distinction and
incoherently advocates restricting wealth inheritance for Paul and Fred
when Paul’s inherited wealth should be restricted less or not at all. Cohen
argues that Dworkin mistakenly categorises some instances when individ-
uals appear to choose an expensive life, when in fact they are motivated
by unchosen preferences. Consequently a just society should identify such
an instance as a form of brute luck rather than option luck. Cohen (2011:
27) explains his view when he says:
A person in possession of his faculties always chooses (within
the constraints he faces) what career to pursue, but he does not
always choose what career to prefer, and the latter fact may
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reasonably restrict his responsibility for choosing to pursue an
expensive one.
Cohen argues that Dworkin’s distinction between choice and luck does not
actually distinguish or separate the states of affairs for which individuals
are responsible and the states of affairs for which they are not responsible.
Cohen (2011: 19–20) argues that Dworkin actually makes a distinction
between preferences and circumstances. Cohen concludes that we must
be consistent in our treatment of all unchosen states of affairs whether
they are preferences or circumstances. To this end, he argues that to not
compensate individuals for possessing unchosen preferences ignores the
way unchosen preferences cause an inequality of opportunity for welfare.
The consequence of this is that if Dworkin’s theory makes an unjustified
distinction between unchosen preferences and unchosen circumstance, then
it does not coherently answer the normative concerns of those who hold
the opportunity and luck intuition. This is because restricting wealth
inheritance when inherited wealth makes the lives of those who suffer from
unchosen preferences better is contrary to equalising opportunities or only
holding individuals responsible for their choices. The next section will
analyse Cohen’s solution to this supposed incoherency. Cohen proposes his
theory justifies restricting wealth inheritance coherently to the opportunity
and luck intuition.
3.3.2 Cohen’s Alternative Theory of Justice
Cohen’s motivations for his theory are similar to Dworkin’s. The norma-
tive judgement of holding individuals responsible for their choices and not
events and circumstances they cannot control motivates Dworkin’s theory.
This is the central judgement of the luck intuition. Cohen (2011: 13) states
that “Equal Access to Advantage” is guided by the distinct intuitive pull:
. . . to eliminate involuntary disadvantage, by which I (stipula-
tively) mean disadvantage for which the sufferer cannot be held
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responsible, since it does not appropriately reflect choices that
he has made or is making or would make.
It is clear that Cohen’s theory uses aspects of Dworkin’s theory, but di-
verges in one crucial way. Cohen (2011: 14) does not believe that his
theory should only equalise resources. Rather it should equalise all types
of advantages that arise from brute luck. Cohen achieves this by mitigating
involuntary disadvantage. With “disadvantage” being broadly understood
as unequal opportunities or unequal resources to achieve a desired level of
well-being (Cohen 2011: 4–5). Using the distinction between brute luck
and option luck, like Dworkin, Cohen’s theory judges individuals to be ei-
ther morally responsible or morally absolved for their access to advantages
(Cohen 2011: 14). Individuals are responsible for their access to disadvan-
tages or advantages so long as they chose to act in a way that gave them
this access. This distinction means that a just society should equalise the
effects of unchosen opportunities for welfare and resources.
Cohen (2011: 15–18) illustrates his theory by using the example of
‘Tiny Tim’. I will use a modified version of this example using ‘Tiny Tim’
and ‘Sheila’. My example starts with Sheila whose legs are paralysed and
so she requires a wheelchair to move. Sheila’s paralysis is caused by brute
luck that she could not have foreseen or chosen and she is born with a very
minimal capacity to fare well. Cohen contrasts Sheila’s case with the case
of Tiny Tim who has a similar aﬄiction to Sheila, however, he was born
with the abundant capacity and opportunity to fare well.
Cohen believes that Dworkin’s theory would judge that a just society
should give Sheila and Tiny Tim a wheelchair each. Sheila and Tiny Tim
lack a certain resource through no fault of their own and so the equalising
of resources demands that they be given a wheelchair. After being compen-
sated for his paralysis Tiny Tim fares much better than before. Sheila on
the other hand, despite being compensated, does not achieve any greater
level of well-being. It is because of this different capacity for welfare that
Cohen disagrees with Dworkin’s theory. Cohen believes that a just society
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should compensate Sheila more because of her different opportunity for
welfare. Dworkin disagrees even though brute luck affects Sheila and Tiny
Tim’s opportunities. Dworkin’s theory judges that Sheila and Tiny Tim
should only have resources through their transformation of brute luck into
option luck.10
Cohen argues that the example shows Dworkin’s theory is insensitive
to differences in unchosen opportunities. This is because the effect of
brute luck on the opportunity to increase one’s subjective well-being cannot
justifiably be treated differently to an unchosen resources disadvantage.
Cohen argues that Sheila’s inability to fare well after being compensated
the same resources as Tiny Tim is not Sheila’s choice. Therefore to treat all
forms of unchosen advantage consistently, a just society would give Sheila
her pain medication or subsidise it so it was less costly.
To return to wealth inheritance Cohen’s theory would justify restricting
wealth inheritance as a form of access to advantage that must be equalised.
According to Cohen’s theory wealth inheritance is an advantage that an
individual can use to grow their opportunities for increasing their welfare.
But Cohen justifies restricting wealth inheritance differently to Dworkin.
Cohen argues that a just society should not restrict, or weakly restrict,
wealth inheritance when it allows an individual with unchosen preferences
to equalise their opportunities to increase their welfare. An individual with
more costly preferences should have their inheritance taxed less or receive
more benefits because their unchosen expensive desires are a form of brute
luck not option luck. On the other hand, Dworkin argues a just society
10At this point Cohen (1989: 919) accepts that his example can be seen as “fanciful”.
How could Sheila, despite having the same aﬄiction as Tiny Tim and given the same
resources as compensation, have fewer opportunities to increase her welfare? It seems
that if Sheila is compensated the same as Tiny Tim she would use her resources to
better herself in the same way. To clarify this Cohen presents other examples where cold
weather affects the elderly or disabled more adversely than other individuals. Cohen
argues that like these individuals Sheila is disadvantaged in a way Dworkin would
incorrectly term “expensive tastes”.
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should restrict wealth inheritance if it allows individuals to have unequal
resources, or opportunities through no choice of their own.
Let us look at another example that clarifies how Cohen’s restriction of
wealth inheritance differs from Dworkin’s. Let us suppose that there are
two groups of millionaires, α and β, who inherit most if not all of their
wealth. α and β differ in one crucial way, namely that the millionaires of α
are born with expensive preferences. These preferences and tastes are ex-
pensive in the sense that they require a lot of resources to fulfil and to not
fulfil them severely diminishes the well-being of the millionaires. The mil-
lionaires of β are fortunately born with relatively inexpensive preferences
and tastes which are easily satisfied by their wealth.
Dworkin’s theory prescribes that what should concern us is that the
members of α and β possess wealth that is entirely the result of brute
luck. Consequently they have no moral responsibility for their wealth and
the unequal opportunities that their wealth gives them. Dworkin’s the-
ory is clear that a liberal democratic society should restrict the inherited
wealth of α and β to redistribute that wealth to those who have little
wealth. In contrast Cohen’s theory prescribes that we should restrict the
wealth of α less than β because the members of α did not choose to have
expensive preferences. However this does not mean that α are exempt
from inheritance taxation, but that they will be taxed less than the mem-
bers of β, because they do not have an equal access to the advantage of
inexpensive preferences and tastes. Cohen’s theory justifies restricting the
inherited wealth of β because they are more easily able to achieve their
desired level of welfare than the members of α. Cohen argues his theory
justifies its treatment of α and β to the opportunity and luck intuition
better than Dworkin’s theory because it does not commit itself to an inco-
herent distinction between unchosen advantages. Cohen treats advantages,
whether resource based or opportunities based, the same because both can
be unchosen.
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Cohen’s theory challenges Dworkin’s theory by treating unchosen cir-
cumstance and unchosen preferences the same way. Cohen does this be-
cause he believes it is the only coherent way to justify restricting wealth
inheritance to the opportunity and luck intuition. In doing this Cohen’s
theory is able to balance the concerns of the luck and opportunity intuition
without prioritising the mitigation of brute luck above equalising opportu-
nities for welfare or resource accumulation. I believe Cohen’s argument is
persuasive and demands some response from Dworkin, because if Cohen’s
challenge is not resisted then there is good reason to modify Dworkin’s
theory to adopt some of Cohen’s principles. This is important for our
purposes because it would place a great comparative cost on Dworkin’s
theory if it were to be modified so radically from its original formulation.
In short this section has seemingly established that Dworkin should either
adopt some of Cohen’s theory or respond in some way to avoid this costly
departure from his original theory.
3.4 The Road Ahead for Dworkin
This chapter has established that Dworkin’s theory cannot justify restrict-
ing wealth inheritance coherently to a broad range of intuitions in a liberal
democracy without some modifications. This was achieved by raising three
problems for Dworkin’s theory.
Firstly, in response to the Harshness Problem I suggested that
Dworkin’s theory must be reread as focusing on social institutions. This is
opposed to Dworkin’s original focus on individual transactions. Applying
GT1 and GT2 to social institutions means that wealth inheritance would
be restricted only when it affects the lives of others. This would mean that
Dworkin’s attempt to satisfy those who hold the luck intuition would not
be incoherent with proposing a theory of distributive justice in a liberal
democracy.
Secondly, in response to the Wrong Focus Objection I suggested that
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the focus on social institutions would mean that Dworkin’s theory would
also hold individuals responsible for the way they were connected in polit-
ical relationships. To that end I suggested that Dworkin’s theory should
adopt an understanding of responsibility as a reciprocal relation between
individuals and social institutions. This would mean that Dworkin’s fo-
cus on equalising resources, like inherited wealth, would not be incoherent
with the normative ideal of equality because Dworkin’s principles would
also apply to the social relationships between individuals.
The final criticism considered was Cohen’s use of his theory of Equal
Access to Advantage to challenge the coherency of Dworkin’s justification
for restricting wealth inheritance. I argued it was incoherent for Dworkin
to restrict wealth inheritance when resources were unequal but choose not
to when unchosen opportunities for welfare were unequal. Cohen’s argu-
ment is that Dworkin makes an unjustified distinction between preferences
and circumstance. Cohen argues that his theory is better than Dworkin’s
because it does not require this distinction to answer the nominative con-
cerns of the opportunity and luck intuition coherently. Cohen argues that
only by equalising all types of unchosen disadvantages can a restriction
of wealth inheritance be consistent. To that end, Cohen’s challenge has
shown that Dworkin must either reinterpret his theory or adopt parts of
Cohen’s theory to avoid arbitrarily discriminating between cases of brute
luck disadvantage.
Some of the costs for adopting an institutional interpretation included
the potential for Dworkin’s theory to weaken its conception of moral re-
sponsibility too much and that to compensate a robust theory of democracy
may be required.11 It also appears that according to Cohen, Dworkin’s the-
ory needs to justify why resources are worthy of being equalised instead of
11It appears that only a theory of democratic political institutions would realise the
solution and that a distributive theory alone cannot. Another cost is that if Dworkin
chooses to adopt a robust theory of democracy, then luck-egalitarianism may appear to
be indistinguishable from Anderson’s conception of “Democratic Equality” which forms
an important part of a distinct theory of relational-egalitarianism.
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opportunities for well-being. Although these solutions and their costs will
be examined in Chapter 5, it is clear that Dworkin’s restriction of wealth
inheritance cannot be justified without modification.
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Chapter 4
Solutions for Rawls and
Dworkin
The last three chapters steadily raised issues for using Rawls and Dworkin’s
theories to justify restrictions on wealth inheritance. Chapter 2 targeted
Rawls’s theory and Chapter 3 targeted Dworkin’s theory. While I already
offered solutions to four of the problems raised in Chapters 2 and 3, in
this Chapter I offer solutions to the remaining problems. In the next
chapter I will use the solutions I suggest below to analyse the comparative
costs and benefits for Rawls and Dworkin. The analysis will conclude that
Dworkin’s theory is better suited to the task of justifying restrictions on
wealth inheritance than Rawls’s theory.
I offer solutions in this Chapter to establish the best versions of Rawls
and Dworkin’s theories to use in the comparative analysis in Chapter 5. If
the problems I discuss in this Chapter are left unanswered they will be sig-
nificant theoretical costs to Rawls and Dworkin. These costs include, being
motivationally incoherent, making incoherent distinctions, the inability to
answer all three normative intuitions in some way and the inability to give
equal weight to each of the three intuitions. The last two costs are espe-
cially troubling because they attack the central reason for including Rawls
and Dworkin as candidates. As I outlined in the Introduction, Rawls and
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Dworkin expect to justify their theories to a range of intuitive concerns
in a liberal democracy. Rawls and Dworkin do not expect their theories
to reveal metaphysical truths about justice. They expect their theories to
describe a system of normative principles which are justifiable to a broad
range of intuitive normative judgements.
The problems I discuss in this Chapter appear in an order of priority.
This means that I will first offer solutions to the two internal problems
against Rawls’s theory and then to the most significant challenge against
Dworkin’s theory. To that end I begin by offering a solution to the Distinc-
tion Problem that I raised in Chapter 2. The Distinction Problem is that
Rawls’s theory does not give a coherent justification for treating wealth
inheritance similar to natural talent but different to social class. I offer a
solution to avoid the comparative cost of an incoherent justification. This
comparative cost means that the way Rawls’s theory justifies restricting
wealth inheritance to those who hold the luck intuition would be incoher-
ent. This would be a comparative disadvantage over Dworkin’s theory.
The normative judgement that grounds the luck intuition is that a just
society should not hold individuals morally responsible for being born into
a high social class or having wealthy bequeathers. Rawls must justify why
he chooses to treat these two events differently when they are both judged
identically by those who hold the luck intuition.
The second problem I offer a solution to is the Structural Injustice
Problem I introduced in Chapter 2. This problem is that Rawls’s theory
does not answer the normative concerns of the luck intuition because it
permits wealth inheritance to contribute to social behaviours that limit
the choices open to individuals. Permitting wealth inheritance in this way
is contrary to the intuitive judgement made by those who hold the luck
intuition that individuals should not be held responsible for how unchosen
social behaviours and values disadvantage them. This means that those
who hold the luck intuition will not find Rawls’s restriction of wealth inher-
itance justifiable. I offer a solution to avoid this comparative cost because
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a theory that cannot justify itself to one of the three normative intuitions
cannot claim to be broadly justifiable in a liberal democracy.
The third problem I propose a solution for is Cohen’s use of his theory
of Equal Access to Advantage to challenge Dworkin’s theory. Cohen’s chal-
lenge is that the coherent way to justify restricting wealth inheritance is
by restricting all forms of brute luck and not just unchosen circumstances.
Cohen argues this because it seems Dworkin’s theory restricts wealth in-
heritance without taking into account the effect of restricting wealth in-
heritance for individuals with other unchosen passions or capabilities for
well being. This would be a comparative cost because it is incoherent with
the normative judgement of the luck intuition that individuals should not
be held responsible for the disadvantages of unchosen phenomena. Cohen
argues the only way to avoid this is to adopt, at least in part, Cohen’s
theory of equalising access to advantage instead of resources. I offer a so-
lution to avoid the comparative cost because it involves a large conceptual
departure from Dworkin’s original arguments and motivations. All three
of the problems I have outlined demand either a response that reinterprets
or modifies Rawls and Dworkin’s original theories.
But before exploring the solutions, let us remind ourselves of how Rawls
and Dworkin set out to justify restricting wealth inheritance. This outline
will include the solutions I offered in Chapters 2 and 3 to Cohen’s Distilled
Arguments, the Harshness Problem and the Wrong Focus Objection.
Rawls (2001: 42, 51–53) justifies restricting wealth inheritance by
proposing that unrestricted wealth inheritance violates his two principles
of justice. Wealth inheritance violates the second principle of justice be-
cause it allows similarly talented and motivated individuals to have un-
equal opportunities to attain social and economic goods. However, wealth
inheritance should only be restricted insofar as it is most beneficial to the
least advantaged in society. Rawls (2001: 42, 114) answers the liberal in-
tuition using his first principle of justice which does not permit a society
to completely restrict a bequeather’s freedom to dispose of their private
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property. This is because the freedom to accumulate and dispose property
is a primary good that all free and equal people desire when endorsing a
fair system of social cooperation.
Rawls (2001: 43) then answers the opportunity intuition using his sec-
ond principle of justice which entails that wealth inheritance should be
restricted because it does not give all individuals an equal opportunity to
attain social and economic goods. For Rawls, equality of opportunity is
more than the formal equality of allowing all individuals to participate
in the market or treating them as equal citizens. It is the equal chance
for all individuals regardless of their social class to compete against others.
Inequalities of opportunities are only permitted when they are to the great-
est advantage for the worst off. Rawls’s theory answers the luck intuition
by specifying the types of things that contribute to unequal opportunities,
namely social contingencies that individuals should not be held responsible
for. These contingencies include lucky events that affect an individual’s
prospects in life. Wealth inheritance is one such contingency that provides
some individuals significantly more capital in their lives than others and
hence more opportunities.
Nevertheless, Rawls’s original theory prioritises the opportunity intu-
ition because the difference principle sets out the limits for equalising op-
portunities. One consequence of Cohen’s argument in Chapter 3 was to
modify Rawls’s theory from treating inequalities as necessary to treating
inequalities as contingently permissible. As a consequence opportunities
should not be equalised at all costs because an inequality can be permis-
sible if it is of the greatest advantage to the worst off. This is because
Rawls (2001: 62–63) believes that the best way for all individuals to have
an equal chance to attain the primary goods that all free and equal people
desire is to have a productive society. According to Rawls a society can
only be productive enough to advantage those in the lowest social class
if individuals have an incentive to be productive. This incentive includes
the ability to accumulate more resources than others and the ability to
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further the lives of their descendants through inherited wealth. There-
fore an emphasis on equalising opportunities does not mean neutralising
or confiscating all instances of inherited wealth but only restricting wealth
inheritance to the extent that it benefits the least advantaged most.
On the other hand Dworkin’s original theory prioritises the luck intu-
ition by proposing the abstract egalitarian principle and the principle of
abstraction (2000: 128, 147–148). The general normative theses - GT1,
GT2 and GT2.1 which I introduced in Chapter 3 - codify a general concep-
tion of Dworkin’s principles and the means to implement them. Dworkin’s
theory entails that a just society should restrict wealth inheritance because
it is a form of brute luck that distributes resources unequally through a
process that individuals do not choose. Dworkin justifies his claim on the
basis that wealth inheritance violates both GT1 and GT2. To this end,
Dworkin answers the luck intuition primarily through GT2, because GT2
specifies that the effects of brute luck, not option luck, on an individual’s
social and economic state of affairs should be minimised as much as pos-
sible. Since wealth inheritance is an instance of brute luck, this means
that it should be converted as efficiently as possible into a form of option
luck. This is because wealth inheritance is an unchosen advantage that
individual’s cannot be held responsible for.
Dworkin answers the opportunity intuition using GT2 and GT2.1 which
prescribe that a just society should equalise resources and the freedom for
individuals to use their resources. For Dworkin (2000: 77–78, 128, 147–
148), the transformation of brute luck into option luck means giving all
individuals an equal chance to use their social and economic freedoms. This
entails the freedom to use their resources to make choices about leading
their lives. In short, the formal equality of political and economic freedoms
combined with transforming brute luck into option luck using insurance
schemes ensures that all individuals have an equal opportunity to lead a
life for which they can be held responsible. This does not mean that equal-
ity of opportunity is the primary concern for Dworkin. Dworkin’s theory
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allows gross inequalities in opportunities, even to the extent that it makes
the worst off even more disadvantaged, so long as the inequality is a result
of a direct choice or option luck. Dworkin answers the liberal intuition
using GT2.1 because it prescribes that all individuals should have the per-
sonal freedoms that are compatible with the efficient running of insurance
schemes and markets. This can include an individual’s right to bequeath
since bequeathing is a choice, even though inheriting is not. Therefore
inheritors must bear the true opportunity cost of lucky circumstances like
being born to wealthy ancestors.
Unlike Rawls, Dworkin’s original theory prioritises the luck intuition.
This is evident in the way he approaches the concept of distributive justice.
Dworkin starts from a desire to equalise the power individuals derive from
their private ownership of resources. Dworkin’s initial motivation is to
legitimise an equal division of resources. For this he relies on the envy
test and the auction (2000: 67–69). Both of these devices ground the
legitimacy of equal resource distributions in the moral responsibility that
individuals have to bear the costs of their choices. Wealth inheritance is one
act that violates this responsibility because it does not present individuals
with a choice. Therefore individuals cannot be held responsible either for
its advantages or its disadvantages. Dworkin’s initial link between choice
and equality is what makes him prioritise the luck intuition above the
opportunity and liberal intuition.
Nevertheless Dworkin’s theory has been modified slightly from his orig-
inal account to solve the Harshness Problem and Wrong Focus Objection.
These changes modify GT2, by specifying in more detail when and what
parts of a just society should hold individuals responsible for their choices.
Three changes are made. First, that social institutions hold individuals
responsible for their choices by educating them about the potential risks
of their choices. Second, that some level of mandatory insurance is per-
missible to ensure that individuals understand the inevitable risks of their
choices for other people. Third, that responsibility is a reciprocal relation
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between social institutions and individuals. While the consequences of the
first two changes are obvious, the third change suggests a more developed
conception of moral responsibility. This developed conception means mak-
ing all individuals equally responsible for their social interactions through
society’s institutions.
In the following sections I develop Rawls and Dworkin’s theories further
from the way I have outlined them so far. In §§4.1–4.2 I offer solutions
to resolve internal problems about the coherency of Rawls’s normative
machinery. In §4.3 I offer two defences of Dworkin’s theory against Cohen’s
challenge.
4.1 The Distinction Problem
The Distinction Problem is the worry that Rawls’s theory cannot justify
treating wealth inheritance differently to social class and therefore is un-
justifiable to the luck intuition. I argued that to maintain Rawls’s different
treatment of wealth inheritance and social class is incoherent because it in-
volves treating two relevantly similar social contingencies in different ways.
In turn this internal incoherency shows Rawls’s theory ignores the consid-
ered intuitive judgements of an entire group of individuals. At the very
least this would mean that Rawls cannot coherently justify his restrictions
on wealth inheritance to those who hold the luck intuition in an impartial
way. This is a significant comparative cost and leads to the conclusion that
Rawls’s theory is not the best way to justify restricting wealth inheritance
in a liberal democracy.
The problem arises, as I argued in Chapter 2, because Rawls’s theory
entails that a just society should restrict wealth inheritance only when
it contributes to inequalities of opportunity between similarly motivated
and talented individuals (Rawls 2001: 43–44). Rawls’s justification for
this judgement is the second principle of justice which all individuals who
desire the same primary goods would accept behind a veil of ignorance and
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through reflective equilibrium. As Rawls (2001: 44) writes:
In all parts of society there are to be roughly the same prospects
of culture and achievement for those similarly motivated and
endowed.
But the pertinent question that arises from Rawls’s second principle of
justice is what is the metric of opportunity? I argued in Chapter 2 that
the answer Rawls (2001: 46) provides is “social class”. Rawls uses social
class or similar life-prospects as an indicator of whether there is an equal-
ity of opportunity in a liberal society. To this end, Rawls treats wealth
inheritance as a brute fact about individuals and families that is no more
inherently unjust than the genetic inheritance of natural talent. This is
because if someone’s social class of origin determines their fewer oppor-
tunities then this inequality of opportunity is inherently unjust (Rawls
2001: 40, 44). Rawls separates the injustice of an individual’s social class
of origin determining her prospects in life from lucky events, like wealth
inheritance, that might determine their social class later in life. The Dis-
tinction Problem questions how Rawls can separate these two injustices.
But what does the Distinction Problem imply about Rawls’s aim to
justify restricting wealth inheritance to the luck intuition? It seems to
imply that even though Rawls (2001: 55) identifies wealth inheritance as a
social contingency, he only treats it as instrumentally involved in creating
unequal opportunities over an individual’s lifetime. What do I mean by
this? I mean that Rawls’s theory is concerned with how efficiently lucky
events like wealth inheritance create unequal life prospects. As Rawls
(1999: 245) says in his revised edition of A Theory of Justice:
The unequal inheritance of wealth is no more inherently unjust
than the unequal inheritance of intelligence. It is true that the
former is presumably more easily subject to social control; but
the essential thing is that as far as possible inequalities founded
on either should satisfy the difference principle. Thus inheri-
tance is permissible provided that the resulting inequalities are
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to the advantage of the least fortunate and compatible with
liberty and fair equality of opportunity.
Rawls appears to argue that a society becomes unjust when wealth inher-
itance is too efficient in creating unequal prospects in life for individuals
of equal talent and motivation but different social classes. Rawls’s judge-
ment that wealth inheritance is not inherently unjust also shows he does
not believe its affects on social class are significant for distributive justice.
For Rawls (2001: 59) the difference amounts to the reasonable expecta-
tions or life-prospects for attaining primary goods. On this view wealth
inheritance is a social instrument that might cause different life-prospects
for those who are similarly talented and motivated. But the question that
arises is why we should consider wealth inheritance as a social contingency
distinct from social class of origin when wealth inheritance is as lucky an
event as being born into a higher social class? If this question is not an-
swered then Rawls’s theory directly contradicts the normative concerns of
the luck intuition. This is because the intuitive judgement of the luck intu-
ition is that we should not discriminate between the luck of being born to
parents with a high income and the luck of having a wealthy bequeather.
4.1.1 Wealth Inheritance as Constitutive of Social
Class
In the previous section I explained what the Distinction Problem is and
how it is problematic for Rawls’s theory. As a response to the Distinction
Problem I suggest that Rawls’s theory already has the tools to answer the
normative concerns of the luck intuition without making an unjustified
distinction between social class and wealth inheritance. I suggest that
Rawls’s second principle of justice can solve the Distinction Problem if it
is modified so wealth inheritance is understood not like natural talent but
as an indicator of social class. This means that wealth inheritance should
not be understood as a resource equivalent of genetic inheritance but as a
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constituent element of what stratifies a society into different social classes.1
On this view, wealth inheritance not only causes unequal opportunities,
but is caused by unequal opportunities. Individuals stratify into groups of
similarly talented and motivated individuals because of wealth inheritance
not in spite of it. This is different from understanding wealth inheritance
as a resource equivalent of genetic inheritance, because the way genetic
inheritance stratifies individuals is not sensitive to any individual’s social
class of origin.
This solution primarily works by not proposing any extra principles or
extra fundamental concepts, but by redefining who the “least advantaged”
are in Rawls’s theory. Rawls (2001: 59) originally defines the least ad-
vantaged as that group of citizens who have the lowest expectations for
attaining the primary goods that Rawls thinks all free and equal people
would desire. But my solution treats wealth inheritance as both an act
that stratifies society into social classes and one that is only possible be-
cause an individual has significantly higher access to the primary goods.
Both consequences of wealth inheritance occur because it creates unequal
opportunities for individuals to attain primary goods. Understood this
way, wealth inheritance is first and foremost a lucky event for an inheritor
who gains an advantage over others because she has more opportunities
to attain the primary goods she desires. However, wealth inheritance is
also a lucky event for a bequeather because it indicates that she is lucky
enough to be born into a social class that allows her to accumulate enough
private property to bequeath.
By accounting for how wealth inheritance can be a lucky event for the
1This is not an entirely novel idea. Christopher Lake (2001: 85–86) suggests that
to understand the link between concerns about equality and responsibility, we should
acknowledge that “entrenched inequalities” like inherited wealth should be seen as both
a cause and effect of the interests of some dominating the interests of others. For our
purposes this means that inherited wealth should be seen as both a cause and effect
allowing some individuals to exploit their inherited wealth ad natural talent for the sake
of productivity and to benefit the worst off.
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bequeather and the inheritor, my solution tries to strengthen the justifia-
bility of Rawls’s theory to the luck intuition. This is because the solution
appeals to the way the principle of fair equality of opportunity requires
individuals to be less constrained by their social class when competing
for social and economic positions. This is not to say the solution forces
Rawls to compensate individuals who inherit nothing or very little to such
a degree that they are materially equal to an individual who inherits a for-
tune. By treating wealth inheritance as an indicator of social class Rawls’s
theory can apply its normative principles to cases where individuals are
less motivated or have fewer opportunities to exercise their talent. This is
because these cases are understood to be an effect of someone being born
into a social class that inherits very little wealth. This modification al-
lows Rawls to understand wealth inheritance as a social contingency that
plays a role in stratifying individuals into groups of different talent and
motivation. Without the modification, those who hold the luck intuition
would reasonably ask why an individual should be held responsible for be-
ing unlucky to not have inherited the resources to improve their talent and
motivation?
To make clear how the solution works let us return to the example of
the Honey Farmer used in Chapter 2. The example supposed a Honey
Farmer receives two inheritances in her life. First, when she and other
individuals discover lethal but productive bees, so that she can set up her
honey farming business. Second, when she has to fight a court case to
protect her business. I argued in Chapter 2 that Rawls’s theory prescribes
that a liberal democracy should tax the Honey Farmer’s inheritance in
both cases. But I also argued that the restrictions on her inheritance in
the first instance would be unjustifiably limited. This is because Rawls’s
theory does not permit taxing the Honey Farmer’s initial inheritance to
the point that her opportunities to open a business are equal to her fellow
bee discovers whose social class of origin prevents them to improve their
talent and motivation. Our Honey farmer is permitted to use her inherited
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wealth to have more opportunities than her fellow bee discovers from a
lower social class only if the influence of her inherited wealth is slowly
eradicated. This is how understating wealth inheritance as a constituent
element of social class allows Rawls’s theory to permit inherited wealth
contingent on restricting it so it slowly loses its influence as a productivity
incentive.
On the other hand Rawls’s theory takes a different approach with re-
gards to the court case where the Honey Farmer and the Plaintiff are
differently talented and motivated in fighting the court case. Rawls be-
lieves it is just to redistribute wealth to allow both the Honey Farmer and
the plaintiff to have equal opportunities to defend themselves in court.
In the solution I suggest, Rawls’s theory would prescribe a tax on the
Honey Farmer’s initial inheritance so that eventually wealth inheritance
no longer stratifies society into social classes. Nevertheless, Rawls’s the-
ory would still not advocate restricting the Honey Farmer’s inheritance so
that she had the same opportunities as those who were less talented or
motivated. Even when we consider wealth inheritance as constitutive of
what it means to belong to a social class, the restriction of wealth inher-
itance should satisfy the difference principle. Rawls’s theory would still
permit wealth inheritance as a contingently permissible inequality so long
as it was to the greatest benefit to the least advantaged and helped slowly
eradicate the influence of wealth inheritance. In the context of the Distinc-
tion Problem the least advantaged are individuals from a social class who
can bequeath very little property. However, restricting the Honey Farmer’s
initial inheritance so she has the same opportunities as her less talented
and motivated bee discoverers does not seem to be of any advantage to
those in the lowest social class. This means the Honey Farmer’s inheri-
tance should be restricted to allow only enough inherited wealth sufficient
to advantage the worst off. But this does not permit restricting the Honey
Farmer’s inheritance to allow the less talented and motivated to develop
their skills and motivate themselves to start a honey farming business.
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The final question to answer is whether my solution helps Rawls coher-
ently justify restricting wealth inheritance to the luck intuition? I believe
it does because it allows Rawls to treat wealth inheritance the same way
he treats social class. He need not make a distinction between two equally
lucky events. Rawls’s theory can justify restricting wealth inheritance as
an indicator of an individual’s unequal opportunities to accumulate and
bequeath private property. Rawls can prescribe this because wealth inher-
itance is a form of luck that is made possible by an individual’s luck to be
born into a particular social class. This allows Rawls’s theory to answer
the normative concerns of the luck intuition by treating wealth inheritance
as a form of brute luck that causes class differences which in turn allows
individuals like our Honey Farmer to bequeath more wealth. In short,
wealth inheritance can be treated as a lucky event in the same way that
social class is and can be restricted in a way that caters to the concerns of
those who hold the luck intuition. I discuss the potential costs and benefits
of my solution in further detail in Chapter 5.
4.2 Structural Injustice Problem
In the last section we explored a suggestion that Rawls can incorporate
wealth inheritance into his conception of social class to coherently justify
restricting wealth inheritance to the opportunity and luck intuition. This
leads us to consider how Rawls can respond to the contention that his
theory is not actually justifiable to those who hold the luck intuition even
after his principles are implemented. This is the central contention of the
Structural Injustice Problem. This problem is that it appears Rawls defines
the scope of his theory too narrowly to account for the ways individuals
suffer from states of affairs they cannot control or have not chosen. This
is significant because if Iris Young’s argument is left unanswered it shows
Rawls does not answer the normative concerns of those who hold the luck
intuition with enough strength. In turn this would mean Rawls’s restriction
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of wealth inheritance was not broadly justifiable and impartial towards the
three conflicting intuitions.
Those who hold the luck intuition will disagree with Rawls’s principles
as a guide for just action. This means individuals will not only disagree on
how to restrict wealth inheritance under Rawls’s theory, they will also dis-
agree about his principles of justice. They will disagree because Young’s
argument entails that wealth inheritance is one way in which social be-
haviours can perpetuate and be disadvantageous to an individual without
their choice. This is contrary to the intuitive normative judgement of those
who hold the luck intuition, namely that the role of luck in people’s lives
should be neutralised.
The striking question that follows from Young’s argument is: what are
social behaviours and why do they matter once Rawls’s normative princi-
ples and conception of background justice is implemented? Young (2001:
70) argues that social behaviours are “structural processes” that reflect
what a society values and what is a culturally and socially endorsed way
of life. Young suggests that the subject of Rawls’s principles are too nar-
row because they apply only to a basic legal and economic framework that
governs individual interactions. For Young the subject of justice should be
broader, it should include the interactions themselves. As Young (2011:
70) says:
Depending on the issue, the structural processes that tend to
produce injustice for many people do not necessarily refer to
a small set of institutions, and they do not exclude everyday
habits and chosen actions.
I believe we can consider wealth inheritance as one kind of chosen action or
everyday habit that reflects a social value for accumulating capital and be-
queathing it for future generations. In Chapter 2 I used a modified version
of Young’s example of Sandy, who is forced into homelessness, to illustrate
what Young’s argument entails for wealth inheritance. In the example I
compared the case of Sandy and Sandra. Sandy is a mother of two who
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works in a male dominated field for a less than average wage. As a result
she finds herself choosing between housing that is inadequate for raising
two children or homelessness. On the other hand, Sandra who is as tal-
ented and motivated as Sandy in the relevant ways inherits a vast amount
of wealth which is restricted through taxation to pay for welfare policies
that help Sandy. Nevertheless, Sandra’s inheritance is not restricted com-
pletely because it would not be of the greatest benefit to Sandy’s social
class.
Young’s argument is that even though Rawls’s principles are applied
coherently, it still seems unjust for Sandy to have fewer choices in life than
Sandra. Sandy is not the victim of one recognisable immoral act, but
she simply does not value wealth accumulation and bequeathing to the
same extent as Sandra. In fact Sandy’s valuing of her children’s education
and adequate housing is probably not something particular to Sandy, but
common to many in her situation. If Sandra was in Sandy’s situation
she would also value her housing and children’s education higher than
accumulating and bequeathing capital.
Despite the restriction of Sandra’s wealth inheritance, it appears that
Sandy is at a disadvantage because her values are contrary to the values
of her society. She is not a male breadwinner and does not have enough
savings to own a home. It seems that Young’s argument entails that a just
society should not treat wealth inheritance as a social value of capital ac-
cumulation and property transfer that excludes individuals with different
values from having the same choices as others. None of this is to say that
Rawls is unaware of the effects of wealth inheritance. But only that, con-
trary to Young (2001: 70), he does not include the “patterns in relations
among people and the positions they occupy relative to one another” when
some individuals inherit wealth and others do not, within the basic struc-
ture. At this point those who hold the luck intuition can reasonably object
that what Young’s argument shows is that Rawls’s theory can still permit
lucky events like wealth inheritance to limit Sandy’s opportunities in life
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without her choice. This objection seems to suggest that Rawls’s theory
does not answer the normative concerns of the luck intuition because it
permits wealth inheritance to determine the choices open to individuals.
It seems that if we take Young’s argument about structural processes
seriously, then the most theoretically economical response from Rawls is to
offer a slightly different interpretation of the basic structure. To that end
Rawls could include individual behaviours that contribute to a collective
behaviour of valuing wealth accumulation in his conception of the basic
structure of society. This would mean that the social processes that lead
to a society valuing capital accumulation and male breadwinners above
affordable housing or female breadwinners should be reshaped so they are
of the greatest benefit to the least advantaged. One way to achieve this
is by restricting wealth inheritance further so it does not perpetuate soci-
ety’s valuing of capital accumulation above other types of everyday habits.
Another way might involve restricting the use of inherited wealth to an
individual’s desires about one’s own life. This would exclude wealth inher-
itance from playing a role in funding philanthropy or political parties or
other activities that allow structural processes and social values to emerge
out of individual choices and individual labour.
Nevertheless, the suggestion to include wealth inheritance as a social
behaviour in the basic structure would be motivationally incoherent. This
is because Rawls’s motivation for defining the basic structure of society as
social institutions is to avoid a case by case moral judgement of individ-
ual behaviours and aggregate social behaviours. As Rawls (2001: 10–12)
clearly states:
We view justice as fairness not as a comprehensive moral doc-
trine but as a political conception to apply to that structure of
political and social institutions.
No attempt will be made here to deal systematically with local
justice.
Rawls’s theory avoids what he calls “local justice” or prescribing the just
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internal relations of associations and individual transactions. To then in-
clude wealth inheritance as an act that reflects a social value for accu-
mulating capital and bequeathing seems contrary to Rawls’s motivations
for a unified general theory of distributive justice. Even to include a few
unplanned individual behaviours that are disadvantageous because they
run contrary to the everyday habits of some individuals is contrary to
Rawls motivations. For example, a society would consider market fluctu-
ations that cause homelessness or unemployment as unplanned individual
behaviours that are caused by collective social behaviours in the market.
Rawls’s theory can then mitigate the effect of unplanned behaviours by
insisting that the intentions of the second principle of justice is to counter
social contingencies. Nevertheless, even this small departure from Rawls’s
theory is motivationally incoherent with the first principle of justice and
Rawls’s conception of pure procedural justice. The motivation for Rawls’s
principles is the idea that they will be arrived at through a widely ac-
ceptable process of fair and impartial deliberation. This process does not
permit cherry picking certain social behaviours that we judge to be obvi-
ously unjust or immoral.
Furthermore the example I use is not a rare case about a highly im-
probable scenario. It is a comparison of two individuals; one who benefits
from her society’s valuing for accumulating and bequeathing capital and
another who is priced out of the housing and labour markets by it. The
example is within Rawls’s framework of a property-owning democracy and
the social conditions prior to the acceptance of the principles of justice. To
include particular individual behaviours that are caused by wealth inher-
itance within the basic structure of society, would necessarily violate the
first principle of justice. This is because Rawls’s theory would have to curb
the equal basic rights of some citizens to dispose or accumulate wealth to
avoid the type of unplanned individual behaviours that worry Young.
So what can be said in response to the Structural Injustice Problem?
One response that Rawls can make is that the Structural Injustice Problem
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does not suggest his theory completely ignores the concerns of the luck
intuition. Rather the problem only suggests that his theory might not
answer the concerns as strongly as initially thought. I will discuss this
response in further detail and its costs and benefits in Chapter 5. For
now it is safe to assert that Rawls’s theory will have some difficulty in
responding to the Structural Injustice Problem. This leads us to assert
that Rawls cannot answer the normative concerns of the luck intuition
with sufficient strength to justify restricting wealth inheritance equally to
all three intuitions.
4.3 Equal Access To Advantage
I have so far discussed two problems that remained outstanding for Rawls’s
theory. This section furthers the discussion by now turning our attention
to the last remaining problem for Dworkin’s theory. I argued in Chapter 3
that Cohen’s theory of “Equal Access to Advantage” can plausibly claim to
be better at justifying restrictions on wealth inheritance to the opportunity
and luck intuition than Dworkin’s theory. Let us remind ourselves that the
purpose of this thesis is to judge whether Rawls or Dworkin are better at
justifying wealth inheritance. This means that if Dworkin cannot mount a
successful defence of his theory, then the theory should be heavily modified
to adopt Cohen’s normative principles. An idea of the parts of Dworkin’s
theory that should be changed include, but is not limited to:
• Changing the focus of Dworkin’s theory from resources to “advan-
tage”
• Changing Dworkin’s theory to include “equal opportunity for wel-
fare” even though it is contrary to his arguments against it (Dworkin
2000: 21–42, 48–62).
In the context of comparing Rawls and Dworkin’s theories these changes
would be a theoretical cost because they entail that Dworkin’s theory
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should depart significantly from its original formulation and motivations.
Dworkin’s original formulation is strictly about resources, because he be-
lieves other measures of equality are incoherent and equalising resources is
the best realisation of the abstract egalitarian principle (Dworkin 2000: 62,
121, 128). I suggest two ways to defend Dworkin’s theory as he originally
formulates it. The first defence, which I call the Subsumption Defence, is
that most of Cohen’s examples of expensive tastes and unequal access to
advantage can be solved by Dworkin’s theory. This is because “equal access
to advantage” is merely another way of referring to unequal resources. The
second defence, which I call the Actuality Defence, is that Dworkin’s the-
ory uses a conception of individuals that more closely corresponds to how
individuals actually behave in a liberal democracy than Cohen’s theory.
Before I discuss my defence of Dworkin’s theory let us remind ourselves
of how Cohen’s theory challenges Dworkin’s theory. Cohen makes two
inferences. First he infers from the counter examples he presents that
Dworkin’s theory is incoherent in the way it attempts to justify restricting
wealth inheritance because it makes an inconsistent distinction between
unchosen preferences and unchosen circumstances. Second he infers from
this that a better way to justify restricting wealth inheritance is to treat all
forms of unchosen states of affairs the same way. Cohen argues that this
involves adopting, at least in part, his theory of Equal Access to Advantage.
Cohen’s (2011: 20) first inference involves the example of Paul and
Fred. Paul has a preference for photography, which is expensive, while
Fred has a preference for fishing, which is cheap. None of these preferences
are cultivated. Paul is at a disadvantage compared to Fred because if both
are not compensated, Paul is forced to have a lower level of well-being
through no choice of his own. Cohen (2011: 20–21) argues that Dworkin’s
theory entails that a just society should not compensate Paul for his dis-
advantage. But Cohen believes that a just society should compensate Paul
for his unchosen disadvantage. Cohen’s judgement entails that if Paul and
Fred were to inherit wealth, a just society should restrict Paul’s wealth
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inheritance less than Fred’s because the effect of having his wealth inheri-
tance restricted is worse for Paul. Paul is disadvantaged by a lower level of
well-being that he has not chosen and so requires more of his inheritance
to achieve the same level of well-being as Fred.
Cohen believes the example shows that Dworkin tries to treat the effect
of restricting wealth inheritance on unchosen preferences and unchosen
circumstance differently even though both are unchosen. This is directly
contrary to the normative judgement of those who hold the luck intuition
that individuals should not be held responsible for unchosen lucky events of
any kind. For Cohen (2011: 19) the correct distinction is between unchosen
access to advantage and chosen access to advantage. Any other distinction
is incoherent because it treats unchosen preferences differently to unchosen
circumstances.
The first inference then leads to a second inference, namely that the
best way to justify restricting brute luck events like wealth inheritance is by
adopting wholly or in part Cohen’s theory of Equal Access to Advantage.
In Chapter 3 I used the example of ‘α and β’ to illustrate this inference.
This example presents two groups of millionaires. Both groups inherit all
or most of their wealth. However, the members of α are different because
they are born with more expensive preferences than the members of β.
According to Cohen (2011: 21), a just society should compensate, if
needed, the members of α because they are at a welfare and resource
disadvantage. This is because they require more resources to extract and
achieve the same level of welfare as the members of β. This means that a
liberal democracy that attempts to justify restricting wealth inheritance,
should restrict α’s inheritances less because α have fewer opportunities for
welfare and should not be held responsible for the luck of being born with
expensive preferences. Not doing so would mean that the restriction of
wealth inheritance wholly, or in part, is unjustifiable to those individuals
who hold the opportunity and luck intuition. Cohen’s theory overcomes
this issue by treating unequal access to any kind of advantage, whether
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welfare, resources or opportunities, with equal weight. Cohen argues that
by adopting his theory a just society can actually be egalitarian because
it makes the distinction between choice and luck in relation to all forms of
advantage.
As I mentioned earlier, I suggest two defences for Dworkin’s theory. The
first is the Subsumption Defence, the second the Actuality Defence. The
Subsumption Defence involves the basic claim that we can interpret most
of Cohen’s examples as forms of resource inequality. Let us first deal with
Cohen’s example of Paul and Fred. Cohen contends that it is inconsistent
for Dworkin to not restrict Paul’s wealth inheritance less which would
allow Paul to pursue his expensive preference for photography. Dworkin’s
theory entails that Paul should not have his inheritance restricted less
because Paul chooses to pursue photography instead of a cheaper passion
like fishing. Cohen argues that this is incoherent because it ignores the
way restricting wealth inheritance affects Paul’s opportunity for welfare
when he cannot fulfil the preferences he did not choose to have.
However, I suggest that Cohen’s argument is misguided. His exam-
ple can be translated and subsumed into the normative commitments of
Dworkin’s theory without any issues. This is achieved by understanding
that Paul’s unchosen expensive preferences are what cause him to have a
diminished opportunity for welfare compared to Fred. To equalise opportu-
nities and neutralise brute luck, I believe Dworkin’s theory should restrict
wealth inheritance in such a way to give Paul the same opportunities as
any other individual to pursue photography. This answers the normative
concerns of the opportunity and luck intuition without any recourse to
the distinction between circumstances and preferences. Dworkin’s theory
is not concerned with adjusting the market price of pursuing certain indi-
vidual preferences. Paul and Fred are born with preferences that require
different resources to fulfil them. Dworkin’s normative commitments then
depend on whether Paul and Fred have unequal resources to fulfil their
preferences because some brute luck or option luck event prevents them
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from accumulating the resources they need. Neither Paul nor Fred faces
such a brute luck or option luck event. Therefore Cohen is misguided be-
cause he seems to argue that Dworkin restricts wealth inheritance as a
way to equalise opportunities for welfare. As I have argued, Dworkin’s
theory is actually equalising the opportunities for individuals to pursue
their preferences by restricting wealth inheritance.
Another example that differentiates Dworkin’s theory from Cohen’s
theory is Cohen’s (2011: 22–23) example of Jude who has cultivated “cheap
expensive tastes”. Jude has cultivated resource expensive preferences,
which are also cheap because he is able to extract a greater amount of
well-being with every unit of resource than his contemporaries. Jude is
able to extract the same amount of well-being from the same preference as
some one else by using less resources. Cohen argues, just as he does in Paul
and Fred’s case, that Dworkin’s theory is incoherent if it justifies restrict-
ing wealth inheritance as a brute luck event but not compensating Jude by
restricting his inheritance less. Cohen’s argument is that Dworkin’s theory
is not sensitive to Jude’s choice to have more opportunity for welfare by
consuming fewer resources. Jude uses fewer resources and leaves more for
others to fulfil their preferences.
As I argued in the case of Paul and Fred earlier I believe Dworkin’s
theory can account for the way Jude is seemingly disadvantaged. An insur-
ance scheme would determine if Jude is owed compensation because brute
luck events have limited his capacity to accumulate resources. Jude either
chooses to pursue his “cheaper expensive tastes” or he chooses to pursue
other tastes. Dworkin’s theory applies to Jude’s case only when wealth in-
heritance affects the choices and the acts entailed by his previous choices.
The translation of Jude’s case into the language of Dworkin’s theory is
that Jude chooses to pursue a cheap expensive preferences. Dworkin’s
normative commitments depend on whether brute luck events like wealth
inheritance affect Jude’s opportunities to fulfil his preferences.
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At this point let us consolidate how the Subsumption Defence works.
In both the examples above, I argued that Dworkin’s theory is able to
subsume the concerns raised by Cohen’s arguments. I argue this by high-
lighting the specific disadvantages Paul, Fred and Jude face and that these
disadvantages can be made sense of in the language of resources and so can
be accounted for in Dworkin’s theory of resource egalitarianism. Therefore,
Dworkin’s theory is not incoherent when justifying restrictions on wealth
inheritance to the opportunity and luck intuition because we can translate
the disadvantage of unequal opportunity for welfare into the disadvantage
of unequal resources. Once we make this translation the rest of Dworkin’s
theory follows as before by transforming brute luck into option luck. This
is because any case of unequal opportunity for welfare is analysed as a
case where individuals either choose to have the resources they need to
pursue their preferences or they do not. In the latter case Dworkin’s the-
ory restricts any brute luck event, like wealth inheritance, that prevents
individuals from choosing to accumulate the resources they need to pursue
their preferences.
One small problem that may still persist is that my response ignores
Cohen’s claim that Dworkin’s theory treats the brute luck of being born
with expensive preferences different to the brute luck of inheriting wealth
(Cohen 2011: 31–32). The worry might be that Dworkin’s restriction of
wealth inheritance is incomplete in not accounting for the way wealth in-
heritance can cause unequal distributions of resources that can then make
opportunities for welfare unequal. Why should we treat unchosen oppor-
tunities for welfare any differently than unchosen resources? To answer
this question I respond with the Actuality Defence.
The Actuality Defence is the claim that Dworkin’s theory recognises in-
dividuals as they actually are as opposed to how Cohen believes we should
ideally conceive of them. Richard Arneson (1989: 79–80) suggests a similar
response to Cohen’s arguments, but stops short of arguing that Dworkin’s
theory treats individuals as they actually conceive their preferences. Ar-
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neson (1989: 80) argues that in relation to compensating individuals:
. . . that we are responsible for our preferences is compatible
with the claim that an appropriate norm of equal distribution
should compensate people for their hard-to-satisfy preferences
at least up to the point at which by taking appropriate adaptive
measures now, people could reach the same preference satisfac-
tion level as others.
However, my defence is not concerned with “preference satisfaction levels”
or in compensating individuals for their preferences. My defence avoids any
of these commitments and attempts to defend Dworkin’s theory without
any concessions to Cohen’s arguments.
My defence suggests that Dworkin’s theory recognises individuals as
either citizens that do not consider their preferences as brute luck ad-
vantages and disadvantages, or as individuals who have control over their
preferences regardless of whether they cultivate them or not. The first
disjunct involves the claim that actual individuals who hold the liberal,
opportunity or luck intuition do not conceive of their congenital prefer-
ences as advantages or disadvantages in themselves because preferences
are contingencies internal to the individual. This is different to the way
the resources required to satisfy the preferences are affected by external
social contingencies.
The distinction between internal and external contingencies is not be-
tween those contingencies that occur internally or externally to the individ-
ual. If the distinction were like this, then handicaps and physical illnesses
would also be internal contingencies. This would be inconsistent with
Dworkin’s theory. Rather the distinction I make is between contingencies
that are internal to an individual’s agent centred intentions towards the
world and those that are external to these intentions. The former includes
contingencies that are intrinsic to an individual’s intentions because they
shape what the intentions are and how they are directed. The latter in-
cludes contingencies that are extrinsic to an individual’s intentions because
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they only help an individual to act on their intentions.
On this view preferences are internal, perhaps even necessarily so, to an
individual’s intentions and attitudes about their own agency towards the
world. Physical illnesses, handicaps, social contingencies like wealth inher-
itance and social relations are instrumentally related and not intrinsically
related to how an individual sees themselves as a creature in the world with
agency and intentions. The first disjunct of the Actuality Defence is that
individuals do not consider unchosen preferences, despite being unchosen,
as brute luck disadvantages because they are internal to the intentions
and conception of agency that actual individuals have. Actual individu-
als consider their unchosen preferences and desires not as separate from
their identity but as part of a framework of intentions and beliefs about
themselves. Unchosen preferences do not require compensation because
individuals do not consider them to be disadvantages that make it difficult
for individuals to efficiently fulfil their desires.
The second disjunct involves the claim that actual individuals have a
high degree of control over whether they choose to satisfy their prefer-
ences. I argue that this high degree of control is independent of whether
the preferences are cultivated or not. Individuals are in control of their
preferences to such a degree that they can reorder them to have less ex-
pensive tastes and preferences. Cohen’s argument appears to assume that
an individual cannot change their unchosen preferences no matter what.
Using the Actuality Defence requires Dworkin’s theory to compensate in-
dividuals if they don’t have the resources to change their preferences in
virtue of how expensive they are. This does not commit Dworkin to com-
pensate individuals to satisfy the preferences in virtue of how expensive
they are.
The Actuality Defence works by explaining why unchosen preferences
can be treated differently to unchosen circumstances like wealth inheri-
tance. It offers a disjunction that states either unchosen preferences are
contingencies internal to an individual’s conception of themselves and their
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intentions or they are controllable to a high degree. If the first case is
true then, pace Cohen, the way Dworkin justifies restrictions on wealth
inheritance to the opportunity and luck intuitions is coherent. This is
because actual individuals do not conceive their unchosen preferences as
contingencies that cause unjust disadvantages either in the form of un-
equal opportunities or unequal resources. Therefore, Dworkin’s theory
need not restrict wealth inheritance less when individuals have unchosen
preferences. If the second case is true then Dworkin’s theory is coherent
because actual individuals have a high degree of control to reorder their
preferences. Therefore individuals can choose what they prefer even if they
are born with expensive preferences.
I believe the Subsumption Defence and Actuality Defence are sufficient
to defend Dworkin’s theory against Cohen’s theory of “Equal Access to
Advantage”. The Subsumption Defence argues that on closer analysis,
Cohen’s examples and cases of unequal opportunities for welfare can be
subsumed into Dworkin’s theory as inequalities of resources. The Actu-
ality Defence argues that Dworkin’s theory can justify treating unchosen
preferences differently to unchosen circumstances like wealth inheritance.
This is because Dworkin’s theory analyses preferences in the way that in-
dividuals actually conceive of their own preferences.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to resolve the problems that were left out-
standing in Chapters 2 and 3. To that end, I suggested that to solve the
Distinction Problem Rawls’s theory should accept that wealth inheritance
is a constituent element of social class. This means that wealth inher-
itance is accepted as a social contingency that causes class distinctions
and is perpetuated by class distinctions. This allows Rawls’s restriction
of wealth inheritance to be justifiable to the luck intuition since wealth
inheritance is analysed as a social contingency different to natural talent
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but similar to being born into a family of high social position. In doing this
the supposed incoherency in treating wealth inheritance and social class
differently is avoided.
I then suggest that to solve The Structural Injustice Problem Rawls’s
notion of the basic structure should be broadened to include social be-
haviours caused by wealth inheritance, that limit the range of choices open
to other individuals. The Structural Injustice Problem proposes that even
after implementing Rawls’s theory, a liberal democracy could still permit
social behaviours, influenced by social values that limit the choices open
to an individual. I concluded by suggesting that Rawls’s theory cannot
include such social behaviours in its basic structure because it would be
contrary to Rawls’s motivation to not cherry pick certain individual inter-
actions as morally bad or unjust. Rawls’s aim is to make social institutions
and not individual interactions that reflect social values, the subject of his
theory.
The final solution I offered was a way for Dworkin to resist Cohen’s the-
ory of Equal Access to Advantage. I first suggested that we can translate
all of Cohen’s examples of inequality of opportunity to fulfil preferences
into the language of resource inequality using the Subsumption Defence.
As a consequence I considered that Cohen could potentially argue that
Dworkin’s theory still seems to make an unjustified distinction between un-
chosen preferences and unchosen circumstances. This is despite Dworkin’s
theory considering inequalities of opportunity for welfare to be inequali-
ties in resources to fulfil one’s preferences. As a final response I argued
Dworkin could respond by using the Actuality Defence to argue that his
theory treats individuals as they actually analyse their preferences and not
how Cohen thinks individuals should analyse their preferences.
The next chapter will analyse the solutions I have summarised above
and formulate a comparative analysis to compare whether Rawls or
Dworkin is better at justifying restrictions on wealth inheritance to a broad
range of intuitions in a liberal democracy. I believe this comparative anal-
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ysis will show that Dworkin’s theory has fewer costs and more advantages
than Rawls’s theory.
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Chapter 5
Incurred Costs and Benefits
Gained
This thesis has so far explained, criticised, and suggested solutions to the
way Rawls and Dworkin’s theories justify restricting wealth inheritance in
a liberal democracy. In this Chapter I consolidate these criticisms and
solutions into a comparison of whether Rawls or Dworkin’s theory is bet-
ter suited to the task of justifying restrictions on wealth inheritance. I do
this by assessing the costs and benefits of the modifications and defences
of Rawls and Dworkin I have argued for in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. I weigh
the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the solutions according
to three metrics. First, I judge how the modifications solve incoheren-
cies or maintain a coherent normative theory. Second, I judge whether the
modifications are justifiable to the liberal, opportunity and luck intuitions.
Third, I judge how the modifications help Rawls and Dworkin justify their
theories equally to all three intuitions. I believe this comparative analysis
will show that Dworkin’s theory is better suited to the task of justify-
ing restrictions on wealth inheritance in a liberal democracy than Rawls’s
theory.
Some of the terms used above require explanation. To judge how a
modification solves an incoherency is to judge whether a solution to a
INCURRED COSTS AND BENEFITS GAINED
particular problem maintains the coherency of the theory or is incoherent
with the normative claims or the initial motivations of the theory. For a
modification to be incoherent with a theory’s normative claims means that
the way it solves a problem is inconsistent with another normative claim
that the theory is committed to. For example, a solution that requires
adopting a new principle may be beneficial in solving the problem but
also inconsistent with the rest of the theory. But what does it mean for
a solution to be incoherent with the initial motivations of a theory in the
context of this thesis? I shall take it to mean two things.
First, it can mean that a modification to Rawls or Dworkin’s theory
emphasises one of the dimensions of wealth inheritance over the other. For
example, a modified principle might force the theory to focus on the syn-
chronic relation and ignore the diachronic relation of wealth inheritance.
As I detailed in Chapter 1, for both candidate theories to completely anal-
yse the implications of restricting wealth inheritance they should analyse
both the synchronic and diachronic relations of wealth inheritance.
Second, it can mean that the modification to Rawls or Dworkin’s theory
is incoherent with the general motivations of proposing a broadly justifi-
able theory in a liberal democracy. This means that a modification could
violate liberal democratic intuitions about impartiality and proportionate
treatment. For example, a theory that adopts a principle that treats in-
heritors as inherently inferior to bequeathers would be incoherent with the
motivation to treat all individuals impartially as equal citizens. As I de-
tailed in the Introduction these motivations are important because they
represent our concern for justifying the restriction of wealth inheritance in
a liberal democracy and not a benevolent dictatorship, or a society organ-
ised according to Pareto efficiency. These motivations situate the domain
of this thesis in the kinds of societies that interest Rawls and Dworkin.
This thesis will not decide the validity of these motivations but only
assume that these motivations are important and must be coherent with a
successful theory. Given the intrinsic importance of coherency, a solution
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that makes a theory incoherent will have a significant cost. This cost will
either rule out the modification or make the modification an option of last
resort.
Let us now turn our attention to the second metric. To say that the
modifications are justifiable to the relevant intuitions is to say that the
solutions help Rawls and Dworkin to answer the normative concerns of
the three intuitions. By this I mean that the solutions either strengthen
or weaken how justifiable a theory is to a particular intuition by either
answering or ignoring the associated concerns of the intuitions in question.
For example let us consider the Distinction Problem. The problem states
that Rawls’s theory treats wealth inheritance similar to natural talents
but different to social class, and that this is contrary to the normative
concerns of the luck intuition. The solution I suggest proposes the existing
principles of Rawls’s theory are sufficient to solve the worry if they consider
wealth inheritance as both a cause and an effect of social class. This
solution attempts to answer the normative concerns of the luck intuition by
incorporating the inherent luck of inheriting wealth into Rawls’s conception
of social class. With all other things being equal, I would consider this
solution as a benefit for Rawls’s theory. This is because the solution allows
Rawls to answers the normative concerns of the luck intuition with greater
strength.
Finally let us consider the third metric. To say that a modification helps
Rawls or Dworkin justify restricting wealth inheritance equally or broadly
to all three intuitions, is to say Rawls and Dworkin give the normative
concerns of all three intuitions equal weight when answering them. For
example, a solution might involve prioritising the normative concerns of
one intuition vastly more than the other two intuitions. In such a case the
theory would be less broadly justifiable and I would judge the solution as
a cost. If a solution helps a theory give roughly equal weight to our three
intuitions this will be judged as a benefit. This is because the solution
helps the theory to impartially justify restricting wealth inheritance as the
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citizen of a liberal democratic society expects.
I do not suggest that Rawls and Dworkin should give equal weight to
all three intuitions with mathematical precision. Rather I suggest that a
theory that proposes principles of justice that could possibly be accepted
by all reasonable citizens of a liberal democracy should give roughly equal
consideration to all the relevant intuitions. As I argued in the Introduction
I use “possible reasonable acceptance” as a minimal definition of justifiabil-
ity because I do not believe my argument entails committing to a position
in the debate about what counts as democratic justification. Possible ac-
ceptance by individuals who participate in a decision making process that
treats all individuals as equal participants captures an important thought.
The thought that those who hold the liberal intuition can possibly accept
principles that order society in such a way that answers their normative
concerns as well as the normative concerns of those who hold the oppor-
tunity and luck intuition.
We can make an important distinction between a solution that is justifi-
able to the relevant intuitions and one that is equally or broadly justifiable.
We can imagine a modification that forces a theory to ignore all three intu-
itions would still be equally justifiable to all three intuitions simply because
it includes none of them. In such a case the theory would satisfy the third
metric but not the second. Conversely a theory may attempt to be jus-
tifiable to all three intuitions but prioritise one intuition vastly above the
others. In such a case the theory would satisfy the second metric but not
the third.
One other idea that must be explained before I begin the comparative
analysis is the concept of democracy used in this thesis. As I stated in
the Introduction, I do not take any definite position on what the true ac-
count of democracy and democratic justification is. I do not believe the
conclusion that Dworkin’s theory better justifies restricting wealth inher-
itance in a liberal democracy commits me to a certain view on the true
democratic theory. Yet, one of the metrics which I use in this chapter is
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about justifying Rawls or Dworkin’s theories equally to the liberal, oppor-
tunity and luck intuition which are held by individuals who live in a liberal
democracy. To that end, some account of democracy must be assumed to
make sense of the kind of justifiability I discuss in the following compara-
tive analysis. In this thesis I understand democracy as a form of collective
decision making that is legitimate because of the fairness of the decision
making procedure.1 This understanding frames this comparative analysis
in the context of comparing how Rawls and Dworkin can prescribe restrict-
ing wealth inheritance in a way that is impartial to the relevant intuitive
judgements. We care about the justifiability of Rawls and Dworkin’s the-
ories because we accept a link, even if it is tenuous, between democracy as
fair procedures and the legitimising of normative principles by justifying
them to others in a democracy.
One impact of this understanding of democracy to the following com-
parative analysis is that I will be holding the intuitions as fixed as possible.
This means that if a modification to Rawls or Dworkin’s theory does not
answer the normative concerns of one of the intuitions, I will first look to
revising the modifications rather than the intuition. I will be giving more
weight to the theoretical cost of a modification not answering the norma-
tive intuitions than for the normative intuitions to be easily answerable.
This is because the intuitions are pre-theoretic judgements that individuals
hold about the justice of wealth inheritance that theories of justice should
cater to.
I now take the three metrics and the idea of democracy I have explained
above, and apply them to a comparative analysis in two stages. First I
1As I explained in the Introduction I endorse a decision making process that acknowl-
edges democratic pluralism and attempts to be acceptable to all who participate. This
is the same kind of democratic pluralism that Joshua Cohen (2003), Thomas Christiano
(2003) and David Estlund (2003) endorse. This means that the outcomes of the pro-
cess should be justifiable to the normative intuitions that individuals hold because the
process is acceptable to all. In this way the process is impartial towards the normative
intuitions of those who participate.
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examine the costs and benefits of the proposed solutions. In the last stage I
compare the costs and benefits and suggest that Dworkin’s theory is better
at justifying restrictions on wealth inheritance in a liberal democracy than
Rawls’s theory.
5.1 Costs and Benefits for Dworkin
In this section I analyse the costs and benefits in two categories. First I
shall consider the costs and benefits of solutions that resist problems and
objections without modifying Dworkin’s theory. Second I will consider the
costs and benefits of solutions that require Dworkin’s theory be modified or
enriched by additional theses. The categories are divided in the following
way:
Solutions without Modifications for Dworkin:
1. Cohen’s argument that because Dworkin makes an inconsistent
distinction between unchosen preferences and circumstances,
the best way to justify any restrictions on wealth inheritance
is to equalise all access to advantage. I argued that Cohen’s
theory can be resisted by the Subsumption Defence and Actu-
ality Defence of Dworkin’s theory.2
Solutions with Modifications for Dworkin:
2Let us briefly outline these solutions in the light of the current chapter. The Sub-
sumption Defence was the argument that Dworkin’s theory could avoid the costs of
endorsing an incoherent distinction by subsuming Cohen’s analysis into the analysis of
equalising resources to cater to the concerns of the opportunity and luck intuition. In
doing this, Dworkin need not commit himself to any further principles but merely show
how Cohen’s arguments about Dworkin’s incoherent distinctions were not problematic
but a misguided way of interpreting cases of unequal resources. On the other hand the
Actuality Defence worked by answering any lingering doubts by arguing that Dworkin’s
theory was more preferable than Cohen’s theory. This was because Dworkin treats indi-
viduals as they actually conceive of their preferences whereas Cohen treats individuals
as he believe they should hypothetically conceive their preferences.
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1. In response to the Harshness Objection3, I suggested that Indi-
viduals should be considered responsible for a particular state of
affairs, if it was caused by individual choice and if the relevant
social institutions attempted to educate and prevent individu-
als from making negligent mistakes. In addition I suggested (a)
Some level of mandatory insurance may be permissible in rare
cases to ensure that human beings are insured against brute
luck and (b) Individuals making mistakes sometimes is a form
of brute luck, because human beings are not perfectly rational
or aware of their decision making process.
2. In response to the Wrong Focus Objection4, I suggested that
‘Responsibility’ should be understood as a reciprocal relation
between individuals and social institutions. I argued this means
that (a) Social institutions hold individuals responsible for their
choices through the analysis of brute and option luck, and in-
surance schemes and (b) Individuals hold social institutions re-
sponsible for the way they treat other individuals.
I begin with the solutions without modifications because they require the
least amount of additional theoretical commitments and so inevitably have
a higher chance of success.
3As I argued in Chapter 3, the Harshness Problem is the objection that Dworkin’s
theory tries to restrict wealth inheritance in ways that violate an individual’s liberal
democratic expectations for proportionate treatment. I argued this was a form of mo-
tivational coherency because the problem shows Dworkin’s theory could not justify
restricting wealth inheritance in a way that treats individuals proportionate to their
circumstances and choices. In short mistakes, no matter how trivial, were treated too
harshly.
4To remind ourselves briefly let us rehearse the Wrong Focus Objection. I argued
in Chapter 3 that some theorists objected to Dworkin’s theory on the grounds that
his theory does not coherently justify restrictions on wealth inheritance to the luck
and opportunity intuition because he does not coherently realise the normative ideal
of equality. Specifically the objectors argue that Dowerin’s ignores social relations and
hence cannot capture the ideal of equality within a purely distributive theory of justice.
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5.1.1 Equal Access to Advantage
I believe there are few, if any, costs and significant benefits to my solution
for Gerald Cohen’s challenge against Dworkin’s theory. This is because
my solution to Cohen’s challenge uses the normative tools already within
Dworkin’s theory. But let us briefly remind ourselves of Cohen’s argu-
ments. Cohen (2011: 19–20) first argues that Dworkin’s theory makes
an unjustified distinction between unchosen preferences and unchosen cir-
cumstances. It is unjustified because it is a distinction that is inconsistent
with the way Dworkin answers and prioritises the normative concerns of
the luck intuition. As Cohen (2011: 27) says:
A person in possession of his faculties always chooses (within
the constraints he faces) what career to pursue, but he does not
always choose what career to prefer, and the latter fact may
reasonably restrict his responsibility for choosing to pursue an
expensive one.
The consequence of Cohen’s argument is that Dworkin’s restriction of
wealth inheritance ignores the brute luck of individuals having expensive
unchosen preferences and therefore the inequality of opportunity for wel-
fare. If Cohen’s challenge is successful, then it seems Dworkin’s theory
does not answer the normative concerns of the opportunity and luck intu-
ition. This is because it permits inequalities of opportunity for welfare and
holding individuals responsible for unchosen aspects of their lives. This in
itself is a significant cost because it shows Dworkin’s theory is unjustifiable
to those who hold the opportunity and luck intuition.
However, Cohen (2011: 14) suggests that to solve the problem, we
should heavily modify Dworkin’s theory to equalise “access to advantage”
and not merely resources. The purpose of Cohen’s theory is to imple-
ment Dworkin’s insurance schemes, without making a distinction between
unchosen preferences and unchosen circumstances. To that end, Cohen’s
theory shows a different way to answer the normative concerns of the op-
162
INCURRED COSTS AND BENEFITS GAINED
portunity and luck intuitions. In the example I used in Chapter 3, Cohen’s
theory entails that we should limit the restrictions on wealth inheritance
for millionaires if they are born with preferences that are expensive to fulfil.
Cohen believes that only his theory correctly holds individuals responsible
for their choices without making individuals bear the costs of their uncho-
sen preferences or unchosen opportunity for welfare. Cohen achieves this
by categorising inequalities of opportunity for welfare and the affects of
brute luck as unequal accesses to advantage. If Cohen’s argument holds
then it seems we have good reason to adopt, at least in part, Cohen’s
alternate theory. This would be a significant departure from Dworkin’s
original theory because it would involve changing what Dworkin chooses
to equalise and the way it should be equalised. Changing Dworkin’s theory
to that extent would no longer result in a legitimate comparison between
Rawls and Dworkin because Dworkin’s theory would no longer follow his
initial motivations.
To avoid these costs I respond to Cohen’s arguments with the Sub-
sumption and Actuality Defence. The defences suggest that Dworkin’s
theory can overcome Cohen’s first argument and show his alternate theory
need not be adopted. This is achieved by translating Cohen’s example
into the language of Dworkin’s theory and by analysing how actual indi-
viduals conceive of their unchosen preferences instead of how Cohen be-
lieves they should conceive of them. In the Subsumption Defence I argue
that Cohen’s examples of the disadvantage of unchosen preferences can be
translated into examples of individuals having unequal resources to choose
to act on their unchosen preferences. When translating Cohen’s examples,
Dworkin’s theory need not worry that individuals might not choose to have
unchosen preferences, but only worry about whether they choose to pursue
their chosen or unchosen preferences. However as I argued in Chapter 3,
Cohen (2011: 31–32) may still argue that even the Subsumption Defence
does not justify Dworkin treating preferences and circumstances differently
even though both are unchosen. It seems Cohen is reasonable to argue that
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Dworkin’s theory is not just about mitigating the role of wealth in deter-
mining resources distributions but about holding individuals responsible
for their choices.
As a final response I suggested the Actuality Defence. This defence
proposes that either individuals do not conceive their unchosen prefer-
ences as disadvantages because they are an integral part of their identity
and intentions, or that individuals have a high degree of control to re-
order and change their preferences. The response works by proposing that
Dworkin’s theory is more preferable to Cohen’s theory because it under-
stands how individuals actually conceive and control their preferences, in-
stead of how Cohen believes individuals should conceive and control their
preferences. Since we are concerned with the intuitions individuals hold in
liberal democracies I take it that a theory that understands individuals as
they actually behave is more preferable to a theory that assumes how indi-
viduals should hypothetically behave. It is preferable because focusing on
how individual actually behave does not require any independent justifica-
tion for asserting that individuals should conceive their preferences as im-
movable and unchangeable. To that end Dworkin’s different treatment of
unchosen preferences and unchosen circumstances like wealth inheritance,
is justified. This is because actual individuals conceive and control their
unchosen preferences very differently from their unchosen circumstances.
I believe the comparative costs and benefits of my response to Cohen’s
challenge are clear. Both the Subsumption and Actuality Defences are
benefits because they allow Dworkin to answer the normative concerns
of the opportunity and luck intuition without a commitment to inconsis-
tent distinctions. The defences allow Dworkin to avoid the charge that
his theory uses incoherent distinctions to justify restricting wealth inher-
itance to the opportunity and luck intuition. The Subsumption Defence
is a benefit because it allows Dworkin’s theory to satisfy individuals who
prioritise the opportunity and luck intuition by subsuming Cohen’s analy-
sis into Dworkin’s theory. It allows Dworkin to translate Cohen’s worrying
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counter examples about unchosen preferences or inequalities of opportu-
nity for welfare into cases where individuals lack the resources to act on
their preferences.
The Actuality Defence is also a benefit because it points out that even
if worries about unchosen preferences and circumstances persist Dworkin’s
theory can justify treating unchosen preferences differently to unchosen
circumstances. This is because Dworkin’s theory understands individuals
as they actually think and behave as opposed to how Cohen argues they
ideally should think and behave. This means that Dworkin can answer the
normative concerns of those who hold the opportunity and luck intuition by
stating that holding individuals responsible for their expensive preferences
but not their inherited wealth is justified. It is justified because actual
individuals consider their unchosen preferences to be an integral part of
their intentions and identity. Moreover individuals have a high degree of
control in reordering their preferences to change and shape their intentions.
Both defences also have few, if any, costs. This is primarily because
both defences reuse the normative tools that Dworkin employs in his the-
ory. The Subsumption Defence tries to incorporate Cohen’s examples into
Dworkin’s analysis without any extra commitments. Similarly the Actu-
ality Defence attempts to highlight something about what Dworkin and
Cohen are both focused on, namely how actual individuals would behave
in liberal democracies. Given the scope of this thesis it seems entirely
appropriate that a theory that better captures how individuals actually
understand their preferences in liberal democracies is more preferable than
a theory that prescribes how individuals should ideally understand their
preferences.
5.1.2 Harshness Problem
Let us now deal with the Harshness Problem. The problem charges that
Dworkin’s theory is motivationally incoherent when justifying restricting
wealth inheritance in a liberal democracy. The problem specifically ques-
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tions the coherency of treating individuals who inherit wealth harshly with
the democratic expectation to be treated proportionate to one’s circum-
stances.
Elizabeth Anderson (1999: 288, 296–298), Marc Fleurbaey (1995: 41–
43), Jonathan Wolff (1998: 113–118; 2010: 343–346) and Samuel Scheﬄer
(2003: 21) present examples where they allege Dworkin’s theory either
stigmatises the unlucky or violates an individual’s personal dignity. The
allegation is that for Dworkin to justify restricting wealth inheritance to
those who hold the luck intuition, he is committed to two intuitively un-
acceptable consequences. First that a just society should only compensate
individuals for brute luck and not option luck no matter how harsh the
consequences. Second, that those who suffer brute luck and option luck
should accept invasive investigation into their life to determine whether
they are responsible for their mistakes.
Anderson and Fleurbaey’s examples entail that when Dworkin advo-
cates the restriction of wealth inheritance either by taxation, or complete
abolition, this can leave bequeathers and inheritors to potentially suffer
from their mistakes when their inherited wealth would have helped. Wolff
and Scheﬄer’s examples entail that for Dworkin to adequately implement
restrictions on wealth inheritance, the state must invasively investigate an
individual’s mistakes and choices to determine whether they are responsi-
ble for their inherited wealth. In both types of cases the central problem
is that Dworkin’s theory seems to violate the expectation of proportionate
treatment that individuals hold in a liberal democracy. Individuals believe
that all choices do not have the same moral status and so should be treated
differently. It seems Dworkin’s theory cannot fulfil its aim of justifying re-
strictions on wealth inheritance to those who hold the luck intuition if it
violates their democratic expectations.
In response I suggest that we should modify Dworkin’s theory to adopt
the following theses (which I summarised at the start of this section):
1. Individuals making mistakes sometimes is a form of brute luck, be-
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cause human beings are not perfectly rational or aware of their de-
cision making process.
2. Individuals are only responsible for a particular state of affairs, if all
the relevant social institutions have done well to educate and prevent
individuals from making negligent mistakes.
3. Some level of mandatory insurance may be permissible in rare cases
to ensure that human beings are insured against brute luck.
The first and second theses aim to narrow the scope of Dworkin’s theory
to minimise the instances where it would be applied. This minimises the
cost of adopting a theory that seems to be intuitively too harsh in bringing
about a just state of affairs. The theses entail that individuals would not
be held responsible for any advantage or disadvantage if the relevant social
institutions sufficiently educate and help prevent negligence. This means
a just society should restrict wealth inheritance only when institutions like
the tax system and legal system had done enough to educate individuals
against depending on their inheritances or bequeathers. This means in-
stitutions educating individuals about brute luck and the consequences of
individual responsibility.
The first, second and third thesis also reduce the instances and provide
greater justification for the state to investigate an individual’s mistakes
and how responsible they are for their state of affairs. While Dworkin’s
theory requires some level of invasive judgement, it need not be as prolific
and widespread as Dworkin’s original theory seems to entail. The benefit
of the solution is that Dworkin’s theory can respond to Anderson, Fleur-
baey, Wolff and Scheﬄer’s examples by limiting when restricting wealth
inheritance is permissible. This solution is preferable to biting the bul-
let because to bite the bullet would suggest that Dworkin’s theory is not
justifiable to individuals who live and carry expectations of proportionate
treatment in a liberal democracy. Given this is one of the metrics of my
comparative analysis, it would be a significant cost.
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Nevertheless the solution does have a cost, namely that the third the-
sis weakens the conception of individual responsibility in Dworkin’s theory.
This is costly because one strong motivation for Dworkin’s theory is to ac-
commodate a conception of individual responsibility with an egalitarian
theory of justice. To concede that we need some level of mandatory insur-
ance scheme for some activities is to raise the threshold for holding indi-
viduals responsible for their choices. Individual responsibility is weakened
because by adopting the solution I suggest Dworkin’s theory treats individ-
uals as beings that inevitably make mistakes. We should tally this small
cost against avoiding the larger cost of justifying restrictions on wealth
inheritance to the luck intuition by violating the democratic expectation
of proportionate treatment. The small cost of weakening Dworkin’s theory
seems preferable to the larger cost because it still allows Dworkin’s theory
to justify its principles to those who hold the liberal, opportunity and luck
intuition without violating their democratic expectations. This satisfies
the first metric of our comparative analysis. If Dworkin’s theory did not
satisfy the first metric because of a costly modification it would already be
ruled out.
5.1.3 Wrong Focus Objection
Let us remain on the topic of individual responsibility by turning to the
Wrong Focus Objection. The Wrong Focus Objection, if successful would
be costly for Dworkin’s theory because it would show Dworkin’s theory
as internally incoherent. According to the objection it is incoherent for
Dworkin’s theory to be motivated to correctly express the normative ideal
of equality and also justify restrictions on wealth inheritance by focus-
ing on the mitigation of luck. Wolff (1998: 104), Anderson (1999: 311)
and Scheﬄer (2005: 24), propose that the aim of equalising resources in
Dworkin’s theory is incoherent with the motivations for an egalitarian the-
ory of distributive justice. What is the motivation for an egalitarian theory
of justice? Anderson, Scheﬄer and Wolff propose that it is the motivation
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to formalise the normative ideal of equality and to use this ideal to express
what a just distribution of resources is. The objectors argue that this ideal
is about treating individuals as equals and therefore about social relations.
Not as Dworkin originally claims about individual responsibility or equal-
ising resources. To that end, the objectors conclude that Dworkin’s theory
focuses on the wrong thing when trying to justify restrictions on wealth
inheritance.
The cost of the Wrong Focus Objection is that it shows Dworkin’s
normative principles are incoherent with the normative ideal of equality.
This is a significant cost because Dworkin believes using his principles to
equalise resources by mitigating the effects of brute luck is the best way
to realise the normative ideal of equality. The Wrong Focus Objection
concludes that Dworkin’s use of the normative ideal of equality to answer
the normative concerns of those who prioritise the opportunity and luck
intuition is incoherent. This is because he mistakes what the normative
ideal of equality entails by disregarding social relations.
I respond to the Wrong Focus Objection by proposing that Dworkin’s
theory should be modified to adopt the following theses (which I sum-
marised at the start of this section):
1. Individuals are only responsible for a particular state of affairs, if all
the relevant social institutions have done well to educate and prevent
individuals from making negligent mistakes. (Proposed in response
to the Harshness Problem)
2. Responsibility is a reciprocal relation between individuals and social
institutions.
(a) Social institutions hold individuals responsible for their choices
through the analysis of brute and option luck and insurance
schemes.
(b) Individuals hold social institutions responsible for the way they
treat other individuals.
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The first thesis above plays much the same role as it did in my response to
the Harshness Problem. It narrows the scope of Dworkin’s theory and so
reduces the instances where restrictions on wealth inheritance would need
to be justified. Although this weakens Dworkin’s theory it also narrows the
gamut of cases where the Wrong Focus Objection can be raised. The sec-
ond thesis counters the Wrong Focus Objection by adopting a reciprocal
interpretation of responsibility in Dworkin’s theory. This interpretation
also entails a more complete institutional interpretation of Dworkin’s the-
ory than was already adopted in response to the Harshness Problem. The
second thesis proposes that responsibility is a reciprocal relation between
individuals and social institutions. This means that we should include so-
cial relations between individuals in Dworkin’s theory because social rela-
tions, like an individual’s wealth should reflect the choices that individuals
make. Social institutions hold individuals responsible for the choices they
make, and individuals hold social institutions responsible for the way they
treat individuals. This reciprocal relationship means that Dworkin’s the-
ory can be both an egalitarian theory about distributive justice and still
focus on treating individuals as political equals.
Let us look at an example that shows how the second thesis is supposed
to work and how it solves the supposed incoherency between Dworkin’s
principles and the normative ideal of equality. Let us suppose a society S
that is generally understood as a liberal democratic state by its members.
S contains two groups, W and P. W is a group defined by a common
cultural history that values education and wealth inheritance. Most if not
all members of W value the education of their children, the accumulation
of wealth and the bequeathing of that wealth within descendants of their
family. On the other hand P is a group defined by a common cultural
history that values farm labour and as a consequence an indifference to
the accumulation and inheritance of wealth.
How would Dworkin’s theory operate in S once we modify it to include
the second thesis? I believe Dworkin’s theory would judge that wealth
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inheritance should be restricted. This is because the members of W and
P do not choose to be born into either W and P and so their inheritances
do not reflect their choices. The second thesis allows Dworkin’s theory to
focus on equalising social relations and resources. The thesis makes the
members of S, whether as members of W or P, equally responsible for their
genuine choices and for the way social institutions treat the members of
W and P. This means that if the members of P have less opportunity to
participate in the political process than the members of W through no
choice of their own, then all the members of W and P are responsible for
the way the social institutions of S make W and P socially equal. One
reason the members of P might have fewer opportunity to participate in
the political process could be that they do not inherit enough property to
influence the elections in S. Therefore restricting wealth inheritance in S
would be justifiable to the opportunity and luck intuition. This is because
Dworkin’s theory attempts to equalise resources so that individuals can
have the same opportunities to participate as social equals in a democracy.
I believe this would satisfy Dworkin’s objectors because giving individuals
an equal opportunity to participate as social equals in a democracy is an
important aspect of equalising social relations. By adopting the second
thesis, Dworkin can incorporate the normative ideal of equality that his
objectors hold into a coherent theory that uses the distinction between
choice and luck to equalise resources and social relations.
One benefit of my response for Dworkin’s theory is that it allows
Dworkin to include what Anderson, Scheﬄer, Wolff think is the correct
analysis of the normative ideal of equality into his analysis of egalitarian
justice. In doing this Dworkin need not concede any ground to his objec-
tors or give any independent reason why his theory chooses to ignore social
relations. Rather he can employ theses 2(a) and 2(b) from my response to
give an account of how individuals can be responsible for social relations
and resources. This means that Dworkin’s principles about the transfor-
mation of brute luck into option luck can apply consistently to resources
171
INCURRED COSTS AND BENEFITS GAINED
and social relations. This would avoid a significant cost for Dworkin’s
theory and allow it to satisfy the first metric of our comparative analysis.
One cost of my response could be that the extra theses weaken
Dworkin’s theory and change his theory too much. After all, my response
requires Dworkin to slightly change his conception of individual respon-
sibility so that it is a reciprocal relation between individuals instead of a
singular relation of responsibility from individuals to their social institu-
tions. Although I believe this is a minor cost, it should be tallied against
avoiding the larger cost of an incoherent theory. Nevertheless my response
will be considered to have a minor cost because it requires Dworkin to
modify a central part of his theory to solve the Wrong Focus Objection.
5.2 Costs and Benefits for Rawls
Let us now turn to Rawls’s theory. In this section I analyse the comparative
costs and benefits of my modifications to Rawls’s theory. The analysis
follows from solutions that require fewer modifications to solutions that
require more modifications and are most costly for Rawls’s theory. The
solutions are ordered in the following way:
1. In response to Cohen’s Distilled Arguments against the coherency of
the fair equality of opportunity principle and the difference principle,
I suggest modifying the difference principle so unequal opportunities
caused by wealth inheritance are contingently permissible but not
necessary to benefit the least advantage.
2. In response to the Distinction Problem, I suggest a constitutive ele-
ment of belonging to a social class is to have bequeathed or inherited
property.
3. In response to the Structural Injustice Problem, wealth inheritance
should be considered a special social contingency that requires special
deliberation to restrict.
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Unlike my solutions to Dworkin’s theory, my solutions in this section do
not divide into categories of solutions that modify the candidate theory and
those that do not. Nevertheless I examine the solutions in the order of least
costly to most costly. To that end I begin with my response to Cohen’s
Distilled Argument that if unequal opportunities are necessary to benefit
the least advantaged, then the principle of fair equality of opportunity and
the difference principle are motivationally incoherent.
5.2.1 The Distilled Argument: Equality of Opportu-
nity to the Difference Principle
In Chapter 2, I presented Gerald Cohen’s Distilled Argument that attacked
the motivational coherency of the principles Rawls uses to justify restrict-
ing wealth inheritance. The argument entails that Rawls’s attempt at
using the difference principle to answer the associated concerns of the luck
intuition is incoherent with the motivation to equalise opportunities in the
market place by restricting wealth inheritance. It seems that the aim to
satisfy those who hold the opportunity intuition undermines the aim to
justify holding individuals responsible for an unequal distribution of op-
portunities. I suggest that to avoid those theoretically costly incoherencies
Rawls’s theory should be modified so that an inequality of opportunity is
understood as continently permissible and not necessary. This means that
inequalities of opportunity caused by wealth would be permissible only
when it helps to advantage the worst off. Before we assess the compar-
ative advantage of this solution for Rawls’s theory let us briefly remind
ourselves about how the Distilled Argument and my solution to it works.
Cohen’s (2011: 246) argument is in response to what he sees as Rawls’s
(2001: 64, 76–77) suggestion that inequalities in opportunities caused by
wealth inheritance are necessary inequalities. Cohen begins by questioning
how Rawls can justify his principle of fair equality of opportunity and the
difference principle when they have conflicting aims. Individuals who hold
the opportunity and luck intuition are expected to endorse a principle
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that aims to equalise opportunities for social and economic positions by
restricting wealth inheritance and endorse a principle that permits unequal
opportunities because of inherited wealth.
Rawls (2001: 55, 64) responds that the difference principle balances the
normative concerns of those who hold the opportunity and luck intuition
with those who hold the liberal intuition. The difference principle justifies
some level of wealth inheritance and hence unequal opportunities to allow
all individuals to access the equal basic liberties for accumulating capital
and bequeathing it to better the lives of their descendants. The difference
principle has an inherent egalitarian purpose to regulate the principle of fair
equality of opportunity so it satisfies the first principle of justice. Cohen
then questions why individuals who hold the opportunity and luck intuition
would endorse the difference principle and its purpose to justify inequalities
of opportunities? This question essentially asks why Rawls’s theory would
be comparatively better than Dworkin’s when it proposes principles that
have conflicting aims.
Rawls (2001: 64, 76–77) argues that the contradictory aims of his prin-
ciples are resolved when we consider what a liberal democratic society
needs to permit to guarantee a regime of equal basic liberties to satisfy the
fair equality of opportunity. Rawls argues that inequalities in opportunity
caused by differences in talent and good fortune, like wealth inheritance,
must be permitted because there must be enough incentives for individuals
to be productive. This entails that a just society should permit some indi-
viduals to have more opportunities than others because wealth inheritance
is a necessary incentive for individuals to be productive at the level needed
for the least advantaged to benefit.
In turn, Cohen argues that if unequal opportunities are permitted be-
cause they are incentives for individuals to be productive, then the differ-
ence principle undermines the motivation for the principle of fair equality
of opportunity. This is because Cohen (2011: 246) believes the differ-
ence principle permits individuals not to truly endorse and implement the
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principle of fair equality of opportunity. Rather it permits individuals to
exploit their natural talents and inheritances to the extent that it still
benefits the worst off more than if they could not exploit their natural
talents and inheritances. But the principle of fair equality of opportunity
is proposed precisely to limit the way natural talent is amplified by social
contingencies like wealth inheritance to create unequal opportunities. The
principles are intended to restrict wealth inheritance as a contingency that
individuals can exploit.
Cohen’s conclusion suggests that Rawls’s theory suffers from a major
cost compared to Dworkin’s theory. The principles Rawls uses appear to be
motivationally incoherent because they aim to do two things. First they
aim to satisfy individuals who hold the opportunity and luck intuition
by equalising opportunities and not holding individuals responsible for
their unchosen social class. Second they aim to permit inequalities in
opportunities caused by wealth inheritance as an incentive for productivity.
In response to Cohen’s arguments I argued in Chapter 2 that Rawls’s
theory can be modified without cost. This is achieved by considering
wealth inheritance as a contingently permissible incentive for productivity
to benefit the least advantaged and not a necessary incentive. This means
that the alleged motivational incoherency of Rawls’s principles is resolved
by asking those who hold the opportunity and luck intuition to endorse
a difference principle that permits the effects of wealth inheritance as a
productivity incentive in a limited capacity.
The response works by changing the difference principle from a broad
definition to a narrow one. The broad difference principle defines social
class, good fortune and natural talent as necessary inequalities. The nar-
row difference principle defines social class, good fortune and natural talent
as contingently permissible inequalities. They are contingent on whether
permitting them helps the least advantaged to compete with equal oppor-
tunities with the better off. This means that the opportunity and luck
intuition can be satisfied by permitting wealth inheritance only to the ex-
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tent that the restrictions on it help individuals with fewer opportunities
to increase their opportunities by developing their talents and skills. The
restrictions would include taxing those in higher social classes to fund oth-
ers to move into the higher class. In sum, wealth inheritance is permissible
insofar as the incentive to bequeath wealth allows Rawls’s theory to redis-
tribute resources to equalise opportunities and mitigate lucky events. The
intention in this is to restrict wealthy inheritance so that the incentive to
bequeath wealth is eventually not required for a productive society.
The benefit of my solution is that it allows Rawls to justify some in-
equalities of opportunity through wealth inheritance while still trying to
equalise opportunities. This allows Rawls to avoid Cohen’s charge of mo-
tivationally incoherent principles. Wealth inheritance is permitted so long
as it allows the society to slowly eradicate inequality of opportunities and
ensure that all individuals have access to a scheme of equal basic liberties.
According to my solution, Rawls’s theory need not weaken or reject the
difference principle but change the principle slightly to ensure that permit-
ting inequalities is contingent on whether it helps equalise opportunities.
Wealth inheritance and other incentives for production can play a role in
giving all individuals equal chance to attain social and economic positions
given that there is always an inevitable inequality in natural talent. The
solution I propose allows Rawls to maintain a coherent set of principles
that restrict wealth inheritance without any conflicting aims and goals.
This means Rawls’s theory can still claim to be a broadly justifiable the-
ory and hence a more advantageous theory for a liberal democratic society
to follow than Dworkin’s theory.
Nonetheless my modification to the difference principle does have a
minor cost. The cost is that it departs slightly from Rawls’s original for-
mulation of the difference principle. But I do not believe my solution
breaks or changes Rawls’s theory too much. My solution aims at limiting
the alleged overreach of the difference principle by limiting when it permits
inequalities of opportunity. It does not change the focus of the principle
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or its scope of application. In sum the benefit of my solution outweighs
the cost of weakening the difference principle. It allows Rawls’s theory to
justify restricting wealth inheritance to the opportunity and luck intuition
without using motivationally incoherent principles.
5.2.2 Distinction Problem
In this section let us turn to the costs and benefits of my solution to the
Distinction Problem. The Distinction Problem is more problematic than
Cohen’s Distilled Argument because it attacks the general distinction that
Rawls appears to make between wealth inheritance and social class. In the
last section I suggested that we should modify Rawls’s difference principle
so that unequal opportunities like social class and wealth inheritance are
only contingently permissible if they help neutralise inequalities of oppor-
tunities or ensure all individuals can access their equal basic liberties. But
this does not help Rawls (1971: 277–278) justify the distinction between
social class and wealth inheritance.
As I argued in Chapter 2, Rawls’s theory appears to make an unjustified
distinction between wealth inheritance and social class with respect to
equalising opportunities. I believe Rawls makes this distinction because
he understands wealth inheritance as a phenomenon external to social
class. What does this mean? It means that Rawls (2001: 53, 160–161)
sees wealth inheritance as a form of income equivalent to a high paying
job that should be taxed to benefit the least advantaged. He does not see
it, at least not originally, as a social contingency like an individual’s social
class of origin. As Rawls (1971: 277–278; 1999: 245–246) says:
The unequal inheritance of wealth is no more inherently unjust
than the unequal inheritance of intelligence. It is true that the
former is presumably more easily subject to social control; but
the essential thing is that as far as possible inequalities founded
on either should satisfy the difference principle.
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The Distinction Problem questions how Rawls justifies his general distinc-
tion between the luck of inherited wealth and the luck of being born into
a particular social class. As I argued in response to Cohen’s Distilled
Argument earlier, we should modify the difference principle to separate
the contingent permissibility of wealth inheritance and the necessity of in-
equality in natural talents. In the Distinction Problem I argue that Rawls
cannot justify separating social class and wealth inheritance if he wants
to coherently justify restrictions on wealth inheritance to the opportunity
and luck intuition. This is because the way Rawls answers the normative
concerns of the opportunity intuition are incoherent with the way he an-
swers the normative concerns of the luck intuition. Rawls argues (1971:
277–278; 1999: 245–246) that restrictions on wealth inheritance are nec-
essary because it is not unjust for individuals to exploit the luck of being
born to wealthy parents in the same way they might exploit their natu-
ral talents. Nevertheless a just society should restrict the exploitation of
inherited wealth and natural talent so it is compatible with the difference
principle. This is unlike the attitude towards social class. But in answer-
ing the normative concerns of the opportunity intuition, Rawls (2001: 44)
argues that individuals should have an equal chance of attaining social
and economic positions “regardless” of their social class of origin. This
requires a just society to introduce measures that make the effect of so-
cial class irrelevant. Despite this Rawls’s theory does not have the same
attitude towards wealth inheritance. Even though there is no describable
difference between the luck of being born into a particular social class and
the luck of being born to parents that can bequeath property.
In response to this I suggested in Chapter 4, that Rawls’s theory should
modify its understanding of social class. This modified understanding
solves the Distinction Problem by making wealth inheritance an inter-
nal constitutive element of a social class. This understanding still allows
Rawls’s theory to consider how wealth inheritance can be used to create
social classes. The only addition is that my understanding accepts that
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wealth inheritance is an effect perpetuated by social class and a cause that
stratifies individuals into social classes. Wealth inheritance is treated as
a synchronic relation between contemporaries that reflects differences in
social class and not only as something that is caused by social class. The
consequence of treating wealth inheritance this way is an acceptance that
wealth inheritance unjustifiably makes it easier for individuals to utilise
their talents and improve their motivation to increase their life prospects.
This solution strengthens the justifiability of Rawls’s theory to the luck in-
tuition because it combines its target for equalising opportunities with its
target for mitigating the role of luck. By understanding wealth inheritance
as a phenomenon that is an effect of social class and a cause of social class,
Rawls’s theory can answer the normative concerns of the opportunity in-
tuition and luck intuition at the same time. On this view a just society
should restrict wealth inheritance so it, like an individual’s social class of
origin, should over time play no role in stratifying and perpetuating class
differences.
The primary benefit of my solution is that it allows Rawls to coherently
justify restricting wealth inheritance to the opportunity and luck intuition
by resolving the different treatment of equally arbitrary social contingen-
cies. Without the solution Rawls’s theory would be ignoring the norma-
tive concerns of the luck intuition because it would be treating wealth
inheritance, like genetic inheritances, as an inevitable fact about families
and personal relationships. My response helps Rawls’s theory shift from
treating wealth inheritance as a contingently permissible form of income
inequality, to treating it as a social contingency that perpetuates class dif-
ferences. This shift allows Rawls to justify restricting wealth inheritance
more harshly than his theory might originally suggest. This helps Rawls
answer the normative concerns of the luck and opportunity intuition with
equal weight. Rawls can restrict wealth inheritance to equalise opportuni-
ties and to mitigate the role of luck with equal severity.
One of the costs of my solution is that it calls for changes to one of
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the central concepts in Rawls’s theory. Social class of origin, is a concept
that Rawls uses repeatedly to describe the stratification of society in to
groups of differently advantaged individuals. Unlike my response to Co-
hen’s Distilled Argument where I advocated a slight weakening of Rawls’s
interpretation of the difference principle, this changes the meaning of what
it means for individuals to belong to a certain social class. However, we
should tally this cost as a minor one against avoiding the much larger
cost of maintaining an unjustified distinction between the luck of wealth
inheritance and social class. My solution allows Rawls to restrict wealth
inheritance for the purpose of eradicating class difference, instead of toler-
ating wealth inheritance as a permissible inequality required for the benefit
of the least advantaged. By changing his understanding of social class to
include the phenomena of wealth inheritance, Rawls can restrict it so it
plays little to no role in perpetuating class differences. This coherently an-
swers the concerns of those who hold the luck intuition by treating wealth
inheritance and social class the same way, with an unjustified distinction.
This does not mean that Rawls’s theory will eradicate all class differences.
Rawls’s theory will still permit some individuals to have more opportu-
nities if they have a greater natural talent or if they have cultivated new
talents.
5.2.3 Structural Injustice Problem
Now let us consider what I believe is the most costly problem for Rawls’s
theory: The Structural Injustice Problem. I argued that the problem shows
Rawls’s theory cannot justify restricting wealth inheritance to individuals
who hold the luck intuition. This problem alleges that Rawls permits a so-
ciety to hold individuals responsible for disadvantages caused by unchosen
social behaviours. To hold individuals responsible for the way their choices
are limited by other individuals inheriting wealth runs directly contrary to
the associated concerns of the luck intuition.
The Structural Injustice Problem is the most costly problem for Rawls
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because on the second metric of the comparative analysis, Rawls does not
justify his theory to all three of our normative intuitions. I believe Rawls’s
theory can claim to justify restricting wealth inheritance to the liberal
intuition, through the first principle of justice and the opportunity intu-
ition, through the second principle of justice. But the Structural Injustice
Problem shows that Rawls’s theory either ignores or, at best, only weakly
answers the normative concerns of the luck intuition. As a result, Rawls’s
theory suffers a comparative disadvantage over Dworkin’s theory because
Rawls’s restriction of wealth inheritance cannot claim to be impartial to-
wards and acceptable by those individuals who hold the luck intuition.
In short, the Structural Injustice Problem alleges that Rawls’s theory
gives no good reason why an individual who finds themselves in the lowest
social class should accept the principles he offers. This is because Young ar-
gues the principles permit wealth inheritance to reinforce the social values
of capital accumulation and bequeathing over the social values of short-
term saving and expenditure. The conclusion of Young’s argument seems
to be that those who hold the luck intuition cannot accept principles that
allow wealth inheritance to fluctuate utility, housing and commodity mar-
kets which disadvantages individuals without their choice. According to
Young (2011: 70) this is because the subject of Rawls’s theory - society’s
institutions - is too narrow to restrict wealth inheritance in a way that is
justifiable to the luck intuition. I outlined the comparative cost of this, but
let us briefly illustrate it here using the examples I used in Chapters 2 and
4. I used a comparison between Young’s example of Sandy and my own
example of Sandra (2011: xiii, 43). Sandy is a female breadwinner who
is forced to choose between unaffordable housing or homelessness because
she is priced out of the housing market.
Sandy does not have the choice to get higher pay for her labour because
her society values male breadwinners and capital accumulation as opposed
to capital consumption. In turn, Sandy has a limited set of choices about
the location and quality of housing for herself and her children. Sandy
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as a female breadwinner is not wronged by one person, but suffers from
a structure of social rules that limit her choices. Sandra on the other
hand has the same talent and motivation as Sandy but was able to use her
inheritance, despite its taxation, to buy a house and live more comfortably
than Sandy. In fact buyers like Sandra price Sandy out of the housing
market. The example shows, not that Sandra’s inheriting in particular
was responsible for Sandy’s limited choices but that economic institutions
like housing and rental markets limit Sandy’s choices. This is because
Sandra’s purchase raises the price of a house and increases demand in the
rental market. As Young (2011: 95) says:
A lack of availability of decent affordable housing for large num-
bers of people, for example, occurs as a normal aspect of most
housing markets. The dynamics of these markets is affected
by investment incentives, developers’ imaginations, expertise,
and financial capacity, cultural assumptions concerning housing
preferences, and local planning policies, among other factors.
The salient aspects of Sandy’s life for a market within a liberal democratic
society are that she is not a male breadwinner, nor is she interested in
saving capital. Rather she is interested in affordable rental accommoda-
tion close to education and healthcare facilities. It seems the way wealth
inheritance limits Sandy’s choices in the housing market is exactly the
kind of disadvantage that those who hold the luck intuition are concerned
about. Yet, according to the Structural Injustice Problem Rawls’s restric-
tion of wealth inheritance is consistent with permitting wealth inheritance
to limit the choices open to some individuals if it benefits the least ad-
vantaged.This means Rawls permits the structure of a just society to limit
the choices open to an individual by valuing certain social behaviours, like
wealth inheritance, above other social behaviours. This is directly contrary
to the normative judgement of the luck intuition which is that wealth in-
heritance, no matter how valued should have as little a role as possible
in determining an individual’s life. In sum, it seems Rawls’s theory can,
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under certain conditions, ignore the normative concerns of those who hold
the luck intuition. As it stands this is a clear disadvantage for Rawls’s
theory.
In response I suggested that Rawls’s theory should consider wealth
inheritance a special social contingency that requires special deliberation to
restrict. This deliberation would include investigating and calculating how
wealth inheritance affects different social institutions and then how these
institutions affect the range of choices individuals have. This inherently
means that Rawls’s principles should be applied in a more fine-grained
way than Rawls original intends. This might mean prescribing that social
institutions should influence and change what individuals value in order
to give all individuals the most complete range of choices possible. This
requires a more prescriptive approach to social institutions than originally
intended by Rawls. Rawls (1999: 242–244) believes procedural fairness
will mean that social institutions will not seek to actively change social
values but keep them in a reflective equilibrium with the demands of the
first and second principle of justice. My solution suggests that a just
society should deliberate about wealth inheritance as a social contingency
that contributes to limiting the choices individuals have despite wealth
inheritance being to the advantage of the worst off. We can imagine that
Sandy would be materially worse off if Sandra’s wealth inheritance was
restricted more harshly. Nevertheless, those who hold the luck intuition
will judge it to be unjustified that Sandy’s choice should be limited by the
way her society’s institutions behave. This is because if Sandy’s choices
are limited and she is not compensated for this limitation she is effectively
being held responsible for her poor choice of housing or her homelessness.
A significant cost for my response, which I mentioned in Chapter 4, is
that it is entirely ad-hoc. To deliberate restricting wealth inheritance as
a special contingency is incoherent with the aim of proposing a theory of
justice that is accepted by consensus through an impartial procedure. My
solution requires Rawls’s theory to be partial towards restricting wealth
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inheritance more than other social behaviours. My response departs from
Rawls’s commitment to a procedural justice process without any prin-
cipled justification but solely to solve the Structural Injustice Problem.
There appears no reason why society should not deliberate about other
specific social behaviours like valuing athletic talent or physical fitness
even though we think it is acceptable to hold individuals responsible for
these behaviours.
For example let us take the case of physical fitness. A society that
values physical fitness would probably organise labour and wages in such
a way that favoured those talented and motivated to achieve a high level
of physical fitness. In such a society an individual could find themselves
continually struggling to compete in a labour market despite having the
same opportunities to find employment as those who are similarly talented
and motivated. Why is this? Because she might be part of a minority
of individuals with similar talent and motivation for activities other than
physical fitness. The choices open to her will not reflect her previous
choices but reflect the collective behaviour of other individuals who are
talented and motivated to be physically fit. This case mirrors the case of
Sandy and Sandra, and shows that the values that matter in the Structural
Injustice Problem need not be irrational discriminatory values or even
values that a liberal democracy would reject as illiberal. According to
my solution, for Rawls’s theory to justify restricting wealth inheritance to
the luck intuition entails that he should also restrict any social behaviour
that limits an individual’s choices when finding employment, housing or an
education. This task seems impossibly difficult and without any guiding
principle.
In short, it seems accepting my solution overcommits Rawls’s theory
to deliberate about other social behaviours that are unrelated to wealth
inheritance. My solution appears too ad-hoc in its pursuit to make Rawls’s
theory justifiable to the luck intuition. There seems no principled justifi-
cation to treat wealth inheritance as a special case that Rawls’s principles
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must necessarily consider, other than for the reason that this dissertation
is concerned with wealth inheritance. The target of Rawls’s two princi-
ples should be determined by the content of the principles or by some
other principle that determines the scope of the first and second princi-
ples. Since my response is neither, my solution seems too costly for the
potential benefit of solving the Structural Injustice Problem.
Where does this leave Rawls’s theory? It seems Rawls’s theory must
either choose to suffer the cost of restricting wealth inheritance in such a
way that ignores the normative concerns of the luck intuition, or deliberate
about every social behaviour in an unmotivated and unjustified way. How-
ever, I believe this might be overstating the cost of the Structural Injustice
Problem. Given the modifications I proposed in response to the Distinc-
tion Problem and Cohen’s Distilled Arguments it would be incorrect to
argue that Rawls’s theory explicitly ignores the normative concerns of the
luck intuition. Rawls’s theory does make some effort to satisfy concerns
about holding individuals responsible for the disadvantage of their social
class. Rawls’s principle of fair equality of opportunity and difference prin-
ciple do not abolish wealth inheritance, but they prescribe restricting it
to the extent that it does not play a role in determining an individual’s
life-prospects or future social class. As a result I believe a fair assessment
of the costs of the Structural Injustice Problem is that Rawls does not
completely ignore the associated concerns of the luck intuition. Rather it
shows Rawls’s theory seems to prioritise the concerns of the those who
hold the opportunity intuition slightly above those who prioritise the luck
intuition. This means that Rawls’s theory is comparatively more costly
than Dworkin’s theory on the third metric of our analysis, namely the
metric of equal justifiability.
On the third metric Rawls’s theory is not impartial enough to give the
normative concerns of those who hold the luck intuition the same moral
weight as the concerns of those who hold the liberal or opportunity in-
tuition. The Structural Injustice Problem highlights this imbalance and
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shows that Rawls’s definition of the basic structure permits wealth inher-
itance to sometimes play a role in limiting individual choices.
It is reasonable to conclude that Rawls’s theory is primarily concerned
with the way wealth inheritance creates unequal opportunities by strati-
fying individuals into social classes. These are the concerns of the liberal
and opportunity intuition. It is only then subsequently concerned with
how wealth inheritance can contribute to social behaviours that limit an
individual’s choices in life – this is the concern of the luck intuition. There-
fore Rawls seems to prioritise the concerns of the opportunity and liberal
intuition above the luck intuition.
5.3 The Final Tally
In the previous sections we have examined the advantages and disadvan-
tages of each solution I presented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. In this section I
shall now conclude my comparative analysis by suggesting that Dworkin’s
theory fares better than Rawls’s in terms of the metrics outlined earlier.
To explain this conclusion let us look at the metrics of the analysis one at
a time.
First let us consider the internal coherency of Rawls and Dworkin’s
theories. I believe it is safe to conclude that both Rawls and Dworkin
are internally coherent with respect to justifying restrictions on wealth
inheritance in a liberal democracy. In Rawls’s case, only Cohen’s Dis-
tilled Arguments raised the objection that the principle of fair equality of
opportunity and the difference principle were motivationally incoherent. I
believe my response to Cohen’s Distilled Arguments resolves this supposed
incoherency with little cost. I proposed that inequalities of opportunities
caused by wealth inheritance should be considered as contingently permis-
sible rather than necessary for the benefit of the worst off.
In Dworkin’s case, Cohen’s theory of Equal Access to Advantage, the
Harshness Problem and the Wrong Focus Objection raise the objection
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of incoherency of justifying restrictions on wealth inheritance to the luck
intuition. Despite this, I believe I have shown how these problems can be
resolved. My defence of Dworkin’s theory against Cohen’s theory is that
Dworkin can translate Cohen’s examples into the language of Dworkin’s
theory. The solution allows Dworkin to emphasise that Cohen’s theory
relies on a conception of how hypothetical individuals should think as op-
posed to how they actually think. I argued that Dworkin’s theory was more
preferable because it conceives preferences in the way individuals actually
conceive them. However, Dworkin can resist the charge that his theory is
incoherent because it makes an inconsistent distinction, by employing the
normative tools already at his disposal. This means that my solution is
not a theoretical cost that prescribes additional commitments or radical
changes to Dworkin’s original theory.
On the other hand, my solution to the Harshness Problem does carry
some costs since it requires additional normative theses. The solution
commits Dworkin to change the subject of his principles and weaken his
conception of individual responsibility. But I believe both these costs are
unavoidable and minor when weighed against the potential incoherency
between Dworkin’s principles and the liberal democratic expectation to be
treated proportionate to one’s costly choices. Similarly, my response to
the Wrong Focus Objection was a clear benefit with a minor cost. It was
beneficial because it resolves the worry that the way Dworkin answers the
normative concerns of those who hold the luck intuition was misguided and
focused solely on resource distribution instead of social relations. My solu-
tion suggested that Dworkin should change the subject of his principle to
include social institutions, and change his understanding of responsibility
to “reciprocal responsibility” between institutions and individuals. These
changes allow him to restrict wealth inheritance so that individuals are not
held responsible when they do not choose to have unequal social relations
and unequal distributions of resources. Like my response to the Harshness
Problem, this solution has a minor cost in that it commits Dworkin to ad-
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ditional theses and to modify one of his central concepts. Again I believe
this cost is affordable for Dworkin because of the benefits it gives. My so-
lution does not depart too far from Dworkin’s original aims. My suggested
changes keep Dworkin’s basic analysis of holding individuals responsible
for choices and option luck events but not holding them responsible for
brute luck events. Wealth inheritance is still restricted in order to sat-
isfy the intuitive concern for only holding individuals responsible for the
choices they make. With respect to internal coherency, I believe Rawls
and Dworkin are on an even footing because both manage to overcome the
allegations of incoherency but with slight modifications to their original
principles.
On the metric of justifiability, or in other words the ability to answer
the normative concerns of the luck, opportunity and liberal intuition, I
believe Dworkin’s theory is comparatively more advantageous than Rawls’s
theory. This is primarily because of the costs and benefits of my solutions
to the Distinction Problem and Structural Injustice Problem for Rawls’s
theory. My response to the Distinction Problem has both a clear benefit
and minimal cost. The Distinction Problem questioned the way Rawls
treated wealth inheritance differently to social class. It alleged that Rawls’s
theory ignored the normative concerns of those who judge inheriting wealth
and being born into a particular social class as the same kind of lucky
event. My response was that Rawls should change his understanding of
social class to include wealth inheritance as both an effect of being born
into a particular social class and also as an act that stratifies society into
classes. With my response Rawls can satisfy individuals who hold the luck
intuition by restricting wealth inheritance to the extent that it plays little
to no role in perpetuating social class differences. This means that Rawls
can justify restricting wealth inheritance to all three of our intuitions. He
can justify his restrictions to the liberal and opportunity intuitions with his
first and second principles of justice, while slightly changing his concept of
social class so that the second principle can also satisfy the luck intuition.
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The one minor cost of my solution is that it requires departing from
Rawls’s original concept of social class. Once again, like my response to
the Harshness Problem and Wrong Focus Objection this cost is affordable
because it does not involve changing too much of Rawls’s theory in contrary
to his original motivations. Changing the concept of social class does not
jettison any of Rawls’s earlier commitments but just adds one more. I
believe the advantages of my solution out weight the costs. Primarily
because my solution mitigates and does not excuse the role of inherited
wealth in determining an individual’s social class. This is a greater benefit
for Rawls’s aim to justify restricting wealth inheritance to the opportunity
and luck intuition than the cost of departing from Rawls’s original theory.
However the cost for Rawls is most significant when we consider the
Structural Injustice Problem. The Problem, as argued by Young (2011)
questions the extent to which Rawls’s theory can satisfy individuals who
hold the luck intuition. Young raises examples where Rawls’s theory holds
an individual responsible for their choices when the choices open to them
have been limited by social values and collective patterns of behaviour like
wealth inheritance. This runs directly contrary to the normative judge-
ments of those who hold the luck intuition. However, as I analysed earlier
in this chapter, my solution to this problem merely trades one cost for
another. My solution involves singling out wealth inheritance as a social
behaviour that values capital accumulation and bequeathing above renting
and spending capital. A society that endorses Rawls’s theory should then
investigate the effects of wealth inheritance on limiting the choices open
to individuals.
However, this response is too ad-hoc and without independent justi-
fication. Moreover the response entails that an entire host of intuitively
acceptable collective behaviours should also be investigated. It seems that
Rawls’s theory is left between two unacceptable options. Either Rawls
should concede his theory holds individuals responsible for choices they
did not make, or it should investigate a multitude of social values and col-
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lective behaviours to determine which specific behaviours limit the choices
open to individuals. In the wake of these options I concluded that the
first option, although a significant disadvantage, is less severe than it first
appears. I argued that it would be incorrect to assert that Rawls’s theory
as a whole cannot justify its restrictions on wealth inheritance to the luck
intuition. Rather we can conclude that it seems to unjustifiably prioritise
the normative concerns of the luck intuition below the liberal and opportu-
nity intuitions. To that end, in my judgement Rawls’s theory falls slightly
behind Dworkin’s theory.
However this only shifts the comparative disadvantages of Rawls’s the-
ory to the third metric of our comparison: broad justifiability. By “broad
justifiability” I mean how well Rawls and Dworkin justify restricting wealth
inheritance by giving equal weight to the normative concerns of each intu-
ition. The most significant point of difference between Rawls and Dworkin
on this metric is that Rawls has no adequate answer to the Structural
Injustice Problem. It seems Rawls can only concede that his theory does
permit, on certain occasions, for individuals to be held responsible for
choices they did not make. It seems Rawls can only answer the Structural
Injustice Problem with either ad-hoc restrictions of wealth inheritance or
an ever increasing list of collective behaviours which should be restricted
for the sake of consistency. On this view I believe the large cost of priori-
tising the normative concerns of those who hold the luck intuition below
the liberal and opportunity intuition outweighs the accumulative benefits
of modifying some concepts and principles.
On the other hand Dworkin balances the importance given to the lib-
eral intuition by allowing free markets, and extensive property rights so
bequeathers can efficiently accumulate and dispose of their wealth. He
then answers the associated concerns of the opportunity and luck intu-
ition by analysing unequal opportunities as an effect of unequal resource
distributions. Dworkin is acutely concerned with the way resources are
distributed unequally by lucky events like wealth inheritance. This is dif-
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ferent to Rawls who in order to make use of inherited wealth as an incentive
for productive activity permits it to influence what individuals value and
how they behave in a liberal democratic society. This means that unlike
Dworkin, Rawls cannot give the normative concerns of the luck intuition
the same priority as the opportunity intuition, because lucky events play
a role in helping Rawls equalise opportunities and satisfy the opportunity
intuition.
But where does this place Rawls and Dworkin’s theories in an over
all comparison? As I see it, the above comparative analysis suggests that
Rawls’s theory falls behind Dworkin’s when we take into account all three
metrics.
The simple reason why I believe Rawls’s theory falls slightly behind
Dworkin’s is because of the accumulative costs of the Structural Injustice
Problem and my responses to the Distinction Problem and Cohen’s Dis-
tilled Arguments. The costs show two things. First, that Rawls’s theory
requires changes to some concepts and must adopt new principles to remain
coherent. These modifications allow Rawls to treat wealth inheritance as a
contingently permissible inequality that is a constitutive element of social
class. Both changes allow Rawls to propose internally coherent principles
and a theory that is coherent with the initial aim of proposing a theory
that operates in a democratic society. However the costs of the Structural
Injustice Problem also show that Rawls’s theory cannot give the norma-
tive concerns of the those who hold the luck intuition the same priority
as the concerns of those who hold the liberal and opportunity intuition.
This is because Rawls’s theory uses lucky events like wealth inheritance
as a mechanism to equalise resources and allow all individuals access to
a scheme of equal basic liberties. In short, it is because Rawls priori-
tises the luck intuition below the opportunity and liberal intuition that he
can justify restricting wealth inheritance in such a way that satisfies the
opportunity and liberal intuitions.
On the other hand Dworkin’s theory is only costly because of the ac-
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cumulated costs of modifying concepts and adopting principles to solve
the Harshness Problem and Wrong Focus Objection. These costs, al-
though somewhat worrying, are outweighed by their benefits. They allow
Dworkin’s theory to apply, just as Rawls’s theory does, to society’s in-
stitutions and hence quell any worries about internal coherency. In sum,
Dworkin’s theory does better on the second and third metrics of our com-
parative analysis. In other words, Dworkin’s theory is more beneficial and
less costly when answering the normative concerns of each intuition and
answering them with equal weight than Rawls’s theory.
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